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**FOREIGN POLICY DECISION
MAKING IN THE KOSOVO WAR**

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INTRODUCTION

In an interview organised by the world's oldest national broadcasting organisation, the highest-ranking military officer in one of history's most formidable superpowers was asked about the proper motivations regarding a highly controversial military campaign, undertaken from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999. Officially speaking, the devastating bombing of Yugoslavia was presented to the international community by politicians, generals and diplomats alike¹, as a humanitarian intervention which was fuelled solely by the desire to prevent the spread of violence and terror in one of the Balkans' most unstable regions. Yet the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's reply to the BBC's question was rather unsettling. General Shelton stated that, with regards to the true reasons behind America's forceful and upfront intervention in the Kosovo War, *"the one thing we knew we could not do upfront was that we could not stop the atrocities or the ethnic cleansing through the application of military power"*².

The contradictions, ambiguities and misinformation surrounding this military operation have long been analysed by several international relations experts and human rights researchers yet exploring this conflict in a new light thus in a foreign policy related context, has proven to be extremely useful and quite fascinating as well. Indeed, finding out why the United States of America's foreign policy decision makers really decided to vigorously advocate for the use of air force against President Milosevic's country, has proven to be an engrossing and tricky task.

Still, the particular branch of political science called foreign policy analysis has demonstrated its overarching relevance when examining the causes of major foreign policy actions. Evaluating how cultural and historical, personal, domestic and international attributes affect the foreign policy decision-making process undertaken by individuals themselves, is nowadays necessary when examining the causes, course and effects of historical events. This is precisely why we have decided to focus on an individual-related, State-related and System-related analysis, comparing the importance of these factors and debating which one affects decision-makers most significantly.

Indeed, we should not forget how even the most seemingly far-fetched series of psychological elements such as a lack of time and analogical thinking, risk-taking and a decision maker's

¹ The United States Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who firmly supported a strong response, stated on March 8 1998, in one of her speeches in Bonn, "the time to stop the killing is now, before it spreads. The way to do that is to take immediate action against the regime in Belgrade."

² Moral Combat: NATO at War, BBC2, 12 March 2000.

personality, bureaucratic constraints and leadership style, stress and miscalculations, have all shaped foreign policy decisions. The same goes for the classic military, economic and geopolitical attributes related to a State's power and, as for internationally related variables, the role of balance of power equilibrium and of international organisations.

Therefore, a broad assortment of foreign policy options which may range from being action-packed or commonplace, such as leaders' decisions to go to war or heighten hostilities, form strong alliances or establish diplomatic relations, and make peace or subtly diminish antagonism, all depend on these four main determinants of foreign policy choices which have a dramatic impact on the decision-making environment.

First and foremost, we will thus have to establish, in the first couple of chapters, the role played by these variables in standard foreign policy decision making processes. We shall do this by employing conflicting theoretical works and supporting or disproving one theory or the other with a series of modern and traditional cases. Both primary sources-such as recently released government records, important speeches and veracious autobiographies, and secondary sources-such as extremely valid research work, recent documentaries and relevant newspaper articles, shall be used in the process.

Only then, when we have fully demonstrated the significance of the factors which affect foreign policy decision making, will we then analyse the domestic, international, psychological and cultural and historical constraints which shaped the actions of the Clinton administration in the decision making process which culminated in favour of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's bombing of Yugoslavia. We will first analyse the Clinton administration's true objectives when intervening in the war and we shall then proceed to analyse the decision-making process itself, taking into account the errors which were unwittingly or in some cases strategically made, the unexpected developments which caused a radical shift in positions and the fundamentally diverging stances between certain key figures.

After proving that all four of these attributes had an impact in shaping the actions of American decision makers, we will compare and contrast the variables between themselves in order to find out which ones played a bigger role in swaying the Clinton administration towards their final foreign policy choice. We shall do this by taking into account that, at the outset of the Kosovo War, American foreign policy decision makers had four options which they could employ with the first one being the traditionally and logically preferred diplomatic solution, whilst two other ones were

more aggressive and involved opting for collective action or sending ground troops in Kosovo unilaterally, and the last one was the most peaceful one of all and would have completely eliminated the possibility of a military confrontation with President Milosevic-however, as we shall find out, this pacifism would have come at a cost.

We'll come to the conclusion that the Clinton administration was indeed shaped by the previously mentioned main four variables when it evaluated that the only course of action which could be taken in Kosovo was military intervention through the form of an intergovernmental organisation. However what differentiated this particular decision making process from others, and what provides an answer as to the reasons for the Clinton administration's involvement in a faraway and seemingly unpredictable war are psychological and domestic variables which heavily affected the exclusion of other courses of action.

CHAPTER ONE

THE STATE ACTOR: DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

SUMMARY: 1. Military Power and a Multilevel Analysis. – 1.1. Does a Nation's Military Power Bestow upon it a World Power Status? – 1.2. Hard Power and Soft Power. – 1.3. A Decision Maker's Willingness to Use Force. – 2. Economic Power. – 2.1. The Significance of Natural Resources – 2.2. Natural Resources with Relation to Time – 2.3. Does Economic Power Boost Military Capabilities? – 3. Geographical Attributes. – 3.1. Are Bigger Countries More Powerful? – 3.2. Are Smaller Countries Destined to be Weak? – 3.3. Power Projection and Geographical Capabilities – 3.4. The Significance of a Country's Borders– 3.5. How Do Geographical Attributes Influence Military Strategies?

1. Military Power and a Multilevel Analysis

It seems to be rather obvious that a State's military strength plays a significant role in establishing the boundaries of what decision makers may and may not afford to do on the basis of the interests and capabilities of their country. As a general rule, countries which exert strong potential on the military field provide their decision makers with ample opportunities on the foreign policy field whilst countries which are relatively weak in military terms provide their decision makers with scant opportunities on the foreign policy field.

Still, we must consider that military power isn't the sole key factor which affects the decision making process and that many more circumstances, both domestic and international, must be taken into consideration. However the realist school of thought, which operates on the assumption that anarchy is the most important external condition which affects foreign policy decision-making³, focuses tremendously on the supposition that the whole international system is riddled with States who seek military power in order to influence international politics, described as nothing more than a jealous game of military power which revolves around States pursuing their own self interests⁴.

³ Smith, Steve (2012). *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴ Lobell, S. E. (2009). *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Indeed, regardless of the several doubts affecting the true translation⁵ of the following quote, strategic grand master Carl von Clausewitz once stated that “*War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.*”⁶ According to the realist⁷ military theorist we should thus automatically⁸ assume that the more efficient a State is militarily, the wider the range of foreign policy choices will be and the more decision-makers will be able to freely choose and enact their favourite and, in their eyes, most effective foreign policy choices.

As we shall demonstrate, we must take great care in not falling too deeply into the realist mind-set which doesn’t take into account a series of other factors which influence foreign policy decision making. Thus, the nexus between a State’s power and the range of decisions which a decision-maker may take is perfectly summed up by Professor Jeffrey S. Lantis, who states that “*the global distribution of economic wealth and military power allows some powerful states to pursue their preferred options in foreign policy but disadvantages others*”⁹.

The Professor formulated this conclusion after having extensively analysed the “global distribution of military and economic power” between several East Asian countries by asking himself the following question: who could ever imagine the Philippines or Vietnam influencing regional politics when we take into account China’s military might? According to the scholar, China’s prowess on the military and economic field clearly demonstrates that it “*may have a greater opportunity to influence regional politics.*”¹⁰

The fact that the Professor includes economic wealth as a fundamental factor which tightens the link between power and a wide range of foreign policy decision making opportunities, demonstrates that other domestic factors such as economic might, influence foreign policy decision making.

⁵ Which are thoroughly examined in Holmes R. James’ article called *Everything You Know About Clausewitz is Wrong*, The Diplomat, Web. 12 November 2014.

⁶ Clausewitz, Carl von (1984). *Vom Krieg*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 87.

