

Merhaba Turkey! Güle güle!

An Empirical Assessment of MEPs' Voting Behaviour on Turkey and Turkish Membership

Stefano Braghioli

Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP), University of Siena

EU's relationship with Turkey has historically been a complicated one. If during the cold-war Turkey has been frequently praised as the last outpost of Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet empire; more recently it has been often depicted, both at the mass and elite level, as an external other, both from a cultural and political perspective. Since the EU-Turkey association agreement of 1963, EU's economic relations with Ankara have improved systematically and today the country appears very much integrated with main European trade and economic networks. From a political perspective the things seem more complicated and controversial. Especially after the opening of the official membership negotiations in 2005, elite and mass opposition to a full integration of the country into the EU has dramatically grown and has fostered mistrust and prejudices between the two parties.

The proposed paper analyzes Euroelites' perspective on Turkey from a privileged vantage point. The work intends to look at the way the debate on Turkish membership has developed in the European Parliament (EP). The objective is two-fold. First, the proposed paper will analyze the impact of the debate on Turkey on the voting dynamics in the assembly, and to what extent it has the power to alter the normal voting blocs. Second, it will assess how and to what extent MEPs' individual view of Turkey and Turkish membership influence their actual voting behaviour when the issue is at stake.

The analysis will take into considerations the votes held between 2004 and 2009 (6th EP). Individual voting behaviour and voting blocs will be assessed using the roll-call vote-based NOMINATE algorithm. MEPs' views on Turkey will be based on survey data collected within the framework of the European Elite Survey (EES). The analysis suggests that the issue of Turkish membership has a very divisive impact on the voting dynamics and voting alignments in the EP. Given its national and political significance, the issue seems to determine ad-hoc voting blocs, beyond MEPs' individual party affiliation.

1. Introduction

Turkey is a unique country; therefore the negotiations with Turkey are unique. Many in Europe, but also in Turkey itself have strong feelings about Turkish membership of the EU. We should allow this debate to continue as it gives Turkey the opportunity to answer all criticisms and convince the sceptics. Citizens' support for enlargement of the EU is indispensable and we should realise that this debate can evolve over time.

Ria Oomen-Ruijten (EPP, NL), *Declaration on the 5th anniversary of EU Turkey negotiations*,
October 1, 2010

Madam President, I agree and recognise Turkey's European prospects [...]

Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos (EPP-ED, D), *Debate on Turkey's progress report 2008*

When the EU decided to start accession negotiations, it was done in the hope and expectation that Turkey does indeed have a place in the European family. Let me ask this question: is it certain that Turkey today thinks along these lines? If and when Turkey engages unambiguously in establishing good relations with its neighbours, settling outstanding problems peacefully in conformity with the UN Charter and other European documents, then there is hope. If Turkey fulfils these criteria

without reservation, then chances are that it will gain the support of each of us, and may also regain the sympathy of European citizens.

Alexandra Dobolyi (PSE-HU), *Debate on Turkey's progress report 2008*

Madam President, I believe that Turkey should be a member of the EU. The criticism of Turkey is justified in many cases, but the excuses and the sitting on the fence must stop and a serious plan for Turkey joining the EU should be drawn up.

Hanne Dahl (IND/DEM-DK), *Debate on Turkey's progress report 2008*

As for Turkey, how can we think of calmly granting membership to a country that is at present imposing an Islamic veto, within NATO, on the nomination of a Secretary General merely because he represents a country, namely Denmark, in which the cartoon affair took place. [...] Our rapporteur, who is I think wearing a lovely pair of trousers, would not today be allowed to walk into the Turkish parliament in her trouser suit. That shows how far behind we are. Turkey is Asia, not Europe.

Mario Borghezio (UEN-I), *Debate on Turkey's progress report 2008*

[...] Turkey is not a European country, but forms part of Asia Minor. As the President-in-Office of the Council has rightly said, Turkey is a strategically important partner and therefore we need a strategic partnership and not accession to the EU.

Bernd Posselt (EPP-ED, D), *Debate on Turkey's progress report 2008*

EU's relationship with Turkey has historically been a complicated one. Especially after the opening of the official membership negotiations in 2005, elite and mass opposition to a full integration of the country into the EU has dramatically grown and has fostered mistrust and prejudices between the two parties. The “Turkey debate” has been reported to have greatly contributed to the victory of the No side in the Constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands. At the same time, the exceptional nature of the Turkey's candidacy is witnessed by the way the negotiations are conducted, in the form of an open end path not necessarily leading to full membership as openly admitted (if not in the EU official documents) still by many European leaders and stakeholders¹.

If we look at the way the “Turkey debate” is constructed and framed in the specific environment of the European Parliament (EP), as evident from the excerpts presented above, the parliamentary positions on Ankara's European ambitions range from enthusiastic support to open Turkophobia. What is even more striking is the wide variety of positions identifiable within the same political/ideological area. Although certain political groups appear on the whole more supportive and others more sceptics; in general, the situation seems much more complex than it might appear at a first sight. The same might well be said with respect to the impact of MEPs' nationality and domestic traditions. In this respect, the “Turkey debate” emerges as a cross-cleavage and at the same time highly divisive issue.

The proposed paper has the ambition to approach and possibly penetrate this complexity from a privileged vantage point. The work focuses on the way the debate on Turkish membership has

¹ The opening of most of the negotiation chapters has been vetoed by the governments of Cyprus and France.

developed in the European Parliament (EP). So far, only limited empirical research has been conducted looking at the “Turkey debate” from an EP perspective, while most of the attention has been devoted to the negotiations at the Council and Commission level or to the national debates.

