Entering the Serbian digital prison: an interview with Jelena Sesar

A series of reports by Amnesty International exposes Serbia’s "Digital Prison", a widespread surveillance campaign targeting journalists and civil society. In this interview Jelena Sesar, researcher at AI, takes us inside this prison

Amid ongoing anti-government protests that have gripped the country since November 2024, Amnesty International run a series of investigations that uncovered how Serbian police and intelligence authorities have used advanced, domestically developed, phone spyware, NoviSpy, and mobile phone digital forensic products, such as Cellebrite, to unlawfully surveil journalists, environmental activists and student protesters.

A first report, A Digital Prison , was launched in December 2024. In February 2025, AI documented further evidence of Cellebrite targeting of student protesters, and in March it found evidence  that two senior independent journalists from BIRN were targeted by NSO Group’s highly invasive Pegasus spyware. All these findings highlight the continued threat of digital surveillance for civil society in Serbia but also the lack of adequate response from the authorities to put an end to unlawful surveillance.

What was the impact on the victims of spyware? How did they react when they learned that their phones were infected by spyware? 

The spyware and digital surveillance have a profound impact on victims. Today, our entire lives are on our phones and the realization that someone has had access to our private information, photos, messages and search history is highly unsettling. Many victims compare it to a home intrusion – a situation where their most sacred and private space is violated leaving them exposed, vulnerable and alone.

For some victims, the knowledge that the authorities may have accessed highly private or intimate data, or the information that they did not share with others, was horrifying. They live in constant fear that the authorities could at any time use this information to expose, compromise or blackmail them, or destroy their career e their family life.

Of course, the journalists who were targeted – especially those investigating corruption and organized crime and their links with the government - are also concerned about the safety of their sources. Not being able to rely on communication over phone or messaging apps is a big problem; they have to meet their sources in public places and in person now, which is not always safe or practical. The risk of surveillance also discourages potential sources from engaging with journalists and generally can have a chilling effect on communication and ultimately undermine access to information.

Digital surveillance is a highly effective tactic of intimidation and fear, aimed at silencing critical voices. It creates a general environment of self-censorship, where some opt to avoid controversial topics or change the way they work and engage professionally. It is important to emphasize that surveillance affects not only the people targeted, but everyone in their broader network of contacts, putting their families, friends and others with whom they communicated at risk.

For many victims in Serbia, digital surveillance, while a traumatic experience, appears to have strengthen their determination to engage in activism, continue writing on issues of public interest, and stand for the values that they believe are a cornerstone of a free and democratic society. 

What are the legal possibilities for the victims, including NGOs, and for those who suspect they are being monitored?

In theory, people who suspect they are being subjected to unlawful surveillance in Serbia can refer their case to one of the oversight bodies, such as Ombudsman’s Office (Protector of Citizens) or Data Protection Commissioner, but also to parliamentary committees that oversee security structures.

In practice, unfortunately, victims have extremely limited access to truth and justice in cases of digital surveillance. Such cases are notoriously difficult to prove, it is difficult to find evidence of surveillance, but also because security services in Serbia have been completely unaccountable and unwilling to cooperate with independent bodies on such investigations.

Finally, the Ombudsman’s Office and Data Protection Commissioner are often reluctant to investigate cases of digital surveillance and avoid what could be perceived as a confrontation with police and the intelligence agency. As we noted in our report, the degree of state-capture and the lack of judicial independence in Serbia greatly undermine the path to accountability. Fortunately, in the cases that Amnesty International uncovered between December and March, there is clear and undeniable evidence that the authorities used digital forensic tools, such as Cellebrite, to forcibly unlock phones of activists and journalists in order to install on some of them spyware to monitor their online activity. We published all the evidence in our reports and our technical analysis has been included in criminal charges against police and intelligence services that were filed by a coalition of NGOs in December.

In February, the Serbian prosecutor for high technological crimes officially registered a criminal case and, as far as we understand, the Ombudsman’s Office and Data Protection Commissioner have also opened their own investigations.

It is important to stress that our technical findings have been confirmed by both Google, whose Android security system has been compromised in this surveillance campaign, as well as Cellebrite company, which – after their own investigation in February – decided to suspend  the use of their products by some customers in Serbia.

Given the strength of the evidence, we expect that the investigations by judicial authorities and independent bodies in Serbia will help identify those responsable of unlawful surveillance and ensure that the victims have access to justice and compensation.