⁷ The fact that the Prussian general was indeed a realist is expertly analysed in Cozette Murielle’s essay called *Realistic Realism? American Political Realism, Clausewitz and Raymond Aron on the Problem of Means and Ends In International Politics*, Journal of Strategic Studies, Web. 8 September 2010.

⁸ As we may deduce through the Prussian general’s use of the term “merely” which, in other words, suggests that war solely and exclusively represents the continuation of politics by other means.

⁹ Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Beasley Ryan. *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Web. May 2017.

¹⁰ Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Beasley Ryan. *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Web. May 2017.

Moreover, we should consider that the use of the modal verb “may”, when talking about the relationship between the range of opportunities which decision makers may have and a nation’s military and power, demonstrates that¹¹ the relationship between domestic factors such as military and economic factors, and a wide range of foreign policy options is neither absolute nor exclusive. We must therefore find ourselves at odds with the theories of offensive realism which state that “*stronger military power will lead states to their ultimate goals in a context of anarchy*”¹² and temporarily focus on the assumptions of Liberal institutionalism, which suggests that the creation of inter-governmental institutions may regulate state behaviour. Moreover we must take into consideration that military power goes both ways-it may not only increase a decision maker’s foreign policy options but may also increase a decision maker’s chances of influencing foreign decision makers’ own foreign policy options.

1.1 Does a Nation’s Military Power Bestow Upon it a World Power Status?

After having analysed data taken from this year’s Global Firepower Index- an index which ranks over one hundred nations’ militaries based on a complicated formula¹³ which utilizes over fifty factors-we may find that military superiority doesn’t automatically bestow a world power status upon the nation in an international context.

Keeping in mind that realists believe that States strive to obtain military power so that their foreign policy makers may influence another country’s foreign policy decision makers, we should observe that even though India ranks higher than the UK¹⁴ in the 2017 Military Strength Scale, also known as the Power Index¹⁵, and even though India is one of the largest contributors of troops¹⁶ to the

¹¹ A point which the scholar explores throughout the rest of his research paper

¹² Grieco, Joseph, *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism*, International Organization. Vol 42. No 3. 1988.

¹³ The formula takes into account each nation’s potential conventional war-making capabilities across sea, air and land along with a nation’s resources, finances and geography.

¹⁴ Indeed, India ranks fourth whilst the UK ranks sixth, all thanks to India’s obviously superior Military Personnel, Aircraft Strength, Army Strength, Total Naval Assets, Logistics, Natural Resources, Finance and Geographical Values. An interesting point would be that the Global Firepower Index, which we have previously analysed, doesn’t take into consideration the nuclear capability of a country.

¹⁵ Moreover, it is worth noting that according to other indexes such as the Credit Suisse’s Military Strength Index, India has ranked higher than the UK for several years.

¹⁶ Indeed, in June 2011, Lynch Column stated in his *India threatens to pull plug on peacekeeping* Foreign Policy Article, that “today, India has over 8,500 peacekeepers in the field, more than twice as many as the U.N.’s five big powers combined”.

United Nations' peacekeeping missions, the country still hasn't obtained a Permanent Member Status in the United Nations' Security Council, despite its frustration¹⁷ and constant attempts to do so- as demonstrated by India's active participation in the G4 nations.

On the other hand the UK, which is a Permanent Member of the United Nations' Security Council, is relatively militarily weaker than India on the Military Strength Scale, and contributes less to the United Nations' peacekeeping missions when compared to certain G4 nations.¹⁸ Indeed, being a permanent member of the Security Council of the world's most powerful intergovernmental organisation thus having permanent veto power, would provide a country's decision-makers with the *de facto* control¹⁹ of international peace and security.²⁰ This degree of power would allow foreign policy makers of one country to heavily influence decision making in another country by establishing peacekeeping operations, imposing international sanctions²¹, and authorizing military action²² through Security Council resolutions. This is precisely why numerous foreign policy scholars recognise that "*a way to evaluate great power status is to look to those States that have been recognised as significant players on the world stage by their status as permanent members in the UN Security Council*²³."

As we shall explore later on, with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia-which was done for the first time in NATO's history without the approval of the UN Security Council because of Russia's and China's threat of vetoing NATO's proposal for military action-the veto power may dramatically affect the course of a war.

¹⁷ For example, Prime Minister Modi Narendra's stated, back in 2015, "We are struggling to get a seat in the UN Security Council...India is asking for its rights"

¹⁸ Indeed, the UK has, throughout the last years, been contributing less than Japan and Germany who are both members of the G4, with regards to the UN's peacekeeping missions. This is clearly demonstrated by the Annex present in the United Nations Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary General, on the seventieth session of the General Assembly. The Report ranks the Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations throughout the years 2015 and 2018, and was published on the 28th December 2015.

¹⁹ Mishra Anant, *Assessing the Veto*, International Policy Digest. Web. 11 April 2017.

²⁰ As stated in the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39, 1945.

²¹ As stated in the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 41, 1945.

²² As stated in the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42, 1945.

²³ Breuning Marijke, *Role Theory in Foreign Policy*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Web. May 2017.

The fact that India doesn't have a permanent seat on the Security Council thus permanent veto power, explains the reasons behind the Indian External Affairs Minister's following quote, which demonstrates foreign policy decision makers' eagerness to expand their foreign policy decision making capabilities: "*If not this time then next time India would become a permanent member of the Security Council... we don't want any discrimination between old and new members. We don't want two classes-that there is a first class and a second class of permanent members.*"²⁴

This example clarifies two assumptions: one, that today's world order isn't as anarchical as Hobbes's description of an international context, seeing as the rise of non-governmental organisations allow there to be a more democratic and tidy decision-making process; two, that a country's allies don't bestow upon the country's decision makers superior decision making powers just because the country is a military strength.

Still, we must recognise that military superiority is an important factor when assessing the range of decision making possibilities which a decision-maker has. A State's adventurousness in foreign policy quests, its bargaining power in international disputes and the degree of respect which it carries in relation to less powerful countries are all characteristics which can be measured by considering, among other things, military might .

Moreover, as recognised by the U.S State Department of Defence, the ability of a State to project its military forces into a foreign area may influence the decision-making process in another State. Indeed, according to force projection, which is defined by the U.S Department of Defence's Military Dictionary as "*the capacity of a state to apply all or some of its elements of national power-political, economic, informational or military...to contribute to deterrence and to enhance regional stability*"²⁵, power goes both ways.

For example, one of the U.S' favourite foreign diplomacy tactics during the Cold War was the use of hard power projection as a means of compulsion or deterrence thus attempting to influence the decision-making process of foreign actors²⁶. It is interesting to note, however, that "*the shift from a bipolar distribution of power during the Cold War to unipolar U.S military dominance caused U.S*

²⁴ As stated by Swaraj Sushma in the Times of India's *India will become permanent member of UN Security Council*: Swaraj April 2016 article.

²⁵ US Department of Defense (2013). *The Dictionary of Military Terms*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.

²⁶ Such as the United States' embargo against Cuba in 1962, after Fidel Castro nationalized American owned oil refineries.

*strategy to shift from policies of deterrence or containment of threats to policies of preventive warfare*²⁷” as demonstrated for example, by the U.S’ led coalition in Iraq in 2003, where many scholars agree that American decision-makers didn’t even try to employ the deterrence strategy, based on the apparent assumption that Saddam Hussein was “un-deterrable”²⁸. The difference in behaviours which decision-makers have on the basis of whether or not the system is bipolar, unipolar or multipolar, will be analysed later on²⁹.

2.2 Hard Power and Soft Power

We must consider that power projection isn’t limited to hard power assets which are only “*associated principally with the armed forces*³⁰” but also involves soft power, described as a relatively new theory which “*comes from diplomacy, culture and history*³¹.” Indeed, according to the former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton Administration, “*the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might makes others follow your will... both hard power and soft power are important.*³²” Culinary curiosities aside, it is obvious that the American political scientist depicts soft power-thus the offer of an alliance, economic help or military protection-with the term carrots; and hard power-thus war and economic sanctions- with the term sticks.³³

Another important factor which must be considered is that-unlike some other characteristics- a State’s military strength is an ever-changing factor³⁴. For example, as demonstrated by political scientist Hanns W. Maull, both Germany and Japan transformed themselves into “civilian powers” after World War Two. However an interesting point regards the fact that both countries still retained their power status throughout history, regardless of the post-war limited possibilities of military

²⁷ Lieberfeld, Daniel. *Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War*, International journal of Peace Studies. Volume 10, 2005.