The objective of the analysis is two-fold. First, we will analyze the impact of the debate on Turkey on the voting dynamics in the assembly, and to what extent it has the power to alter the normal voting blocs. Here we will perform a comparative assessment of the way the EP voting dynamics articulate and of the way they change when Turkey is at stake. Second, we will assess which factors influence MEPs' individual sentiments towards Turkey and Turkish membership, as reflected by their voting behaviour.

From a preliminary look, the positions in the EP – as they emerge from the excerpts presented above – seem to reflect different degrees of support and opposition, ranging from interest-driven positions (which seem more frequent among the mainstream parties such as liberals, conservatives, and socialists) to more ideological/identitarian ones (more common among the radicals).

The analysis will take into considerations the votes held between 2004 and 2009 (6th EP). Individual voting behaviour and voting blocs will be assessed using the roll-call vote-based NOMINATE algorithm. MEPs' views on Turkey will be based on survey data collected within the framework of the European Elite Survey (EES).

The analysis will show that the “Turkey debate”, and in particular, the issue of Turkish membership has a very divisive impact on the voting dynamics and voting alignments in the EP. Given its national and political significance, the issue seems to determine *ad-hoc* voting blocs, beyond MEPs' individual party affiliation.

When it comes to the most relevant factors behind MEPs' voting behaviour, the factors generally mentioned by the literature such as ideology and domestic background do not seem as relevant as they are generally depicted, even if they still display a relevant explanatory potential. In this respect, other factors seem to emerge along with more “traditional” ones in explaining MEPs' voting decisions when Turkey is at stake, such as context specific factors and MEPs' structure of beliefs.

The paper is structured as follows: following a short review of the key concepts used in this work and of the research strategy adopted (section 2), we will define our two analytical levels and our methodology, cases, and variables (section 3). In section 4 we will present and discuss the empirical results of the RCV-based and survey-based analysis. In section 5 we will present some concluding considerations and discuss possible wider implications and further developments.

2. Defining the setting and the actors

When, in December 2004, the European Council decided unanimously to start accession negotiations with Turkey, the decision was firmly endorsed by the European Parliament, with 407

votes in favour and 262 against. Already in 1999, the European Council had declared that Turkey should be treated like any other candidate state.

Despite the fresh start, within months Turkey was confronted with statements by European leaders that undermined this unanimous decision, as well as negative actions by EU member states to block the talks.

According to the Independent Commission on Turkey (2009) “in several countries, such public discourse coincided with elections, giving the impression that domestic political calculations were involved” and started to gain ground also among the representatives of the mainstream parties in the European Parliament. Attacks on the EU-Turkey process became a practical shortcut for popular concerns about immigration, worries about jobs, fears of Islam and a general dissatisfaction with the EU.

This growing scepticism was backed up by efforts to re-interpret the Negotiating Framework formally agreed by all governments, on the basis of which Turkey started negotiations on EU membership in October 2005. The 27 EU governments agreed that

the shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond (European Commission 2005).

As a consequence, some governments began arguing in favour of a “privileged partnership” or “special relationship”, thereby emphasizing the exceptionality of the Turkish case if compared to the other waves of enlargement.

The effect was – among others – a dramatic growth of scepticism among the Turkish public that provided further legitimation to the anti-European political forces in Ankara, thereby reinforcing the vicious circle of mutual mistrust and suspect. In this respect, “high-level European talk of a 'privileged partnership' lacking substance thus works against the key EU goal of building up its soft power beyond its current borders, a process that is visibly promoted through Turkish adoption of EU rules, values and political standards” (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009).

So far, only few of the 27 governments in the EU are openly against Ankara's EU membership, and a majority of them supports it, some strongly. However, as time passes and the negotiation outcome becomes increasingly unpredictable a growing number of politicians in the EU member states seem tempted to adopt a more populist approach on the debate in order to maximize protest votes in an electoral perspective.

In this respect, when we deal with *support* and *opposition* to Ankara's European ambitions we should distinguish between functional/interest-oriented and ideal/ideological approaches. The former appear more frequent among the mainstream governmental parties, while the latter characterize more protest and extreme parties. Clear examples of the functional opposition side is represented by those forces concerned about the shift of EU structural funds to Turkey or about the massive influence that a member Turkey would have within the European institutions. In this respect, a recent report commissioned by the German Christian-democrats warned that Turkey might be “too big, too poor, with too dangerous borders and insufficiently ‘European’ to join the Union”².

This wide range of functional/ideal conflicting approaches as well as these fears seem to be by and large reflected in the EP environment and therefore to have a non-irrelevant impact on the parliament's dynamics. To what extent, in which directions, and according to which trajectories these factors shape the political debate in the EP when “Turkey debate” is at stake? A frank answer is that we do not know yet.

In this respect, our study represents one of the few systematic attempts to look at the nature of the debate on Turkey from an EP perspective. As argued above, generally the scholarly attention has been focused on the two other most visible institutions involved in the “Turkey debate” (the Council and the Commission), while the EP has been generally depicted as at best as the least influential actor in the debate or even as a sort of “irrelevant other”. However, as LaGro and Jorgensen (2007) warn “the institutions to decide on the faith of Turkey will not be national parliaments on the recommendation of their respective governments, but the peoples of Europe and, of course, one must not forget, the European Parliament, which is gaining power exponentially within the EU institutions”. In this respect, one should not forget that the EP represents the only EU institution directly legitimized by citizens' popular vote and, in this respects, it is not only the legitimate representative of the above-mentioned peoples of Europe, but, given its nature and composition, it is also more likely to reflect and echo their sentiments and fears in its voting dynamics.

