Although the Western Balkan countries have been waiting for over twenty years to fully join the European Union, the region’s gradual integration is emerging as a priority for the Brussels institutions.

But is it really enough to focus on replicating the economic benefits of EU membership as much as possible before accession to compensate for an enlargement that hasn’t arrived yet?

“If we know that reforms are difficult to implement in this context and that joining the EU takes decades, I think it’s natural to think about more advantages before accession. But at the same time, I think the risk is that we don’t go further,” explains Richard Grieveson, deputy director of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw), in this interview for OBCT.

However, favoring an approach that has immediate positive effects and concretely brings people closer to the idea of ​​the European Union – with financial transactions at the same price as member countries and the end of roaming charges – risks being limiting in the long run.

“I fully support this solution to the extent that it improves people’s standard of living, but the ultimate goal must remain EU membership,” Grieveson makes clear.

Why is full EU membership preferrable to gradual integration in economic terms?

No one has yet managed to replicate the benefits of membership outside the EU.

Whatever has been achieved in terms of gradual integration – with IPA funds or the Stabilization and Association Agreements – is still a long way off in terms of economic impact. EU membership is a real turning point.

We already have examples like Poland and Romania, which have experienced strong growth since accession, year after year, thanks to the significant budget inflows that have financed infrastructure development, participation in the Single Market, and the foreign investment they can attract.

Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia recently joined SEPA, the Single Euro Payments Area. What does this development mean for their European economic integration?

It’s quite a significant development.

SEPA will be one of the most important parts of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. We’ve seen that it can make a real difference, especially for countries that are already integrated with the EU not only economically but also financially, like the Western Balkans.

Financial flows are very significant in local economies, and SEPA has an impact in terms of reducing transaction costs and payment processing times.

We must be realistic about what can be achieved. It will certainly have positive financial and economic benefits and will be one of the most tangible ways people can see that integration is happening in practice, for example when they send remittances home.

However, it won’t be a real game-changer. Exclusion from the SEPA area wasn’t the reason the Western Balkan countries have a lower gross domestic product than all EU countries.

Albania and Montenegro are also expected to abolish roaming charges with the EU in 2026. What economic and social effects are expected from this measure?

Roaming will certainly be part of the process of regional integration and bringing people closer to the Union.

We must, however, be realistic about the economic benefits. It’s important to facilitate people’s mobility and communication, but ultimately the region needs more capital.

Growth rates in the region are performing better than most of the rest of Europe after the pandemic, but there’s still a long way to go.

The region has lost a lot in terms of European integration and, therefore, at this stage of the accession process, it needs more capital than countries that joined earlier. Without increasing demand, this can only go so far.

We return once again to the fundamental question: how can we attract more capital to the region? This is a task for both the public and private sectors.

So what concrete mechanisms could channel greater public and private investment into the region?

Facilitating the movement of capital is necessary, but not a sufficient condition for raising the level of economic development. From the EU’s perspective, there are probably at least two things that can be done.

First, recognize that the Western Balkans are part of the European integration process just like the rest of Europe – even if they are not formally part of the EU – and that they are subject to most of the same agglomeration effects we observe in the Union.

For example, countries like Germany strongly attract the region’s workers, as there is a strong concentration of industries with higher added value.

Brussels also recognizes this for Member States through Cohesion Policy, which channels a large amount of resources to countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.

However, the Western Balkans have not had access to the same type of compensation funds. In other words, they suffer the same pressures in terms of population loss – often highly skilled young people – but do not receive as much financial assistance and public capital as the less developed EU Member States.

Second, the EU could ensure the region’s full inclusion in all its industrial policy initiatives. The Western Balkans’ markets are relatively small, and the EU would not need to channel significant new investments to make a difference.