²⁸ Williams, Rachel. *Lessons in Deterrence from U.S Foreign Policy in Iraq, 1982-2003*. Political Science, Yale. Web. 25 April 2017.

²⁹ Another interesting point is that, as Copeland Daryl states in his article *Hard Power, Soft Power and Talking to the Taliban* published in 2010 on Guerrilla Diplomacy, the gap between soft power and hard power is further widened on the basis of a country’s institutional setting, the bureaucratic culture of the military, international organisations and the country’s foreign ministries.

³⁰ Copeland Daryl, *Hard Power, Soft Power, and Talking to the Taliban*. Guerrilla Diplomacy. Web. 30 January 2010.

³¹ Copeland, Daryl. *Hard Power vs Soft Power*. Web. 2 February 2010.

³² Nye Joseph S. *Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power*. Guerrilla Diplomacy. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Web. 10 January 2003.

³³ Indeed, towards the end of his piece he states “now that we Americans have a big stick we should learn to speak softly” referring to Theodore Roosevelt’s famous quote.

³⁴ Rizwan Amer, *An Introduction to Foreign Policy: Definition, Nature and Determinants*. Web. 2 August 2009.

power politics. Indeed, the scholar corroborates our theory, stating that “*the dynamics of international relations have shifted from the military-political sphere to economic and social developments—a shift that favors Japan and Germany...military power is left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction*”³⁵ thus recognising that economic factors and not just military ones must be taken into account when assessing foreign policy decision making.

Scholar Marijke Breuning fully supports these claims by stating “*Maull questions the standard assumption that a State’s power is best understood in military terms and thus broadens the understanding of how decision makers pursue their state’s interests*”³⁶.

As Ernest Wilson recognises³⁷ both hard power and soft power are important when decision-makers try to subtly or blatantly coerce foreign decision-makers to take certain actions or prevent them from taking certain actions. This is precisely why Joseph Nye believes that only through smart power, which is nothing more than a combination of hard power and soft power strategies³⁸, decision makers will have the best possibility to influence other decision makers.

2.3 A Decision Maker’s Willingness to Use Force

We may consider that, from the point of view of a country’s own decision-makers, the comfort of knowing that their country may easily and expertly defend itself when necessary will probably provide the country’s decision makers with a sense of cautious tranquility or jovial assertiveness which is reflected in the State’s foreign policy. Vice versa, from the point of view of foreign decision-makers, the mere fact of knowing that the other country has a strong military force should be more than enough to make a reasonable foreign decision-maker think twice before issuing vain and aggressive threats against that militarily powerful country.

³⁵ Maull Hanns W. *Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers*. Foreign Affairs. Web. Winter 1990/91 Issue.

³⁶ Breuning Marijke, *Role Theory in Foreign Policy*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Web. May 2017.

³⁷ Indeed, he describes smart power as “the capacity to coerce another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise” in his piece called *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power*, published by SAGE Publications on behalf of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 2008.

³⁸ Smart power is defined by the Center for Strategic and International Studies as “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action”, as we may see in its 2012 article called *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*.

It is obvious that the intensity of a Nation's threats, combined with whether the international system is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, usually influences a decision maker's decision to use force and a State's military spending. This reflects the Cold War atmosphere perfectly, when the stakes were high because of the United State's and Soviet Union's military might, their intense rivalry and mutual threats. It is thus obvious that American and Russian decision makers, understanding that the risks of a mutual destruction were too high, decided to opt for softer strategies in order to pursue their country's own national interests in a feasible manner. As stated by philosopher Raymond Aron, in the bipolar system, they couldn't afford not to do so³⁹.

On top of all that, we must consider that a decision maker's willingness, and not only possibility, to use force plays an important role in determining whether or not the military factor has an active impact on the State's power. There are indeed certain militarily powerful countries such as Canada,⁴⁰ Australia⁴¹ and Switzerland⁴² which have a historically peaceful manner of resolving difficult international issues or deciding to take part in the resolution through ways which don't include military force⁴³. As we shall explore later on, culture, geographic location and history play a huge role in a decision maker's desire to act coercively or diplomatically. Moreover, even though we have stated that the stronger a State's military is the more opportunities it provides its decision makers with, certain States have extremely limited attack and defense capabilities, such as Iceland⁴⁴, but are nonetheless respected as important actors on the international arena who influence foreign decision makers through the use of soft power⁴⁵.

³⁹ Aron, Raymond. *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973*. Cambridge, 1974.

⁴⁰ Indeed Canada comes 26th on the Global Firepower Index yet is ranked fifth on the World Economic Forum's Soft Power 30 Index

⁴¹ Indeed Australia comes 22nd on the Global Firepower Index yet is ranked sixth on the World Economic Forum's Soft Power 30 Index

⁴² Whilst Switzerland comes seventh on the Soft Power 30 Index, it ranks 37th on the Global Firepower Index.

⁴³ Indeed, Canada ranks eighth on the Global Peace Index ranking, Australia ranks twelfth and Switzerland ranks ninth.

⁴⁴ In accordance with Iceland's cultural identity as a pacifist nation, the country has not had a standing army since 1869. However, it still has a military expeditionary peacekeeping force, an air defense system, an extensive militarised coast guard, a police service and a tactical police force. Moreover, it is an active member of NATO and has had a defense agreement with the United States until 2006 and has had several other agreements regarding military and security operations with Denmark, Norway and other NATO countries.

⁴⁵ In fact it is described by the Nato Association of Canada as "a valuable ally to the NATO Alliance...Iceland has played a crucial role in defending the Western Alliance", as stated by Mah Spenser, *Iceland in NATO: an unlikely yet invaluable partner*, Nato Association of Canada, Web, 24 January 2017.

2. Economic Power

Considering that “*as foreign policy decision makers seek their way across the global stage, decision makers have to take into account how the national environment constrains the policy options that are realistically available to them*”⁴⁶ a country’s economic wealth may be considered to be a factor which significantly influences a decision maker’s foreign policy options. Much like the potential power which a State may have thanks to its military, a State’s potential power may also be measured on the basis of its economic capabilities. One can assume that the wealthier a State may be, the more its decision makers may be able to influence and restrict other decision makers’ options. Still, we should always keep in mind that “*multi-causal explanations are most appropriate in explanations of foreign policy decision making.*”⁴⁷

2. The Significance of Natural Resources

A wide range of theories state that foreign policy decisions are inextricably linked to a State’s economic capabilities. The fact that power may be exercised through economic means is supported by the role which the presence of natural resources play in a country’s economic wealth and foreign policy decisions. The general rule is that the lack or abundance of natural resources influence a country’s needs and objectives, considering that States who lack natural resources will try to obtain them, and States who have an abundance of natural resources will try to exploit them. Thus, temporarily considering that decision makers act in the State’s best interests, the availability of a country’s natural resources may influence a decision maker’s actions.

For example, a brief analysis of the early 1970s embargo by the *Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries*, under the leadership of Saudi Arabian oil minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani, demonstrates how control over a strategic resource may influence other decision makers’ actions.

The main reason for the Arab neighbouring countries’ rare unification, was that they wanted to pressure oil-importing countries into giving them concessions with regards to the longstanding conflict between Israel. Even though the efficiency of embargos is heavily debated⁴⁸ the fact that oil

⁴⁶ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁷ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁸ As stated by the director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, Trenin Dmitri in an article called *How effective are economic sanctions?* published on the World Economic Forum in 2015. “Applying sanctions is usually a double-edged sword. The country applying sanctions hurts its own businesses that trade with or invest in the target country....Sanctions can also provoke counter-sanctions...The stronger economy backed by other forms of power can incur more damage on the target country than it will sustain in return, but it does not always alter the political behaviour of the government to be punished.

is finite is of a great importance seeing as the embargo caused a severely limited availability of gasoline which worsened the economic situation of certain oil importing countries. This embargo demonstrates that economic power is indeed effective, seeing as the *Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries* managed to force the most desperate oil importing countries to modify their policies towards the Middle East.⁴⁹ It is thus interesting to note that the world's "unipole" and its strong allies found itself in a disastrous situation in which their livelihood was threatened by what was perceived to be a small group of chaotic and incompetent countries which however, had managed to alter foreign policy decisions of great international actors.