In an attempt to satisfactory penetrate these dynamics our analysis will pursue two clear objectives, one complementary to the other. First, we will define a “map” depicting MEPs' voting behaviour in the EP when the debate on Turkish membership is at stake. Second, we will look at the most relevant individual level determinants of MEPs' vision of Turkey.

In particular, the study will be focused on the parliamentary works of the 6th EP. To grant the saliency of the votes considered, we included only the votes falling in the policy area of “Foreign and Security Policy”. This decision is based on the consideration that those votes include mostly annual progress and evaluation reports, which represent the key documents on which the

² For further details see Hughes (2004) and Boehm (2010).

Commission's assessments of candidate countries' progress are based.

As we are addressing a still relatively unexplored ground, this study is conceived as an exploratory analysis towards a more precise understanding of the parliamentary face of the "Turkey debate" and might ideally represent a stepping stone for further investigation in the field. For this reason, we will not propose a formal set of hypotheses to test.

3. Methods, measures, and techniques

In this section we will define the methods and the tools used to conduct the empirical assessment. First, we will compare the nature of the voting dynamics when Turkey and Turkish membership are at stake with the overall dynamics in the EP. The analysis will be based on 75 roll-call votes held between December 2004 and March 2009 [see Appendix 1].

Second, we will look at the possible determinants of MEPs' individual voting behaviour based on survey data including 442 MEPs from 11 member states.

Defining the RCV-based test

The RCV-based analysis has been conducted using the NOMINATE algorithm³. In particular, the NOMINATE algorithm produces 'maps', where each dot represents the estimated location of an MEP on a plane. It is worth noting that what this scaling method does is to 'discover' the main orthogonal dimensions of voting behaviour. This method does not provide any substantive meaning of these dimensions. In fact, like other scaling techniques, the dimensions discovered by NOMINATE might capture a mix of underlying issue-based or interest-based dimensions of conflict. The plane in which MEPs are located is defined by the two most significant dimensions⁴.

In order to compare the dynamics marking the debate on Turkey with the general dynamics in the EP we will make use of the most recent NOMINATE assessment of the 6th EP (Hix and Noury 2009) as our reference point. In this respect, in order to allow the comparability between the two, we will maintain the same explanatory dimensions emerged from Hix and Noury's analysis: the left-right divide and MEPs' feelings towards European integration and we will apply them to the votes on Turkey.

In this respect, Hix and Noury (2009) maintain that

3 For further details see Everson, Valelly, and Wiseman (2009).

4 Generally the analysis defines two key dimensions based on eigenvalues which explain most of the variance. According to Everson, Valelly, and Wiseman (2009) the party systems characterized by more than two significant dimensions are considered to be chaotic and unstable. They maintain that "interestingly, an expansion in legislative dimensionality in fact happened once in congressional development, in the pre- Civil War era. This underscores the tremendous political and developmental importance that "chaos" – and its aftermath -- can actually have. Poole and Rosenthal found so much dimensionality in Congress just before the Civil War that they called the American Congress "chaotic" – unmanageable in just the way that Joseph Bruno fears the New York legislature might be were it not for his autocratic leadership".

the first dimension in both [6th and 7th] Parliaments is clearly the left-right dimension. The second dimension is more difficult to interpret. At face value, this dimension appears to represent anti-/pro-Europe policy preferences: toward the top of the figure are the more pro-European parties (Socialists, Conservatives, and Liberals), and near the bottom are the more anti-European parties (Radical Left, Greens, Nationalists, and Anti-Europeans). A more-detailed analysis of MEP locations reveals that this second dimension also captures government-opposition interests in the European Union: MEPs from national parties that are in government appear near the top on this second dimension; MEPs from national parties in opposition appear near the bottom.

The RCV data covering the 2004-09 legislature have been collected and made available within the framework of the VoteWatch project⁵.

Given the technical requirements of the statistical package used (*W-Nominate*), the valid votes have been coded as follows: “Yes” (code=1), “No” (code=6), “Abstentions” (code=9). All other options such as “Present but did not vote” and “either absent or not an MEP” have been coded as 0 (missing values).

Following Hix and Noury's analysis, the analytical dimensions have been set to two⁶. Moreover, 15% or better on the minority side has been set as the cut-off criteria for a vote to be counted; while a minimum of 56 roll calls attended (out of 75) represents the cut-off criteria for a legislator to be included in the scaling⁷.

Before moving on to the description of our analytical steps, it seems helpful to briefly discuss the nature of the RCVs. When a RCV is requested, the voting choice (Yes, No, Abstention) of each MEP is recorded in the minutes⁸, thereby providing the position of each legislator on a specific vote. The RCVs represent only a portion (roughly one third) of all the votes casted by the plenary⁹; all the other voting procedures – either by a show of hands or by ‘electronic vote’ – do not register the way in which each individual MEP votes. The RCVs are usually called by the political groups. According to Hix (2002) and Carrubba et al. (2002) this procedure is typically requested by the parliamentary leadership for achieving two specific self-promotion goals, either to show their

5 The VoteWatch project coordinated by Sara Hagemann, Doru Frantescu, Simon Hix, and Abdul Noury. According to its developers Votewatch.eu “is an independent website set up to promote better debates and greater transparency in EU decision-making by providing easy access to, and analysis of, the political decisions and activities of the European Parliament”

6 Cem Odzemir (G/EFA-D) has been set as reference point for the left pole (left on the first dimension), while Marco Cappato (ALDE-I) has been set as reference point for the pro-Europe pole (up on the 2nd dimension)

7 In the light of the cutoff criteria, 53 votes and 573 MEPs were included in the analysis.

8 Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/pv.do?language=EN>.

