
Nikol Pashinyan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (foto Armenian gov.)
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended last month’s World Economic Forum in Davos. So too did Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev but there have so far not been any reports that the two met. Instead, during his visit, Pashinyan made headlines in another area: the relations with Turkiye
On 24 January, Pashinyan met representatives of the Swiss-Armenian community in Zurich. During that meeting, Pashinyan again introduced his concept of “historical” versus “real” Armenia. The latter, his preference, came into being after Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan and among other things differentiates between ethnic Armenians born abroad and actual citizens.
Many also consider this to be transitioning from the post-independence third republic to a fourth that coincidentally absolves him from criticism for events leading up to the war that Armenia lost to Azerbaijan in 2020.
Pashinyan also went further by remarking that the number of ethnic Armenians active within their communities amount to just 10 percent of the total living abroad. The remark comes as Pashinyan continues to construct a new diaspora away from the influence of those institutions that have been in place for decades and which now oppose Yerevan’s policy to normalise relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye.
Though not the largest such institution, many particularly suspect this means the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), believed inseparable from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation–Dashnaktsutyun (ARF–D), a political party both the republic and the diaspora. They are also critical of Pashinyan in general. Under the administrations of former president Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, Dashnaktsutyun was a minor coalition partner. Today, most of the 28 deputies in Kocharyan’s opposition Hayastan parliamentary bloc come from the party.
The bad blood between Pashinyan and Dashnaktsutyun as well as with Kocharyan dates back to the late 1990s. Central to this mutual contempt includes disagreement over policy on the 1915 massacres and deportation of as many as 1.5 million ethnic Armenians in the then Ottoman Empire. For Pashinyan, and his supporters would argue for the country too, neighbourly relations between Ankara and Yerevan are vital if Armenia is to move forwards.
In Zurich, and on a visit to the United States last week, Pashinyan made that clear in no uncertain terms. It was necessary to “revisit the history of the Armenian Genocide, what it was, and why it happened, and how we perceive it”, he said. He also implied that the international campaign for genocide recognition was a product of Soviet policy during the Cold War given that its target was NATO member Turkiye. His critics charge that such words were part of his pivot to the West.
Other criticism was swift. Some accused of Pashinyan of “genocide denial,” a charge he flatly denies. Regardless, his comments were hardly new. In April last year, a prominent parliamentary deputy with Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party had made similar comments, including clarifying how many ethnic Armenians were actually killed. Numbers vary from 600,000 through 1.5 million to 2 million.
“Armenians, as a rule, present themselves as victims, the international community is used to perceiving Armenians as a victimised nation, and sometimes it is quite confusing. What is the cause and what is the consequence?,” Pashinyan said in Zurich. “We are trying to change that […].”
And in last year’s annual address to mark the occasion of the anniversary of the events of 1915, Pashinyan used the term “Meds Yeghern,” or “Great Catastrophe”, more often than “Genocide”, again incurring the wrath of his opponents. During his term in office, when then President Barak Obama used the Armenian term, the response was similar, but coming from Pashinyan was doubly worse.
A sitting U.S. president has only used the word genocide in a commemorative address only under Joe Biden in his 24 April 2021 message.
But as Armenia almost desperately seeks to move westwards, it is already clear that an open border with Turkiye is vital, especially if Armenia seeks to expand its relationship with the European Union. The last time Yerevan attempted to normalise relations, in 2009, Ankara insisted on forming a joint historical committee to assess the events of 1915. It also expected a breakthrough in talks between Yerevan and Baku to resolve their decades long conflict.
The same is true today.
Last year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had already urged Pashinyan to change Yerevan's official narrative and warned that the “doors of opportunity” do not remain open forever. At the same time, though previous leaders have met with their Turkish counterparts in the past, they have accelerated under Pashinyan. At the first European Political Summit held in Prague in October 2022, Pashinyan and Erdoğan met face to face.
In June 2023, Pashinyan attended Erdoğan’s re-inauguration ceremony in Ankara, the first time an Armenian leader had visited in over a decade. And in September last year, Pashinyan again met Erdoğan at a Turkish government building in New York on the sidelines of a United Nations General Assembly meeting. The Turkish President gifted Pashinyan a copy of his book, “A fairer world is possible.”
Moreover, with Pashinyan appearing to have pinned his chance of re-election on moving closer to the European Union, that open border with Turkiye is vital in order to diversify away from Moscow. In 2023, speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, then EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Toivo Klaar, admitted as such. Turkiye was best placed take leading role in the South Caucasus, he said.
In 2023, Pashinyan had already signalled that he understand the need to change the use of historical symbols such as Mount Ararat (Agrı) in neighbouring Turkiye. Removing a controversial preamble to the country’s constitution in 2026 or 2027 would also mean the absence of what are perceived by Ankara and Baku to be territorial claims on both Turkiye and Azerbaijan.
It is unclear how the population will react to this new reality, but the results of an opinion poll last month indicated that although Pashinyan’s electoral rating now stands at just 11 percent, the opposition also lacks sufficient support. However, the main priorities for the electorate are peace and security as well as European integration. Pashinyan’s visit to the United States last week appeared to be to convince the Trump administration to support Pashinyan in these areas.
As the 2026 parliamentary elections approach, expect them to take centre stage.