Cohesion policy, extremely delicate negotiations in Brussels
The European Commission’s proposal for the new National and Regional Partnership Plans envisaged in the 2028-2034 EU budget is dividing Parliament and Member States, amid fears of centralization and demands for greater guarantees for regions and agriculture. The debate has just begun and will be decisive for the future structure of European funds
Plenary session at the Europena Parliament – Photo EP
Plenary session at the Europena Parliament - Photo EP
The protests began immediately after the European Commission’s proposal for the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, confirming fears about the possible centralization of cohesion policy.
The events of the following months were a direct consequence of this, including threats from the European Parliament, letters from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attempting to calm tensions, and long shadows over what will ultimately become one of the fundamental pillars of the EU budget.
While negotiations are still in their early stages, the real crux of the matter is the next multiannual budget revolution, desired by President von der Leyen herself to model the management of cohesion policy on the post-COVID Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF): the National and Regional Partnership Plans.
The bone of contention
According to the Commission’s proposal, in the next budget period, cohesion policy funds will be grouped together with those of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), social policy, fisheries policy, and migration, border management, and internal security.
This basket is precisely that of the National and Regional Partnership Plans, which are expected to cover almost half of the EU budget’s resources, with their estimated €865 billion out of a total of €1.9 trillion.
In practice, each of the 27 member states will be assigned a Partnership Plan. Twenty-seven plans will replace the current approximately 540 programs for the individual merged policies, and their disbursement will be tied to the achievement of agreed-upon reform objectives. In other words, European funding will no longer be distributed based on expected and actual expenditure, but rather according to a “pay-for-reform” approach.
Another point that has created considerable friction in Brussels and the 27 member states concerns the distribution of funds. Historically, cohesion policy and agricultural policy have each absorbed a third of the EU budget, while for the 2028-2034 period, they will together account for less than 40% of total resources.
The increases in resources (compared to the current budget) must also be interpreted beyond the bare figures. It’s true that the €453 billion earmarked for cohesion make up an increase of €60 billion, but in practice, this could be a significant cut, considering that future funds could also be used to replace the regional part of the common agricultural policy and to support fishermen and tourism.
Brawl and détente in Parliament
It was in the European Parliament that the controversy erupted most vociferously after the proposal was presented.
Given the inconclusive discussions with the Commission upon returning from the summer recess, the leaders of the four political groups that make up the so-called “Ursula majority” – the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe, and the Greens/EFA – threatened on October 30 to block the entire proposal for the next EU budget.
In the letter sent directly to von der Leyen, the four political group presidents made it clear that Parliament “cannot accept” the Commission’s proposal on national and regional partnership plans “as a basis for starting negotiations.”
The seven demands against the “renationalization” of European policies included keeping the major European policies – cohesion, agriculture, fisheries, social policies – separate, each with its own budget and rules.
The role of regions and local authorities in designing and managing cohesion policy was also defended, as well as strengthening Parliament’s oversight powers in approving and amending Member States’ plans and directing the annual budget procedure.
In an attempt to defuse tensions, von der Leyen herself presented a series of concessions regarding the role of the regions and agricultural policy. Their consolidation into a single fund and the division of the budget into national plans were not, however, called into question.
The amendments to the initial proposal arrived in the form of a letter and aim to provide greater protection for the regions.
First and foremost, the introduction of “regional oversight to further ensure the full involvement” of regional authorities in the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of the Plans, which is accompanied by the “clear right” of regional authorities to engage directly with the Commission, while each Member State will manage “according to its own institutional and territorial structure” regarding the coordination of the Plans.
Furthermore, in addition to the mandatory minimum amount already envisaged for less developed regions – €218 billion – the Commission President stated that “specific safeguard measures can also be considered to ensure the continuity of investments in transition and more developed regions.”
Speaking at the Parliament plenary session on November 12, von der Leyen was keen to clarify that “cohesion governance remains unchanged with the full involvement of the regions” and that, despite the structural changes, the next EU budget provides for “regional control and specific guarantees to ensure the continuity of investments in transition regions.”
All the centrist majority groups have accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm the new adjustments, which do not substantially change the nature of the cohesion policy revolution.
What seemed like a showdown between the Commission and Parliament ultimately demonstrated that there is no risk of an institutional rift. The von der Leyen cabinet wanted to send a message of openness to compromise (with limited amendments), while none of the four parliamentary group leaders further discussed rejecting the Plans.
The start of work
Although the proposal for the new cohesion policy is still considered imperfect by Parliament, the negotiating basis remains the one presented by the Commission.