9 According to the article 160.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament ‘the vote shall be taken by roll call if so requested in writing by a political group or at least forty Members the evening before the vote unless the President sets a different deadline’. In addition, it states that ‘votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the sitting by political group in the alphabetical order of Members’ names, with an indication of how they voted’ [<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=EN&reference=TOC>].

position to the public or to mortify other groups (Corbett et al. 2000).

According to several scholars, the analyses based on RCV records might suffer from a structural bias determined by the particular nature of this procedure (Settembri 2005; Rasmussen 2008; Carrubba et al. 2002).

Hix (2002) maintains that “RCVs cover a broad range of issues on the European Union agenda do not appear to be called disproportionately by one EP party or another. Hence, without empirical evidence to prove that roll-call voting is systematically biased towards a particular EP party or set of issues, it is reasonable to assume that these votes should produce a fairly accurate picture of voting behaviour in the EP”.

In conclusion, notwithstanding their still controversial nature, the analysis of RCV records represents by far the most effective means currently available for studying MEPs’ legislative behaviour from an empirical perspective.

Defining the survey-based test

To look at the determinants of the voting dynamics when Turkey is at stake, and, therefore, to identify the potential explanatory factors behind MEPs’ individual feelings towards Turkey a number of questions collected within the framework of the European Elites Survey (EES) have been used.

The EES¹⁰ is a panel project (initiated in 2006) whose aim is to examine the attitudes of MEPs and top Commission and Council officials towards foreign policy and transatlantic issues. The project is coordinated by the Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP) of the University of Siena in cooperation with other European universities and is supported by the foundation Compagnia di San Paolo.

In the three waves included (2006, 07, 08) a total of 442 MEPs were interviewed, from 11 member states¹¹ belonging both to mainstream (EPP-ED, PES, and ELDR) and minor parties (EUL/NGL, Greens, UEN, IND/DEM, and non-attached MEPs). Moreover, the inclusion of different geographical dimensions¹² which reflect by and large the territorial cleavages of the EU tend to facilitate cross-country comparisons [see Table 1].

The level of internal differentiation of our sample and the inclusion of more than 40% of the total number of MEPs assigned to the 11 member states seem to grant a satisfactory degree of generalizability to our results and will possibly allow us to extend our findings and considerations beyond our sample.

10 For further details see http://www.gips.unisi.it/circap/ees_overview.

11 The countries included in the 2008 survey are Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

12 Scandinavia represents the only possible exclusion.

Table 1. – Geographical distribution of the sample

	Mediterranean E.	Continental E.	Northern E. / Scandinavia	Central and Eastern E.
Small MS.	Portugal	The Netherlands	---	Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia
Big MS.	Italy, Spain	France, Germany	United Kingdom	Poland

Our dependent variable addresses MEPs' feelings towards Turkey and registers in particular their attitudes towards Ankara's EU membership. In particular MEPs were asked weather “generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership to the EU would be a good thing?”; assuming a negative response to identify a general negative attitude towards Turkey and *vice versa*.

Our set of explanatory factors include four distinct groups of variables: socio-demographic variables

(age, gender, and education); variables addressing the international context (role of NATO/US, threat perception, MEPs' structure of belief¹³, threat perception, and idea of Islam); attitudinal factors (ideology and religion); and macro-level factors (country) [see Table 2].

Table 2. – List of variables

Group of variables	Operationalization
<i>Dependent variable</i>	Support for Turkish membership
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>	Age Gender Education
<i>International context</i>	Feeling thermometer – US NATO still essential MEPs' structure of beliefs (pragmatists, doves, hawks, isolationists) Threat Perception – General Islam/democracy
<i>Attitudinal factors</i>	Left-right Religion
<i>Macro-level factors</i>	Country

4. Empirical results

In this section we will first look at the nature of the voting dynamics when the “Turkey discourse” is at stake, using the NOMINATE algorithm, then we will explore the determinants of MEPs' individual attitudes towards Ankara's European ambitions, and, more in general, the explanatory

¹³ To address MEPs' structure of belief an index of pragmatism has been developed using two questions: 1) Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice (Yes / No); 2) Which of the following do you think is more important in determining a country's overall power and influence in the world – a country's economic strength, or its military strength?. MEPs who answered Yes to the first and military strength to the second were labelled as "hawks"; those who answered Yes to the first and economic strength to the second were labelled as "pragmatists"; those who answered No to the first and military strength to the second were labelled as "isolationists"; while those who answered No to the first and economic strength to the second were labelled as "doves".

factors behind their positive or negative attitudes towards Turkey.

The NOMINATE test: looking at the specificity of the Turkey discourse

Table 2 presents the goodness-of-fit measures of the NOMINATE analysis conducted on the basis of the votes on Turkey (TR NOMINATE).

The first measure is the percentage of roll-call vote decisions correctly classified by the set of legislator locations on the first (left-right) and second (anti-/pro-Europe) dimensions. What we see is that TR NOMINATE with 84% appears comparable to EP NOMINATE (according to Hix, producing 90% of correctly classified votes). The measure in the second column is the aggregate proportional reduction in error (PRE), which indicates how much the spatial model improves on a naive benchmark model, such as everybody voting the same way in each vote.


The last three columns focus on the variation explained by the two dimensions. The first two dimensions (Eigenvalues) capture approximately 37 percent and 8 percent of the variation. In the case of NOMINATE TR, with an aggregate value scoring 44,99 (Eigenvalues respectively of 49,42 and 10,30), the variation explained scores relatively lower than the overall EP average, generally higher than 50%. This relatively low score is most probably due to the small number of RCVs included in the analysis.