However, as we shall explain, we should consider that a lack of natural resources doesn't automatically mean that these States are condemned to be weak and insignificant for the rest of eternity. Moreover, States which have an abundance of natural resources aren't automatically going to rule the world.

It is also important to remember that natural resources definitely don't determine a country's economic wealth which may be based on a series of other factors. We may take the case of Belgium as an example and consider that it has very few natural resources but a highly developed economy, mainly thanks to the fact that nowadays its economy depends heavily on international trade. As recognized by *Trading Economics*, this leads to the average Belgian, an individual whose country lacks natural resources, to be wealthier⁵⁰ than the average Iraqi, an individual whose country practically wallows in oil⁵¹.

Indeed the Middle East, in line with the so called resource curse, has spiraled into chaos, war and despair and is a perfect example of a transcontinental region which has been incapable of exploiting

⁴⁹ For example, mighty Japan was heavily dependent on Arab oil and not even a month after the embargo started Japan issued a statement on the 22nd of November, stating that "Israel should withdraw from all of the 1967 territories, advocating Palestinian self-determination and threatening to reconsider its policy towards Israel." Shortly after this statement, the Saudi government labeled Japan as an Arab-friendly state. The same goes for Canada which, according to Professor Roy Licklider, "after the embargo, moved quickly toward the Arab position." Even the UK, the USA's most loyal ally, refused to allow the United States to use British bases and Cyprus to airlift supplies to Israel.

⁵⁰ Indeed, *Trading Economics* recognised that in 2016 Belgium's GDP per capita was 45308.24 US dollars and Iraq's GDP per capita was 16086.9 US dollars in 2016.

⁵¹ Indeed, *World Atlas* has classified Iraq as having the fifth largest oil reserve in the world which amounts to 1422.2 billion barrels of oil, recognising that Iraq may even have bigger reserves but that "it was not possible to do any meaningful exploration of Iraq's oil reserves owing to civil unrest and military occupations over the last few decades. As a result the data used is at least three decades old."

the vast quantities of oil which it has been blessed with and which the rest of the world eagerly pursue.

Moreover, decision makers whose country lacks natural resources don't necessarily concentrate their foreign policy efforts by solely focusing on their state's economic external relations. Indeed, even though according to some scholars Belgian decision makers definitely do so⁵² we may take the case of Netherlands as an example. Both countries are equally small democracies which have a very open economy and are extremely dependent on international trade. However, as opposed to Belgium, its decision makers do not shy away from high profile foreign policy roles, probably for reasons related to the Netherlands having a more heroic history, developed culture and successful colonial experience.

The same goes for Japan, a mountainous and volcanic island nation, which, as opposed to Nigeria⁵³, has inadequate natural resources to support its enormous population and growing economy and thus depends on raw materials. This was one of the main reasons for Japan's military aggressiveness towards its potentially wealthier neighbours in the past. Indeed Japanese leaders have always seen their economy as "*deadlocked because of the shortage of raw materials in Japan, its expanding population and the division of the world into economic blocks.*"⁵⁴

Towards the aftermath of World War One, Japan had to face protectionist Western barriers on Japanese trade, anti-Asian immigration laws and Western colonial markets which controlled the world's resources. It is thus not surprising that the Japanese obviously sought to copy the West's pattern⁵⁵ and become highly relevant in their own economic spheres of influence. Indeed, the desire to obtain raw materials in Manchuria, such as oil, rubber and lumber, was "*justified on the basis of the lifeline argument*⁵⁶-the idea that Japan's economy was deadlocked...*The Japanese aggression*

⁵² Coolsaet Rik, *Belgie en zijn Buitenlandse Politiek*. Web. 2014.

⁵³ Which, according to *World Atlas*, has 37.07 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and is thus the tenth largest oil producer in the world.

⁵⁴ Townsend Susan, *Japan's Quest for an Empire*, BBC. Web. 30 March 2011.

⁵⁵ Indeed, as stated by Mutter, James. *Japanese Society and the 1931 Invasion of Manchuria*. Journal of World History. Web. 2004, "Japan increasingly looked upon Britain as a model for success, as both countries shared quite similar geographical characteristics...In an attempt to mimic Britain's solution, Japan began to search for colonies."

⁵⁶ As it was described by Japanese media throughout the 1930s. The Japanese slogan throughout the years was infact "Manchuria, Japan's life-line" also known as "seimeisen."

*of Manchuria in 1931 was in this context and was justified on the basis of the Manchurian-Mongolian seimeisen argument*⁵⁷.”

The fact that Japanese decision makers took a foreign policy decision primarily on the basis of the need to obtain raw materials from a foreign country demonstrates the importance of a country having or not having raw materials. We should note, however, that factors such as public opinion played a huge role in the decision on whether or not to go to war. Indeed, the highly literate public opinion, fuelled by the media's criticism of the government, the boycott of Japanese goods and the casualties caused by anti-Japanese uprisings in China, played a fundamental role in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Indeed, the Japanese foreign minister, Shidehara, reportedly attempted to resolve the dispute through diplomacy, but was heavily criticized by the newspapers who described his foreign policy as “*spineless*”⁵⁸.”

As for the question of who foreign policy decision-makers truly are, even though one may assume that in this case it was the Japanese foreign minister, we should consider that the military played a huge role in foreign policy decision making in Japan at the time, behaving “*as the only legitimate advisor on the Emperor's exercise of Supreme Command*”⁵⁹” and was accused of invading Manchuria by ignoring the government in Tokyo. Indeed, journalist Goto Shinobu went so far as to describe the war as a “*two-fold coup d'état*”⁶⁰ by the Kwantung army against the government in Tokyo and the government in China. This would demonstrate that there is more to foreign policy decisions than one simple motivation, and that the context in which foreign policy decisions are taken must be analysed very carefully, in order to understand the causes which led to the decision itself.

Another example which proves that natural resources don't always entail economic wealth is a comparison between Taiwan and Venezuela, considering that Venezuela is the country with the highest volume of proven oil reserves in the world⁶¹, easily overtaking Saudi Arabia, but is nonetheless facing a devastating economic collapse. We should note that for more than fifty years,

⁵⁷ Townsend Susan, *Japan's Quest for an Empire*, BBC. Web. 30 March 2011.

⁵⁸ Mutter, James. *Japanese Society and the 1931 Invasion of Manchuria*. Journal of World History. Web. 2004.

⁵⁹ Mutter, James. *Japanese Society and the 1931 Invasion of Manchuria*. Journal of World History. Web. 2004.

⁶⁰ Young, Louise (1998). *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

⁶¹ *World Atlas* states that by 2017 it has over 298.4 billion barrels of oil thanks to the discovery of huge reserves of oil sands deposits which may however be easily extracted, and thanks to its conventional deposits.

Taiwan's natural resources were entirely at Japan's disposal, with the official policy being "industry for Japan, agriculture for Taiwan"⁶² thus maximizing the exploitation of Taiwan's natural resources "primarily for the benefit of the Japanese colonial forces in Taiwan and for the home islands."⁶³

We may thus observe how decision-makers whose States lacks resources decide to embark on foreign policy quests which include wars and military occupations of foreign countries. This will ultimately lead to the possibility of exploiting the foreign country's resources and in the process, depleting the foreign country of its own resources. Indeed this was a common practice throughout the years 1881 to 1945, as we may see through the policies which European countries pursued from 1881 to 1914 during the Scramble for Africa, with the continent having plentiful resources of copper, cotton, rubber, almond oil, cocoa, diamonds, tea and tin. Even though these raw materials were deemed to be indispensable by European consumers they were unavailable in European countries, which is precisely one of the main causes of imperialism⁶⁴, along with national prestige and propaganda, world influence and maintaining the balance of power equilibrium⁶⁵.