On December 11, members of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) began discussing the draft report on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, which will form the basis of Parliament’s negotiating mandate.
Co-rapporteurs Siegfried Mureşan (EPP) and Carla Tavares (S&D) are calling for a “significantly strengthened” budget, with cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy not being used as adjustment variables to finance new priorities, such as security, defense, and competitiveness.
The parliamentary calendar calls for amendments to be submitted by January 29, to be adopted in the BUDG Committee in early April and in plenary in May.
Regarding the other co-legislator, the Council of the European Union, the Cypriot Presidency inherited from the Danish Presidency—which ended on December 31—the first draft of the negotiating framework, as it emerged from meetings on the horizontal principles of the entire budget proposal.
This is an initial negotiating package that lists all the available policy options on the table, without going into detail about the specific funding envisaged, but which outlines the possible political directions.
The document was then discussed on December 18 during the latest summit of the heads of state and government of the 27 member states. “An agreement before the end of 2026 would allow for the adoption of legislative acts in 2027, which is necessary to ensure that EU funding reaches beneficiaries without interruption in January 2028,” the European Council conclusions read.
The next six months will be crucial for preparing the Council negotiations. As set out in writing in the program of the Cypriot rotating presidency, the goal is to develop a “mature” negotiating framework—that is, with “indicative figures” on the key elements of the next budget—by the end of June, on which the 27 EU countries will have to reach a formal agreement.
The Council’s unknown factor
The Council itself remains the most enigmatic institution in terms of how it could shift the balance of the final text of the next multiannual budget, particularly regarding the idea of a single fund merging the common agricultural policy and cohesion policy.
Von der Leyen’s letter quelling the internal revolt within Parliament appears to have had little impact on the MPs, who instead consider the Commission’s move “a first step, but not enough.”
This view is shared by 15 countries that, at varying degrees, do not support the proposal for the National and Regional Partnership Plans as presented: Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Germany.
In Germany, however, the issue of funding allocation and governance of the next budget risks exacerbating the relationship between the federal states and the central government, revealing the balance of power at play within individual member states in the debate over the future of European cohesion.
This publication has been produced within the EuSEE project, co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the granting authority and the European Union cannot be held responsible for them.
Tag: EU Cohesion | EuSEE
Cohesion policy, extremely delicate negotiations in Brussels
The European Commission’s proposal for the new National and Regional Partnership Plans envisaged in the 2028-2034 EU budget is dividing Parliament and Member States, amid fears of centralization and demands for greater guarantees for regions and agriculture. The debate has just begun and will be decisive for the future structure of European funds
Plenary session at the Europena Parliament – Photo EP
Plenary session at the Europena Parliament - Photo EP
The protests began immediately after the European Commission’s proposal for the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, confirming fears about the possible centralization of cohesion policy.
The events of the following months were a direct consequence of this, including threats from the European Parliament, letters from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attempting to calm tensions, and long shadows over what will ultimately become one of the fundamental pillars of the EU budget.
While negotiations are still in their early stages, the real crux of the matter is the next multiannual budget revolution, desired by President von der Leyen herself to model the management of cohesion policy on the post-COVID Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF): the National and Regional Partnership Plans.
The bone of contention
According to the Commission’s proposal, in the next budget period, cohesion policy funds will be grouped together with those of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), social policy, fisheries policy, and migration, border management, and internal security.
This basket is precisely that of the National and Regional Partnership Plans, which are expected to cover almost half of the EU budget’s resources, with their estimated €865 billion out of a total of €1.9 trillion.
In practice, each of the 27 member states will be assigned a Partnership Plan. Twenty-seven plans will replace the current approximately 540 programs for the individual merged policies, and their disbursement will be tied to the achievement of agreed-upon reform objectives. In other words, European funding will no longer be distributed based on expected and actual expenditure, but rather according to a “pay-for-reform” approach.
Another point that has created considerable friction in Brussels and the 27 member states concerns the distribution of funds. Historically, cohesion policy and agricultural policy have each absorbed a third of the EU budget, while for the 2028-2034 period, they will together account for less than 40% of total resources.
The increases in resources (compared to the current budget) must also be interpreted beyond the bare figures. It’s true that the €453 billion earmarked for cohesion make up an increase of €60 billion, but in practice, this could be a significant cut, considering that future funds could also be used to replace the regional part of the common agricultural policy and to support fishermen and tourism.
Brawl and détente in Parliament
It was in the European Parliament that the controversy erupted most vociferously after the proposal was presented.