Table 3. – Analytical dimensions of NOMINATE TR

	% classified	Aggregate PRE	Variation explained (1st dimension)	Variation explained (2nd dimension)	Aggregate variation explained (1st+2nd dimension)
<i>NOMINATE TR</i>	84,33	0,51	37,23 (Eigen. 49,42)	7,76 (Eigen. 10,30)	44,99

It is worth noting that both NOMINATE tests identify one main dimension of voting: the ideological dimension. Nevertheless, if we look at the differentials between the first and the second dimension, we find that MEPs tend to think bi-dimensionally when the Turkish issue is at stake. Even if weaker in terms of explanatory potential, the second dimension still plays an important role in the “Turkey discourse” (Eigen. 10,30).

Figures 1 and 2 – Spatial maps of NOMINATE TR and NOMINATE EP



Figures 1 and 2 show the spatial maps produced by NOMINATE, where each dot represents the estimated location of each MEP on the first two dimensions. Before interpreting these figures, it is worth bearing in mind that this method does not provide any substantive meaning of these dimensions. In fact, as with other scaling techniques, the dimensions discovered by NOMINATE might capture a mix of underlying issue-based or interest-based dimensions of conflict. However, according to Hix, Noury, Roland (2006) “the location of the European party groups in these figures nevertheless suggests that the two dimensions of politics in the European Parliament are the left-right and pro-/anti-Europe dimensions”.

In their analysis [Figure 2], Hix, Noury, and Roland (2006) show that

the parties are ordered from left to right exactly as one would expect [...]: with the Radical Left and Greens on the furthest left, then the Socialists on the centre-left, the Liberals in the centre, the European People’s Party on the centre-right, the British Conservatives and allies and French Gaullists and allies to the right of the European People’s Party, the Extreme Right on the furthest right, and the Anti-Europeans divided between some MEPs on the extreme left and some on the extreme right. Also, the figures suggest that the second dimension may be related to party positions on European integration, with the main pro-European parties (the Socialists, Liberals, and European People’s Party) at the top of the figures, and the main anti-European parties (the Radical Left, Greens, Gaullists, Extreme Right and Anti-Europeans) at the bottom”.

If we compare Hix's results with those emerged from NOMINATE TR we can identify a number of relevant differences.

The first point deals with the nature of groups' votes. While in figure 2 the party groups are clearly distinguishable and the borders between and within them are clearly detectable, when the debate on Turkey is at stake the situation tends to be much more chaotic, with a more than 90% of the MEPs within the $+0.50$ - -0.50 range in the first dimension (as witnessed by the relatively low Eigenvalue). This seems to suggest that in terms of ideological nature of the votes, the major parties appear closer than in NOMINATE EP. In this respect, PES, ALDE, and EPP-ED seem to converge towards an ideal centre in which most of their MEPs are located. Despite this relevant level of inter-group agreement the groups are still clearly identifiable in terms of ideology, with the Socialists located on the centre-left, the Liberals in the centre, the European People's Party on the centre-right.

In line with our discussion of figure 2, we see that in both plots the groups are far more internally coherent on the left-right dimension, than on the anti-/pro-Europe one. This phenomenon is clearly represented by the way ideologically like-minded MEPs are spread along this second dimension. If we look at figure 2, for instance at the EPP-ED, the highest scoring MEP on the y axis yields 0.96, while the lowest scores -1.

If we compare NOMINATE EP and NOMINATE TR in terms of MEPs' distribution along the second dimension, the phenomenon appears to take place with different intensity in the two models. The lower coherence in NOMINATE TR seems due to the fact that, as Hix and Noury (2009) suggest, the anti-/pro-Europe dimension might capture a mix of underlying issue-based or interest-based dimensions of conflict related to European integration. In this respect, we suspect that the second dimension might fairly well represent the dependent variable itself, that is MEPs' positive or negative attitudes towards Turkey (along with more general sentiments towards Europe), an issue that is by definition cross-party and only loosely affected by the left-right divide¹⁴.

We suppose that, given the specificity of the 75 votes taken into consideration, our second dimension might capture MEPs' attitudes towards Turkey¹⁵. In other words, we believe the issue of the votes at stake to have changed the characterization of the second dimension in the NOMINATE analysis.

In this respect, the goodness of our supposition seems also justified by the choice of our reference point on the 2nd dimension. Marco Cappato is not only among the most fervent pro-European legislators in the EP, but also an influential pioneer of the pro-Turkey lobby in the parliament¹⁶.

In the light of these arguments, the three major groups seem to display very different attitudes towards Turkey. While, as predictable, the Socialists emerge as the most cohesive in their pro-Turkey stance; (despite a relevant minority located in the upper part) most of the Christian-

14 EPP-ED and extreme right equally opposite to Ankara membership. This argument seems confirmed by the relatively low explanatory potential of the first dimension if compared to NOMINATE EP.

15 We also suspect the former to matter more than the first, given the nature of the votes at stake. In other words, we suppose the nature of the votes to have changed the nature of the second dimension in the NOMINATE analysis.

16 For further details see...

democrat MEPs locate in the lower part of the plane, denoting widespread scepticism. Worth noting is the position of the liberal-democrat MEPs that appear the least coherent along the second dimension. Among the Turkosceptic liberal delegations emerge the Belgian (*Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten*), French (Mouvement Démocrate), and German (*Freie Demokratische Partei*) ones; while the British delegation (*Liberal Democrat Party*) appears as the most supportive. Also in the light of our measures of fit, what emerges is that the “Turkey debate” might not be classified as a purely ideological issue. MEPs' voting behaviour seems rather determined by a combination of factors, which – we believe – might be reflected by both political, national, or attitudinal dimensions. An evidence of the unfamiliarity displayed by the major parliamentary groups when the Turkish discourse is at stake is represented by their relatively low internal cohesion.