As for Taiwan, we may thus understand why, after its liberation from Japan in 1945, it was almost devoid of resources and nowadays only has small deposits of coal, natural gas, limestone, marble and arable land⁶⁶. However, confirming the theory that a lack of natural resources doesn't mean infinite poverty, Taiwan has nonetheless managed to become the 22nd largest economy in the world⁶⁷ thanks to its hi-tech electronics exports and the global consumer electronics boom.

2.2 Natural Resources with Relation to Time

We should note that we shouldn't just evaluate the importance of natural resources, but we should also determine the significance of natural resources with relation to time, taking into account

⁶² Indeed, this was the Office of the Governor-General's official economic policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

⁶³ Chang David Ch'ang-yi (2008). *Taiwan's Environmental Struggle: Toward a Green Silicon Island*. Routledge, Contemporary Asia Series.

⁶⁴ As recognised by Foreign Policy News "impressed by the continent's abundant supply of natural resources, Europeans sought to exploit the potential wealth. To attain this objective, they endeavored to hegemonies...European nations initiated competitions to colonize as much African territory as possible." Zahid Khan, *Colonialism in Africa: Bondage, exploitation and developments*. Foreign Policy News. Web. 22 May 2016.

⁶⁵ Hobson, J. A (2011). *Imperialism: A Study*. Spokesman Books.

⁶⁶ CIA World Factbook, Natural Resources in 2017, Taiwan. Web. 2017

⁶⁷ According to the International Monetary Fund's statistics in 2016.

measures such as technological development and globalisation. Indeed, oil has garnered importance only thanks to recent technological developments which led to the invention of the internal combustion engine. Thus, in the past, no countries were interested in oil. Rather, they preferred competing for arable land, as stated by scholar Patrick Vinton Kirch who studied Maori warfare during the 19th century, stating that “*Vadya’s model...provides an important perspective on the ability of territorial conquest responds to pressures of population and land distribution (whether real or simply perceived as such by the groups involved)...Roger Duff similarly stressed the role of population pressure and competition for arable land as the primary stimulus to warfare in New Zealand*⁶⁸.”

In the past, no countries were interested in uranium either, whilst it has recently become an invaluable resource needed for atomic energy development, the production of weapons-grade uranium, and the basis for many aggressive foreign policy decisions, as demonstrated by the Chadian-Libyan Conflict. Indeed, one of Colonel Gaddafi’s main reasons for intervening in Chad was “*the presence in the area of uranium deposits*⁶⁹.” This is precisely why Gaddafi intended to annex the northernmost part of Chad, thus the uranium-rich Aouzou Strip, seize it and place it under direct military control. At a certain stage, the Libyan military managed to control as much as one-third of uranium-rich northern Chad. Colonel Gaddafi decided to combine these efforts by providing arms and financial support to a series of rebel groups who were trying to secede from the legitimate Chad government, before embarking on a full scale invasion in 1980. Our point is supported by the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* which states that “*Libya’s nuclear program also helps to explain some puzzling aspects of Libyan foreign policy in the uranium-rich Sahel*⁷⁰.”

Of course, several other factors influenced the Libyan authorities’ foreign policy decision to intervene in Chad, such as “*the use of Chad as a base to expand Gaddafi’s influence in central Africa*⁷¹” thus creating a Libya-friendly Muslim Republic which would, at the same time, drastically reduce French control of the area. Seeing as Colonel Gaddafi’s foreign policy was thus

⁶⁸ Kirch, Patric V (1989). *The Evolution of the Polynesian Chiefdoms*. Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁹ Pike, John. *Libyan Intervention in Chad 1980-87*. Global Security. Web. 2016.

⁷⁰ Micallef Joseph V.R. *A nuclear bomb for Libya?* The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Volume 37, Number 7. August/September 1981.

⁷¹ Azevedo M. J (1998). *The Roots of Violence: A history of War in Chad*, Routledge.

primarily⁷² focused on obtaining uranium in order to gain a more respected international military standing, we may thus state, based on this brief example, that natural resources do play a role in, overall, determining a decision-maker's foreign policy, as long as in that specific period of time they are useful and may be strategically used. Of course, it is the civilized international system as a whole which dictates whether or not a resource may be deemed useful. A classic example regards the Amerindians merrily trading their gold with conquerors' beads, not recognising the true value which gold had in the civilized world where rules were dictated by the most powerful countries, which usually were the richest and had acquired, over time, most gold⁷³.

We may thus state that obtaining economic wealth does not strictly derive from having a large quantity of raw materials, seeing as much depends on how they are used, on the country's degree of civilization or stability and on the country's willingness and ability to exploit those resources.

2.3 Does Economic Power Boost Military Capabilities?

As recognised by Jeffrey Lantis, "*economic power and not just economic wealth may be useful to purchase military capability*⁷⁴." Seeing as military capabilities are related to economic capabilities such as military spending, we should ask ourselves if, statistically speaking, wealthy countries invest more on their military capabilities, and if so whether or not highly militarized countries are more likely to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. We may observe that countries with the highest military expenditures are usually the wealthiest countries in the world⁷⁵ such as the United States⁷⁶, China⁷⁷, Japan⁷⁸, France⁷⁹ and Germany.⁸⁰ Their decision-makers will be able to afford this luxury,

⁷² For example, combined with other factors, the desire to obtain uranium would also explain why in the 1980s the Libyan Government was implicated in attempts to finance pro-Libyan groups in a series of countries which are major uranium producers-Niger, Gabon and the Central African Republic.

⁷³ Vilches, Elvira (2010). *New World Gold: Cultural Anxiety and Monetary Disorder in Early Modern Spain*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

⁷⁴ Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Beasley Ryan. *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Web. May 2017.

⁷⁵ As we may deduce from the *World Bank's 2016 Statistics on the List of Countries by Nominal GDP*, and the *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database in 2016*.

⁷⁶ Which ranks highest both on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale, and the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

⁷⁷ Which ranks second highest both on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale, and the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

⁷⁸ Which ranks third on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale and eighth on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

⁷⁹ Which ranks sixth both on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale, and the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

⁸⁰ Which ranks fourth on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale, and ninth on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

also experimenting on technologically sophisticated weaponry. Of course, a country's decision makers are the ones who decide whether or not to devote a small or large proportion of the State's wealth to their military, and there are decision-makers who decide to devote a great deal of money to their military even though their countries aren't particularly wealthy, such as Russia⁸¹ and Saudi Arabia⁸².

As for the question are highly militarized countries-which are thus usually wealthy countries- more likely to have an aggressive foreign policy just because they can afford it, we may state that it isn't always so. Indeed, we may take into account one of the Global Peace Index's indicators which is involvement in external conflict and is usually analysed by the *Institute for Economics and Peace*.

The Institute stated in 2015 that some of the worst countries in the world for external conflict were Uganda, Estonia and Rwanda, countries which are neither rich nor take any particular pride in their military skills, whilst Japan ranked as the eighth most peaceful country in the world, even though as we have recently stated it is one of the wealthiest and heavily militarized countries⁸³.

We could thus analyse whether decision makers whose country is in a dire economic condition are more prone towards pursuing an aggressive foreign policy in order to try to boost the nation's morale, to obtain foreign riches or simply to increase their own popularity. For example, historian A.J.P Taylor recognises that one of the main causes of Hitler's rise to power was Germany's disastrous economic condition. As "*the hyperinflation in 1924 wiped out much of the life saving of the middle class, the political consequences would be devastating as many people became distrustful of the Weimar government...this distrust, along with resentment over the Treaty of Versailles, lent itself to the increasing popularity of more left and right-wing radical political parties*"⁸⁴.