Given the inconclusive discussions with the Commission upon returning from the summer recess, the leaders of the four political groups that make up the so-called “Ursula majority” – the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe, and the Greens/EFA – threatened on October 30 to block the entire proposal for the next EU budget.
In the letter sent directly to von der Leyen, the four political group presidents made it clear that Parliament “cannot accept” the Commission’s proposal on national and regional partnership plans “as a basis for starting negotiations.”
The seven demands against the “renationalization” of European policies included keeping the major European policies – cohesion, agriculture, fisheries, social policies – separate, each with its own budget and rules.
The role of regions and local authorities in designing and managing cohesion policy was also defended, as well as strengthening Parliament’s oversight powers in approving and amending Member States’ plans and directing the annual budget procedure.
In an attempt to defuse tensions, von der Leyen herself presented a series of concessions regarding the role of the regions and agricultural policy. Their consolidation into a single fund and the division of the budget into national plans were not, however, called into question.
The amendments to the initial proposal arrived in the form of a letter and aim to provide greater protection for the regions.
First and foremost, the introduction of “regional oversight to further ensure the full involvement” of regional authorities in the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of the Plans, which is accompanied by the “clear right” of regional authorities to engage directly with the Commission, while each Member State will manage “according to its own institutional and territorial structure” regarding the coordination of the Plans.
Furthermore, in addition to the mandatory minimum amount already envisaged for less developed regions – €218 billion – the Commission President stated that “specific safeguard measures can also be considered to ensure the continuity of investments in transition and more developed regions.”
Speaking at the Parliament plenary session on November 12, von der Leyen was keen to clarify that “cohesion governance remains unchanged with the full involvement of the regions” and that, despite the structural changes, the next EU budget provides for “regional control and specific guarantees to ensure the continuity of investments in transition regions.”
All the centrist majority groups have accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm the new adjustments, which do not substantially change the nature of the cohesion policy revolution.
What seemed like a showdown between the Commission and Parliament ultimately demonstrated that there is no risk of an institutional rift. The von der Leyen cabinet wanted to send a message of openness to compromise (with limited amendments), while none of the four parliamentary group leaders further discussed rejecting the Plans.
The start of work
Although the proposal for the new cohesion policy is still considered imperfect by Parliament, the negotiating basis remains the one presented by the Commission.
On December 11, members of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) began discussing the draft report on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, which will form the basis of Parliament’s negotiating mandate.
Co-rapporteurs Siegfried Mureşan (EPP) and Carla Tavares (S&D) are calling for a “significantly strengthened” budget, with cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy not being used as adjustment variables to finance new priorities, such as security, defense, and competitiveness.
The parliamentary calendar calls for amendments to be submitted by January 29, to be adopted in the BUDG Committee in early April and in plenary in May.
Regarding the other co-legislator, the Council of the European Union, the Cypriot Presidency inherited from the Danish Presidency—which ended on December 31—the first draft of the negotiating framework, as it emerged from meetings on the horizontal principles of the entire budget proposal.
This is an initial negotiating package that lists all the available policy options on the table, without going into detail about the specific funding envisaged, but which outlines the possible political directions.
The document was then discussed on December 18 during the latest summit of the heads of state and government of the 27 member states. “An agreement before the end of 2026 would allow for the adoption of legislative acts in 2027, which is necessary to ensure that EU funding reaches beneficiaries without interruption in January 2028,” the European Council conclusions read.
The next six months will be crucial for preparing the Council negotiations. As set out in writing in the program of the Cypriot rotating presidency, the goal is to develop a “mature” negotiating framework—that is, with “indicative figures” on the key elements of the next budget—by the end of June, on which the 27 EU countries will have to reach a formal agreement.
The Council’s unknown factor
The Council itself remains the most enigmatic institution in terms of how it could shift the balance of the final text of the next multiannual budget, particularly regarding the idea of a single fund merging the common agricultural policy and cohesion policy.
Von der Leyen’s letter quelling the internal revolt within Parliament appears to have had little impact on the MPs, who instead consider the Commission’s move “a first step, but not enough.”
This view is shared by 15 countries that, at varying degrees, do not support the proposal for the National and Regional Partnership Plans as presented: Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Germany.
In Germany, however, the issue of funding allocation and governance of the next budget risks exacerbating the relationship between the federal states and the central government, revealing the balance of power at play within individual member states in the debate over the future of European cohesion.
This publication has been produced within the EuSEE project, co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the granting authority and the European Union cannot be held responsible for them.
Tag: EU Cohesion | EuSEE