As an example, if we look at what might be seen as the most important vote on Turkey in the 6th EP (*Opening of negotiations with Turkey*, 28 September 2005) the specificity of the “Turkey debate” emerges very clearly¹⁷. In line with what depicted by the plot, the PES emerges as the most cohesive, with a cohesion rate of 82% (compared to an overall average of 91%); the ALDE emerges as very disunited, with a cohesion rate of 48% (vs. 89%); while the worst performing group is the EPP-ED with a dramatically low cohesion of 17%, compared to an overall average of 88%.

Testing the Regression Model: looking at the determinants of the “Turkey discourse”

While the figures above say a lot about the specificity of the Turkey debate, they do not say much about the determinants of MEPs' voting behaviour in this specific respect. In this section we will explore the explanatory potential of our four sets of independent variables and present the most significant EES data related to the “Turkey debate” in the light of the NOMINATE analysis presented above.

The stepping stone of our analysis is that, according to the EES data, a majority of MEPs supports Turkish membership (57% vs. 43%). Quite unexpectedly is also that the level of support is increasing over the years: from 53% in 2006, to 55% in 2007 and 64% in 2008¹⁸.

In terms of socio-demographic factors [see Figure 3], gender, interestingly emerges as the most relevant explanatory factor, with 71% of the female MEPs favouring Ankara's European bid, compared to the 53% of the male colleagues that think likewise.


Surprisingly, neither age, nor education present a clear trend, and the impact of the two variables seems less straightforward and more difficult to define. When it comes to age, the most favourable cohort is represented by the MEPs falling in the median category (35-54 y.o.). When we look at the

17 Source <http://www.votewatch.eu/index.php>

18 The opposite trend is reported to take place among the public.

impact of education, an interesting point emerges. All the groups, from the least to the most educated present a pretty high level of support for Turkey (around 60%), with the only exception of the MEPs who attended secondary education only, for which the average level of support falls to 38%.

Figure 3. - Socio-demographic factors (respectively gender, age, and education)




MEPs' vision of the global context [see Figure 4] emerges as an extremely revealing factor to understand their attitude towards Turkey, and in particular their favourability of Ankara's European bid. Here two sets of factors can be identified: MEPs' degree of atlanticism (including perception of NATO and USA) and their general vision of global affairs.

One of the most important points that emerges from our analysis it that the likelihood of favouring Turkish membership seems inversely and strongly correlated to MEPs' degree of atlanticism. To put it another way, the most fervent atlanticists are also very likely to be staunch opponents of Ankara's European ambition, while the MEPs who appear more critical towards Transatlantic cooperation appear, on average more supportive. While among those who believe that NATO is still essential only 49% of the respondents think that Turkish membership is “a good thing”; among those who believe the contrary, the percentage grows dramatically to 76%. Similarly, the difference, in terms of support for Turkish membership, between those who favour US global leadership and those who oppose it equals 20 percentage points (53% vs. 73%). This point seems particularly interesting, considering that Turkey has been historically a very relevant NATO member (with the second largest army of the alliance). A possible way to read this picture is thorough the lens of the recent

developments in the Turkish foreign policy. Following the doctrine of “Neo-ottomanism” inaugurated by the new foreign Minister Ahmet Devatoglu, Turkey's moderate Islamic government has increasingly strengthen its ties and promoted economic and diplomatic cooperation with Iran and Syria, posing – in a number of occasions – a challenge to the unity of the alliance. According to a number of observers, the country might be in the process of slowly abandoning its traditional western collocation in the global network of alliances. From this point of view, it might well be that the MEPs who are more supportive of Transatlantic cooperation increasingly see Turkey as a troublemaker, rather than a reliable ally.

If we look at MEPs' structure of beliefs, pragmatists and doves emerge as the most supportive of Turkish membership (respectively with 57% and 65% of positive answers). In this respect, the common denominator between the two categories is the prevalence of economic over military power. We can therefore suppose that for doves and (especially) pragmatists Turkish membership represents first and foremost an economic asset, whose perceived relevance might even outweigh colder sentiments towards Ankara under other aspects.


Figure 4. - International factors (support for USA, role of NATO, and global attitudes)



If we look at other variables addressing the international context [see Figure 5], while MEPs' general threat perception does not emerge as particularly revealing, given its inconstant trend; their perception of Islam seems to make the difference when it comes to Turkey's European perspectives, thereby emerging as one of the most relevant explanatory factors. In this respect, those who believe that a democratizable Islam is possible seem much more likely to support Ankara's EU ambitions

(67% of pros vs. 54% of pros). The acceptability of Turkish membership seems therefore still largely conditioned by the religious distinctiveness of the country and by its understanding in the eyes of the MEPs.

Figure 5. - International factors (general threat perception and vision of Islam)




Looking at the other side of the coin [see Figure 6], the relevance of religion as a practical short-cut to look at Turkey and Turkish membership is confirmed by the outstanding effect of MEPs' religious beliefs on their feelings towards Ankara. Among the MEPs who declare themselves “Christian” the percentage of supporters of Turkish membership equals a risible 37%; while the percentage dramatically grows to 81% among the “non-Christian” or “non-believer” MEPs.

Along with religion, the left-right divide emerges as the most significant explanatory factor. If we shift from left to right, the degree of support for Turkey's membership falls from 88% to 33% (-55 percentage points). This confirms what timidly emerged from the NOMINATE analysis: Greens, Socialist, and Radical Left tower – on average – as champions of support for Turkish membership; the Conservatives and the Eurosceptics are generally the most unsupportive; while the liberal-democrats emerge as the most internally divided (with 43% of support). Despite the relatively lower significance of the left-right cleavage in NOMINATE TR, what emerges from the EES data is therefore an extremely consistent impact of the latter on MEPs' attitudes. Needless to say, the strong ideological connotation still does not however exclude cases of cross-party convergence among

individual MEPs¹⁹.