Moreover, because of the Great Depression and restrictionist trade policies, Nazi propaganda decided to concentrate on criticizing the Treaty of Versailles which increased the population's hostility towards the British, French and Americans. Seeing as these countries did have colonies which were particularly useful for raw materials in times of crisis "*have-not nations looked to form*

⁸¹ Which ranks twelfth on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale, and third on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

⁸² Which ranks twentieth on the World Bank's Nominal GDP scale and fourth on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

⁸³ Withnall Adam, *The nine most warmongering countries in the world revealed*. The Independent. Web. 2015.

⁸⁴ Johnson Matthew, *Economic Conditions that helped cause World War Two*. Investopedia. Web. 25 February 2016.

their own regional trade blocs and found it increasingly necessary to use force to annex territories with the much needed resources⁸⁵”.

Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the previously mentioned case of Japan invading Manchuria in the early 1930s, in Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and in Germany’s annexation of most of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia in 1939. However, we should consider that these pre-World War Two cases were quite particular, so we can’t transform these examples into a general rule. Indeed, countless historians disagree on the main causes of these wars, with some stating that economic conditions played a huge role in the conflict’s outbreak, and others stating that factors such as nationalism, militarism and specific conditions which had to do with the decision-makers’ warmongeringly impulsive or erroneously uninterested personalities.

The same goes for the Second World War itself, with the *World Trade Organisation* stating that “*the world economy spiraled downwards eventually contributing to the outbreak of World War Two.*” The use of the verb “contribute” makes us realise that the economy is just one of the several causes which influence a foreign policy decision. Indeed, if we take another look at the *Institute for Economics and Peace’s* Statistics, the Institute also stated that the US was the second worst country in the world for external conflict, the UK was the fourth worst country and that France was the sixth worst country⁸⁶. Our analysis to understand which factors influence a decision-maker taking a foreign policy decision, must thus go on.

Before passing on to the next stage, an interesting point is that military strategists may decide to employ the apparently most harmless natural resources as a weapon. The age-long tactic which involves destroying pipes conveying drinking water or polluting resources of water is terribly effective, as demonstrated by history’s earliest documented case thus the First Sacred War in Greece. Less radical military tactics may be used, such as strictly controlling the natural resources and threatening the other country that they’ll never manage to obtain them unless a certain deal is struck. This is precisely what Israel is doing when it ratifies “discriminatory water-sharing agreements” with Palestine, and when it denies Palestinians control over their water resources thus “*successfully setting the ground for water domination, granting itself a further tool to exercise its*

⁸⁵ Johnson Matthew, *Economic Conditions that helped cause World War Two*. Investopedia. Web. 25 February 2016.

⁸⁶ Withnall Adam, *The nine most warmongering countries in the world revealed*. The Independent. Web. 2015.

*hegemony over the occupied population and territory.*⁸⁷” and limiting foreign decision makers’ foreign policy options.

3. Geographical Attributes

Considering that capabilities of States are measurable assets which contribute towards shaping a State’s role on the world stage, another factor which may influence a State’s capabilities are a country’s geographic size, its population and its frontiers.

3.1 Are Bigger Countries More Powerful?

We could begin this analysis by temporarily assuming that bigger countries are more powerful, regardless of frontiers, seeing as they both have a larger population, therefore a bigger potential to have efficient conventional forces, and the opportunity to have more natural resources, therefore a larger economic potential. Seeing as the more powerful a State is, the fewer constraints their foreign policy decision-makers will have, we may automatically assume that foreign policy decisions which will also be based on a State’s size which plays a role in determining their ability to project power globally . In order to corroborate this theory, we should determine whether or not the largest countries in the world are considered to be the most powerful countries in the world.

Based on data from the *CIA World Factbook* which measures State’s Geographic Size (in total square km), the largest countries in the world are, in descending order of geographical size, Russia, Canada and the United States-which is only slightly bigger than China. We should consider the fact that throughout history both the United States and Russia were considered to be superpowers and that the latter country lost its superpower status after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union which reduced the territory from 22,400,000 square kilometers-which made it the world’s biggest country which covered a sixth of the world’s populated land-to 17,100,000 square kilometers. The fact that Russia losing its superpower status after its size was drastically reduced led to the United States to be described as the sole *hyperpower*⁸⁸ in the post-Cold War era seems to corroborate our theory. Moreover China is nowadays considered to be an emerging potential superpower⁸⁹ and Professor

⁸⁷ Corradin Camilla. *Israel: Water as a tool to dominate Palestinians*. Al Jazeera. Web. 23 June 2016.

⁸⁸ Bidwai Praful, *The US as a Hyperpower*. Transnational Institute. Web. 2006.

⁸⁹ Shaw, Timothy M. *The Emerging Politics of Merging Powers: The BRICs and the Global South*. University of Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies. Web. June 2010.

Amy Chua⁹⁰ has described it as an ancient hyperpower when analysing Ancient China's extremely vast Tang Dynasty⁹¹.

Therefore, nowadays three out of four of the world's largest countries are hyperpowers, superpowers or emerging potential powers. However Canada, the second largest country in the world, is not even in the top ten most powerful countries⁹². However, much can be attributed to its relatively recent history as an independent country, low population and moderately peaceful culture-the latter of which we'll analyse later on.

As for the relationship between a country's size and population, the United Nations' *World Population Prospects* in 2017 recognised that Canada has a smaller population than Argentina which proves that a large country doesn't necessarily entail that it will have a high population, especially when dealing with countries which have particular geographic and climatic conditions that render less than half of its territory practically uninhabitable.⁹³ On the other hand, Japan ranks eleventh by population and 61st in the United Nations' Statistics Division⁹⁴, demonstrating that a country's size thus its potential capabilities, isn't necessarily related to its population. The fact that India has a higher population than the United States and that Russia's population is less than half of that of the United States further supports our findings.

3.2 Are Small Countries Destined to be Weak?

As for small countries, we must not automatically assume that they are weak, irrelevant or unimportant, especially seeing as a country's own geographic characteristics are only small flecks when we consider the wider picture thus a multilevel analysis of foreign policy. Seeing as they'll

⁹⁰ Professor Amy Chua has described enormous empires such as the British Empire, the Mongol Empire which ranged 24 million square kilometers at its best, the Ottoman Empire which ranged 5, 200 000, the Achaemenid Empire which ranged 5.5 million square kilometers, the Roman Empire which ranged 5 million square kilometers at its best, as hypowerpowers, thus supporting our point that a country's size truly does matter when decision makers have to evaluate the range of potential options which they have when taking a foreign policy decision.

⁹¹ Chua Amy (2007). *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance-and Why they Fall*. Doubleday.

⁹² As demonstrated by *Business Insider's* ranking of the *23 Most Powerful Nations on Earth* in 2017 and by *US News' Power Ranking* in 2017. Both rank Canada as 12th, giving it an extremely low score for "their military", a high score for "strong international alliances", a good score for being "economically influential", and a relatively low score for the "being politically influential" and "a leader" section.

⁹³ Indeed, approximately about four-fifths of Canada's population lives within 150 kilometers of the contiguous United States border.

⁹⁴ Which created a ranking of the list of countries and dependency by area in 2017

have a harder time achieving their preferred foreign policy options, small countries are going to have to compensate by being even more strategic when taking a foreign policy decision. Indeed, thanks to their decision-makers, small states may become economic giants, relevant players in international organisations⁹⁵ and may be crafty and scheming when it comes to alliances. Moreover, small countries' foreign policy decision makers do not all act in the same way⁹⁶ when trying to find solutions which compensate their size in order to allow them influence global politics. This would lead us to believe that there have to be even more factors other than geography which influence foreign policy decision making.

Still, smaller States do have certain natural disadvantages which can be summed up under the terms of having less structural power which leaves them more unprepared to deal with the challenges that the international environment presents, and leaves them more open to external influence and coercion. Moreover, according to Panke, “*weak aggregate structural power makes them less attractive coalition partners*”⁹⁷ thus eliminating another chance for them to become relevant players on the global scale. For example, if we temporarily assume that small countries have smaller populations, a leader's ability to find able decision-makers whom they can count on and ask advice to is severely reduced. A rather amusing example regards the early American republic which encountered severe difficulties when trying to assemble an efficient American diplomatic force. As a result the Republic had no choice but to employ foreigners as consuls. However much like constructivist political scientist Alexander Wendt believes that anarchy is what States make of it, we believe that national and international constraints are what decision-makers make of them.