Equally important, we hope that greater awareness of the risks of digital surveillance will lead to a genuine reform of Serbia’s legal and oversight framework, which does not adequately regulate the use of exceptional measures, such as digital surveillance, nor does it provide solid guarantees against abuse. 

The Cellebrite software was purchased by donors, who appear to have trusted that the Serbian officials would use the software for a legitimate purpose. What were their obligations in this regard? And what about the obligations of software companies?

It should be noted that Cellebrite digital forensic tools are legitimate and are used by law-enforcement authorities around the world in the context of criminal investigations. Our research showed that the Serbian authorities misused this highly invasive technology for political purposes - to target students, peaceful protesters and investigative journalists in the context of ongoing protests.

The Norwegian government, which donated Cellebrite to Serbia, and United Nations’ Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which managed the procurement of the equipment, did not conduct adequate due diligence to assess and mitigate potential human rights risks of this technology.

In effect, they had handed out this highly intrusive technology to a government with a questionable human rights record without a risk assessment and without ensuring that robust safeguards are in place to prevent potential abuse. The Norwegian government has been since very forthcoming, and we understand that they are reassessing all their aid-related due diligence procedures globally as is UNOPS.

This is a very positive outcome. While Cellebrite eventually did the right thing, investigating our allegations in Serbia and cutting off some customers in the country, they too had failed initially to conduct a risk assessment to ensure that their product would not be used in a way that could cause harm.

Everyone in this so-called value chain, from the donor to the tech companies developing these potentially highly invasive products, should have had in place a proactive human right due diligence processes to identify, prevent and account for any human rights risks of their products and services.

Since the publication of your report, other similar cases have emerged, also in Italy. Would Amnesty expand its assistance to other NGOs and individuals affected by similar issues? 

The cases of Paragon’s spyware being used against journalists and human rights defenders in Italy are particularly shocking. Amnesty International’s Security Lab has been supporting several activists in Italy who fear they have been targeted. Unfortunately, spyware scandals have shown just how broad the category of people are who should be concerned about spyware. We have seen victims targeted because of their activism on a broad range of issues, and even cases where family members have been targeted.

Amnesty is currently focusing its support to individuals with the strongest reasons to fear they could have been targeted. Those most at risk are NGOs working this issue and in countries where we have seen recent spyware abuses, for example in Italy and in Serbia; those who have had their phones seized and held by authorities and those who have received a notification from WhatsApp, Google or Apple that they may have been targeted. Anyone who believes they may fit these criteria should contact Amnesty International’s Security Lab . 

Do you also map companies and agencies in Europe and elsewhere that sell these software and provide similar assistance, like Intellexa and NSO Group? 

Amnesty conducts constant monitoring of the infrastructure used to deliver spyware attacks of a range of spyware companies, including Intellexa and NSO Group. We have also been actively tracking the exports of cybersurveillance technologies, both from and to Europe. For example, in the case of Intellexa, we’ve documented how their products have been found in at least 25 countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa and have been used to undermine human rights. The Intellexa case is interesting because the promote themselves as “EU-based and regulated”, but in practice, the EU has allowed such companies to operate without proper oversight and accountability. In fact, one of our key policy recommendations is for the European Commission to publish an annual public report on licences granted and denied for the cybersurveillance technologies. The lack of such public reporting has allowed the export and use of such technologies to evade public scrutiny. Meanwhile, Amnesty will continue to use commercial trade databases and other research methodologies to track the industry. 

What is the role of the EU institutions? Can they do something? 

Even the most robust legal framework in individual states can not provide sufficient protection against highly invasive spyware such as Pegasus and Predator, which is why a more decisive action is needed at the regional and global level, including by the EU. Amnesty has long advocated for completely ban on the development, transfer and use of highly invasive technology, and strict controls over the development, sale and transfer of digital surveillance technology.Sadly, as previous Amnesty research showed , the EU remains a safe haven for spyware companies.

As for Serbia, given its candidate status, the EU should use all their engagement with the country, as well as financial and technical assistance, to ensure that the authorities immediately stop the surveillance campaign against civil society, properly investigate the reported instances of unlawful targeted surveillance and put in place a meaningful and robust legal and oversight framework to prevent further abuse of digital tools for political purposes.