Figure 6. - Attitudinal factors (religion and ideology)



If we look at the impact of nationality [see Figure 7], the Turkosceptic characterization of certain national delegations is clearly detectable. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the German and the French delegations, marked by a massive presence of negative answers among the interviewed MEPs (respectively 62% and 59%). Among the most supportive delegations we can mention the Portuguese MEPs (100% of positive answers), the Bulgarians (86%), the Spaniards (75%), the Dutch (73%), and the Italians (70%). Interestingly, these figures seem to contradict the common belief according to which the presence of a relevant Turkish community does determine negative sentiments. Both in the Dutch (marked by the recent experience of Turkish immigration) and Bulgarian cases (historically characterized by a relevant Turkish minority that dates back from the Ottoman period), this phenomenon does not seem not to have take place.

¹⁹ A clear example of the cross-party nature of the "Turkey debate" is represented by the establishment of the EP inter-group "Friends of Turkey" in the early 2010 counting among its members 47 MEPs from all the major parliamentary factions (the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Liberals, the Greens, the European Conservatives and the Reformists) and from 15 countries. For further details see Today's Zaman (2010).

Figure 7. - Impact of nationality



5. Concluding considerations

The present study represents a pioneering attempt to look at the "Turkey debate" from an EP perspective; a perspective generally ignored by the mainstream literature. Our belief is that the EP might represent, in this respect, the perfect laboratory to study the impact of cross-cleavage issues on the voting dynamics, given the parliament's multinational, multilingual, and multicultural nature. On the other hand, despite its exceptional nature and multi-dimensionality, the general patterns of competition and coalition in the EP are – as proved by a number of recent studies – largely based on the ideological left-right division and are evolving towards progressive normalization. The primary objective of this study is to assess to what extent these general dynamics change when the Turkish issue is at stake.

Practically, the analysis performed in this study has been therefore twofold. On the one hand, we comparatively explored the key dimensions that shape the parliamentary debate on Turkey using the NOMINATE algorithm. On the other hand, we attempted to look at the individual level explanatory factors that determine such dynamics when Turkish membership is at stake, using EES data.

In both respects our analysis proved successful and particularly revealing, thereby demonstrating that the nature of the voting dynamics is much more complex than it might appear at a first sight. The comparative NOMINATE analysis revealed that, although the dimensions that shape the debate in the EP persists even when Turkey is at stake, their explanatory potential decreases and, in the case of MEPs' anti-/pro-European sentiments (adopted as second dimension), they even change their connotation, due to the monothematic nature of the votes considered.

The comparative NOMINATE analysis proved the somehow chaotic ideological voting patterns

defined by the “Turkey debate” as witnessed by the fact that more than 90% of the MEPs fall within the +.50-.50 range in the first dimension.

On the other hand, this state of things is reflected in terms of MEPs' distribution along the second dimension, which seems to capture fairly precisely MEPs' positive or negative attitudes towards Turkey (along with more general sentiments towards Europe).

The smaller degree of familiarity the EP political families seem to display is reflected by the way ideologically like-minded MEPs are spread along this second dimension, thereby denoting a fairly high level of inter-group differentiation. Among the most coherent groups on Ankara's membership emerge the Socialists.

If we look at the reasons behind the identified dynamics, our analysis reveals that ideology and MEPs' national background emerge among the most revealing factors. Alongside these traditional dimensions, other variables, related to MEPs' structure of beliefs and to the context that frames the debate, seem to display the strongest explanatory potential. In this respect, it is worth mentioning MEPs' religious belief (and, indirectly, their vision of Islam as compatible with democracy) as one of the strongest predictors of their support for Ankara's membership. At the same time our results show that a pragmatic or “dove-like” structure of beliefs seems to constitute the most favourable framework for MEPs to develop a positive mindset towards Turkish accession. Coherently, our analysis also show the likelihood of a negative impact of MEPs' favour towards NATO and USA role as a global power.

In conclusion, our attempt to penetrate the nature of the parliamentary dynamics when the "Turkey debate" is at stake, far from being completed, seems to provide a useful map to identify the key dimensions of conflict and the triggering factors that determine the identified voting patterns. Furthermore, our study seems to introduce a comparative method of analysis between *particulare* and *generale* which might be easily applied in the future to other sensitive cross-cleavage areas of policy.

References

Boehm, W. (2010), One day Turkey will run the EU, Die Presse, 22 September 2010. Available at <http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/348111-one-day-turkey-will-run-eu>

Çarcoglu, A., L. B. Rubin (2003), Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics, (London:

Carrubba, C. J., R. Clough, E. Montgomery, L. Murrah, R. Schambach, and M. Gabel (2002), Selection Bias in the Use of Roll Call Votes to Study Legislative Behavior, EPRG Working Paper № 11.

Corbett, R., M. Shackleton, and F. Jacobs (2000), The European Parliament, 4th ed. (London:

Catermill).

CIRCaP (2008), European Elites Survey, University of Siena, Italy

CIRCaP (2007), European Elites Survey, University of Siena, Italy

CIRCaP (2006), European Elites Survey, University of Siena, Italy

Everson, Ph., R. Valelly, and J. Wiseman (2009), NOMINATE and American Political History: A Primer, VoteView Working Paper

European Commission (2005), Commission presents a rigorous draft framework for accession negotiations with Turkey, IP/05/807, 29 June 2005

Independent Commission on Turkey (2009), Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle, 7 September 2009

Hix, S. (2002), "'Parliamentary Behaviour with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), pp. 688-98.