It is obvious that small countries will tend to thrive when there is multilateralism and global peace and when they participate in large-scale international or regional organisations. Indeed, according to Vital “*the need for a peaceful international system...in early international relations was seen as the*

⁹⁵ As stated by Thorhallsson Baldur, *Small State Foreign Policy*. Web. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. May 2017. “Small states show a preference for multilateral organizations because they reduce the power asymmetry between states, decrease the transaction costs of diplomacy, and impose constraints on large states.”

⁹⁶ Indeed, Gignoux Victor states that “variations also exist within cases whereby small States have undergone significant foreign policy shifts...” in his *Explaining the diversity of Small States' Foreign Policies through role theory*. Third World Thematics. Volume 1, 2016.

⁹⁷ Panke, D. *Small states in the European Union: Structural disadvantages in EU policy making and counter strategies*. Journal of European Public Policy. Web. 2010.

*most pressing concern facing small states*⁹⁸” If small countries don’t have to occupy themselves with focusing on defense and the peaceful international system serves as a guarantor which allows the countries to pursue other foreign policy interests, their global influence may potentially increase. Moreover, when States participate in international organisations, the differences between States’ sizes are slightly leveled out in favour of more democratic and egalitarian seats in the world’s major foreign policy decision making institutions.

Almost paradoxically, according to Professor Arreguin-Toft “*small actors have fared better than large actors in wars since 1950*⁹⁹” demonstrating that a State’s size is truly what it makes of it. For example, thanks to technological developments, a country’s size isn’t that important when it participates in a war. Small countries such as Israel have managed to develop highly sophisticated weapons which practically annul the importance of a country’s size in armed conflicts. We mustn’t forget that usually small actors involved in wars “fight dirty” by using guerrilla or terrorist tactics whilst larger actors usually prefer using standard fighting techniques seeing as all critical eyes are on them.

If we temporarily ignore certain controversial mechanisms such as the fact that only the five permanent members of the United Nation’s Security Council have permanent veto power, we may observe that when it comes to the voting system in international or regional organisations, small countries and big countries, with a high population density or low population density, weigh the same on the basis of the *one country one vote* system according to the UN’s Charter Article 18, Paragraph 1. This would allow small States to develop power which is relatively disproportionate to their size, seeing as they have an equal say in foreign policy issues.

It’s worth noting that various foreign policy scholars have the same findings. For example, an analysis of southern small African states’ foreign policies led Suzanne Graham to state that “*State size is important in shaping the foreign policies of these southern African small States, but that it is not mutually exclusive from other typical domestic and international determinants that play a role in conditioning most States’ foreign policies*¹⁰⁰.”

⁹⁸ Vital, D. (1967). *The inequality of States: A study of the small power in international relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

⁹⁹ Arreguin-Toft, I. *How the Weak Win Wars*. Stanford. Web. 2001.

¹⁰⁰ Graham, Suzanne. *Drivers of the Foreign Policies of Southern African Small States*. South African Journal of Political Studies. Volume 44, Issue 1 2017.

3.3 Power Projection and Geographical Capabilities

Before moving on to the next point, we should analyse a country's size, population and geographical attributes in more detail and consider that "*strong capabilities do not always translate into the motivation or the ability to define the State's interests as global in scale, just as lesser capabilities can under favourable circumstances be translated into a substantial ability to project power*¹⁰¹."

For example, Afghanistan is a relatively large and densely populated country¹⁰² whilst North Korea is a much smaller country with a smaller population.¹⁰³ Combined with Afghanistan's mountainous terrain which renders the country extremely difficult to invade-whilest on the other hand Korea had been easily annexed by the Empire of Japan in 1910 and split into two zones in 1945 despite North Korea's following attempt to change the situation-we could assume that Afghanistan has all the necessary geographical prerequisites to become a world power whilst North Korea started off on the wrong foot in its quest to become a world superpower.

Indeed, major foreign policy decision-makers have described the Afghan territory as treacherous and unbreakable, which would demonstrate that Afghanistan has the perfect geographical characteristics which would allow its foreign policy decision makers to exert the country's power on a global scale. Indeed, once Afghanistan's *Emir* surrendered to the British, he described his country as "*a land of only stones and men.*¹⁰⁴" Once Harold Macmillan was handing over his prime ministership to Alec Douglas-Home he warned him "*my dear boy, as long as you do not invade Afghanistan you will be absolutely fine,*¹⁰⁵" Even ex-President Mikhail Gorbachev, from his own experience, warned NATO that "*victory in Afghanistan is impossible*¹⁰⁶." The few times in which the country was invaded, it has proven to be extremely difficult to control due to its mountains and deserts.

¹⁰¹ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁰² According to the *United Nations Statistics Division*, Afghanistan ranks 40th in the list of world countries and their dependent territories by area, and in its list of countries and their dependent territories by population ranks 45th.

¹⁰³ According to the *United Nations Statistics Division*, North Korea ranks 97th in the list of world countries and their dependent territories by area, and in its list of countries and their dependent territories by population ranks 52nd.

¹⁰⁴ Dalrymple William. *Is Afghanistan really impossible to conquer?* BBC News. Web. 9 March 2014.

¹⁰⁵ Dalrymple William. *Is Afghanistan really impossible to conquer?* BBC News. Web. 9 March 2014.

¹⁰⁶ As he stated in a BBC interview on the 27th of October 2010.

It would seem that Afghanistan has an ideal geography which would enable its decision makers to avoid a series of tasks such as spending time and resources on elaborating defense strategies much like Israel has to do¹⁰⁷ or trying to enter in foreign countries' good graces in order to plan military alliances just like most Nordic countries have to do, and having to constantly worry about its surroundings and create new defense plans just like Poland has to do. Afghan decision-makers could focus on developing its economy or possibly invading other countries in order to develop their country's power on a world scale. Indeed, even though these two characteristics are not mutually exclusive, certain decision-makers who aren't that adventurous to pursue a foreign policy which would develop both a State's wealth and military power, will decide to focus on at least one of these two factors.

For example, for cultural and historical reasons which we will analyse further on, the Netherlands spends "*anemic amounts on its military...this country doesn't seek to project military power beyond an ability to defend its borders*¹⁰⁸" and maintains good relationships with its mostly democratic neighbours. At least its decision makers decide to focus on the country's economy and as a result the Netherlands ranks thirteenth according to the *International Monetary Fund's* list of countries by GDP per capita in 2016. Seeing as we know for a fact that Afghan decision-makers have never succeeded in waging aggressive warfare in neighbouring countries, we could at least expect that their decision-makers decided to influence foreign decision makers' policies by projecting their own power through their economy. This would be a highly intelligent approach seeing as "*small countries tying themselves into international markets also boosts efficiency and innovation in ways that a reliance on a small domestic market would fail to foster*¹⁰⁹". However, according to the very same statistics Afghanistan ranks amongst the poorest countries in the world and according to the *Global Peace Index* in 2017, it is the second least peaceful country in the world, followed only by Syria.

If we consider that, geographically speaking, Afghanistan had such an excellent potential, the results are quite disappointing but may be attributed to incapable rulers, a lack of decision-makers who would act in the country's best interests and the instability which reigns in the Middle East from decades. Moreover, once we analyse whether or not population density increases a country's

¹⁰⁷ Data from the *World Bank* in 2017 recognises that Israel ranks among the top 5 countries who spend the most militarily based on their GDP- indeed Israel has spent billions of dollars in creating the most advanced missile defense program in existence.

¹⁰⁸ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁰⁹ Eaton, J., & Kortum, S. *Technology, geography, and trade*. *Web. Econometrica*. Vol 70. No.5 2002.

capability, we should take into account towards what ends decision-makers decide to employ their population. In the case of Afghanistan the high population isn't employed as an economic or military force but is mostly ignored and left to fend for itself.