Hix, S. and A. Noury (2009), "After Enlargement: Voting Patterns in the Sixth European Parliament", Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXXIV, 2, May 2009.

Hix, S., A. Noury, and G. Roland (2006), 'Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament', American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2), pp. 494-511.

Hughes, K. (2004), Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement?, Friends of Europe working paper series, September 2004. Available at http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/Friends_of_Europe_Turkey.pdf

LaGro E. and K. E. Jørgensen (2007), Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Rasmussen, A. (2008), 'Party Soldiers in a non-partisan Community? Party Linkage in the European Parliament', Journal of European Public Policy, 15(8), pp. 1164-83.

Settembri, P. (2006), 'Is the European Parliament competitive or consensual... 'and why bother'?' Paper presented at the Conference on 'The European Parliament and the European Political Space', London, March 30, 2006.

Today's Zaman (2010), 47 European Parliament members establish 'Friends of Turkey' group, 19 March 2010. Available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=204782>

Appendix I – Votes included in the analysis

1	5518	Foreign & security policy	Turkey: progress report 2008 - Motion for a resolution : Vote: resolution (text as a whole)	12.03.2009
2	5517	Foreign & security policy	Turkey: progress report 2008 - Motion for a resolution : After § 51 7	12.03.2009
3	5516	Foreign & security policy	Turkey: progress report 2008 - Motion for a resolution : After § 45 15	12.03.2009
4	4278	Foreign & security policy	Turkey's 2007 progress report - Report : Vote: resolution (as a whole)	

	21.05.2008		
5	4277	Foreign & security policy Turkey's 2007 progress report - Report : After § 39 17D	21.05.2008
6	3345	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions : after recital D 4	24.10.2007
7	3344	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions : Recital C 9	24.10.2007
8	3343	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions : After 19	24.10.2007
9	3342	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions : After 18	24.10.2007
10	3341	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions 17	24.10.2007
11	3340	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions 25	24.10.2007
12	3339	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions 16	24.10.2007
13	3338	Foreign & security policy EU-Turkey relations - Motions for resolutions : After 15	24.10.2007
14	2041	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : vote: resolution (as a whole)	27.09.2006
15	2040	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : recital B 19	27.09.2006
16	2039	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 72 §/2	27.09.2006
17	2038	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 69 §/2	27.09.2006
18	2037	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 57	27.09.2006
19	2036	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 56	27.09.2006
20	2035	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 50 51/2	27.09.2006
21	2034	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 49	27.09.2006
22	2033	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : after § 47	27.09.2006
23	2032	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : after § 45	27.09.2006
24	2031	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : after § 41	27.09.2006
25	2030	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : Before § 1	27.09.2006
26	2029	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : Before § 1	27.09.2006
27	2028	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : Before § 1	27.09.2006
28	899	Foreign & security policy Opening of negotiations with Turkey - Joint motion for a resolution (as a whole) : vote: resolution (as a whole)	28.09.2005
29	898	Foreign & security policy Opening of negotiations with Turkey - Joint motion for a resolution : After § 10 3	28.09.2005
30	897	Foreign & security policy Opening of negotiations with Turkey - Joint motion for a resolution : After § 3 1/2	28.09.2005
31	896	Foreign & security policy Opening of negotiations with Turkey - Joint motion for a resolution : After § 3 1/1	28.09.2005
32	895	Foreign & security policy Opening of negotiations with Turkey - Joint motion for a resolution : § 1 2	28.09.2005
33	153	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After recital GG 40	15.12.2004
34	152	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : Recital FF 82D	15.12.2004
35	151	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After recital EE 80	15.12.2004
36	150	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After recital EE 38	15.12.2004
37	149	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After recital Y 70	15.12.2004
38	148	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After recital F 9	15.12.2004
39	147	Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After recital	

E 34 15.12.2004

40 146 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 60 66
15.12.2004

41 145 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 60 54
15.12.2004

42 144 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 60 84D
15.12.2004

43 143 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 59
13 15.12.2004

44 142 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 59
15/rev 15.12.2004

45 141 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 59
16 15.12.2004

46 140 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 59 75
15.12.2004

47 139 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 59 53
15.12.2004

48 138 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 58 77
15.12.2004

49 137 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 58 52
15.12.2004

50 136 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 58 76
15.12.2004

51 135 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 55
68 15.12.2004

52 134 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 55
65 15.12.2004

53 133 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 55 74
15.12.2004

54 132 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 54
51 15.12.2004

55 131 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 53
78/2 15.12.2004

56 130 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 53
78/1 15.12.2004

57 129 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 44 7
15.12.2004

58 128 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 42
15.12.2004

59 127 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 41
61 15.12.2004

60 126 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 40 21
15.12.2004

61 125 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 38
20 15.12.2004

62 124 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 38 32
15.12.2004

63 123 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 38 48
15.12.2004

64 122 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 38 5
15.12.2004

65 121 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 35
83 15.12.2004

66 120 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 34
18 15.12.2004

67 119 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 27
47 15.12.2004

68 118 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 27
46/rev 15.12.2004

69 117 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 27
45 15.12.2004

70 116 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 19

28 15.12.2004

71 115 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution :
 After § 7 25 15.12.2004

72 114 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 5 6
 15.12.2004

73 113 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 1 43
 15.12.2004

74 112 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : After § 1 42
 15.12.2004

75 111 Foreign & security policy Turkey's progress towards accession - Motion for a resolution : § 1 41
 15.12.2004