As stated by Breuning “*capabilities measure power resources and the possibility for a State to be powerful but not whether its leaders are willing and able to make effective use of those power resources*¹¹⁰.” An interesting point would be to analyse a country's literacy rates which may act as an indicator of a country's desire to strengthen their domestic standing before going on to project their power on an international scale. It is not surprising that Afghanistan has extremely low literacy rates¹¹¹ whilst countries which are important actors on the international scale such as North Korea-which nonetheless has a small population and territory-have the highest literacy rates in the world.¹¹²

We may thus state that in order for States to be powerful actors on the international arena it is not absolutely necessary that they have large populations, as is the case of Afghanistan for example. However it is necessary that a country's population, in this day and age, is literate. Even though a high literacy doesn't necessarily mean power it is a good indicator that the State wishes to employ their population towards certain power-related uses such as creating well-educated scientists and engineers for their military, economists and highly skilled workers to boost their economy. Most likely, in the past, other factors were more important such as whether or not a country had many men of fighting age, as demonstrated by fascist propaganda in Italy which tried to encourage women to produce as many offspring as possible.

3.4 The Significance of a Country's Borders

Moreover, we should analyse a country's borders and determine whether countries with land borders behave differently from countries with sea borders, how their military spending varies and which countries manage to be most powerful taking into account who their neighbours are. Logically, a country with sea borders is more difficult to attack than a country with land borders¹¹³ and a country with sea borders may project its power on a global scale more easily than a country

¹¹⁰ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹¹¹ According to the *UNESCO Institute for Statistics* Afghanistan has a 38.2% literacy rate.

¹¹² According to the *UNESCO Institute for Statistics* the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a 100% literacy rate.

¹¹³ Unless the country with land borders presents certain impregnable geographical characteristics, such as those presented by Afghanistan and Switzerland.

with land borders. Indeed, Britain has primarily sea borders and has been very difficult to invade and at the same time it has managed to expand its control on the British Empire thanks to its maritime adventures¹¹⁴. It is obvious that countries which are surrounded by potentially hostile neighbours find it difficult to fare well when it comes to power projection, mainly because of the fact that their foreign policies are so occupied with deterring their neighbours from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy against them.

Ethiopia is a good example of a country whose foreign policy is unequivocally determined by its geography seeing as it is unfortunately land-locked, borders on the largest country in Africa thus an increasingly unstable Sudan, and doesn't have a strategic location as opposed to its neighbours. For example, Djibouti is extremely small but in an excellent strategic location and even though landlocked Ethiopia is much larger than Djibouti, it must maintain a good relationship with the country seeing as it's an important transshipment point for goods going into Ethiopia or leaving Ethiopia. Indeed, Professor Breuning states "*Ethiopia's geographic location in an unstable neighbourhood suggests a partial explanation for its military spending*¹¹⁵" which is quite high when we take into account its relatively small economy, and much higher than that of its larger neighbour, Sudan.

Of course, countries may try to reduce the threat of having a potentially hostile neighbour by deciding to tighten economic relations with it, thus forcing decision-makers to pursue a certain foreign policy, a tactic which small countries pursue as well. For example, even though the Netherlands borders on large and strategically located Germany, it provides transshipment for the country.

The same may be said for small States, which are affected by the following rule: "*diplomacy is always an option but force rarely*¹¹⁶." In fact, these States will tend to focus their energies in "*working through international organizations such as the UN or regional organizations like the EU to exert influence beyond their own independent capacity*" which is exactly what Belgium does when it allows the EU and the UN to have their headquarters in Belgium, exerting its power indirectly yet firmly on the organisations' members. Usually small countries find it easier to

¹¹⁴ For example, according to the *CIA World Factbook*, another advantage which Britain has is that even though it is smaller than France or Germany, it is three times as large as the only country with which it shares a border.

¹¹⁵ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹¹⁶ Hey (2003). *Small States in World Politics*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

dedicate their full attention to certain specific issues seeing as international organisations usually play a role in securing countries' defense or economic stability, allowing the State parties to expand their power in other areas. However, much depends on the necessities of these States. For example, even though NATO and the EU do try to maintain security and stability in all areas of the world, most notably the Baltic region, the Baltic States can't afford to have their security depend solely on intergovernmental military organisations or regional organisations and prefer directing their own specific attention and resources not only towards influencing NATO's and the EU's decision making process with regards to security policy, but also towards influencing their countries' security. On the other hand Luxembourg, a landlocked country which borders with nowadays three peaceful and democratic countries who actively participate in maintaining world peace, is relatively undisturbed and can afford leaving its security policy in the hands of the EU whilst it prioritizes policies which relate to its financial sector¹¹⁷.

This demonstrates that even though conditions such as a small territory, a low population density and an uncomfortable geographic position are quite annoying, when it comes to the range of options which foreign policy decision-makers have, they don't certainly doom States to their fate seeing as if the decision-makers are capable enough they will certainly find ways to overcome these obstacles and play a role on the international arena anyway.

3.5 How Do Geographical Attributes Influence Military Strategies?

If we temporarily focus on certain geographical advantages which some lucky countries have, we may recognise that thanks to these attributes, there is a higher range of foreign policy options which decision makers may take, including deciding whether or not to opt for an aggressive or diplomatic response. For example, when analysing Canada's relatively low military ranking¹¹⁸ we should consider that the US military doctrine involves a decisive response against any country which acts aggressively on North American soil thus providing Canadian decision-makers with a partial solution to the defence problem.

The United States' highly alert and defensive attitude allows Canada to serenely spend less than one percent of its gross domestic product on defence thus providing its decision makers with the opportunity to focus on other aspects of their foreign policy such as the economy-as demonstrated by Canada's role in the Group of Eight where the most powerful eight economic world powers

¹¹⁷ Thorhallsson Baldur, *Small State Foreign Policy*. Web. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. May 2017.

¹¹⁸ It ranks 26th on the Global Firepower Index of Military Strength in 2017.

discuss global economic governance. Canadian decision-makers are well aware of the advantages which their geography entails, with Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stating that “*Canada’s geography has meant that we have always been able to count on American self-interest to provide a protective umbrella beneath which we have found indirect shelter*¹¹⁹.”

This would explain why the self-defined middle power has always been quite relaxed when it comes to military interventions and has even been frequently accused of free-riding on defense thanks to their American allies¹²⁰. An interesting point has to do with the Foreign Minister’s recent statement which threatened a dramatic foreign policy shift¹²¹ because of the new American administration’s “*decision to shrug off the burden of world leadership*¹²²”, demonstrating that foreign policy decision-makers decide whether to take passive or active roles in international crises not only by basing themselves on national attributes but also by analysing how more powerful States act on the international arena, and playing the game accordingly.

Indeed, the Foreign Minister stated on the 6th of July 2017 in a speech to the House of Commons that “*the fact that our friend and ally has come to question the very worth of its mantle of global leadership puts into sharper focus the need for the rest of us to set our own clear and sovereign course*¹²³” and that as a consequence Canada would increase its military spending and its activities in international organisations, demonstrating that the perception of other States’ power influences a country’s decision-makers when deciding which path to pursue on the international scale.

Another good example of a country which has extremely favourable geographical attributes which it can exploit for its defence is Switzerland, which is surrounded by a mountain range which has helped it deter invaders for ages. In the meantime, Swiss decision-makers have actively decided to develop their country’s economy and project power globally in that fashion. Switzerland’s main defence strategy has, in the past, relied mainly and almost exclusively on its mountains and infrastructure. For example the *National Redoubt* plan was created in the 1880s, developed in order

¹¹⁹ As reported by Agence France Presse on the Military.Com Website on the 6th of June 2017, with the headline of the article being “*Canada to Rely Less on US Defense in Major Policy Shift.*”

¹²⁰ Austen Ian, *Canada will pursue a more robust global role, Minister says.* The New York Times. Web. 6 June 2017.

¹²¹ Indeed, the Foreign Minister stated “if middle powers do not implicate themselves in the furtherance of peace and stability around the world, that will be left to the great powers to settle among themselves. This would not be in Canada’s interest.”

¹²² Austen Ian, *Canada will pursue a more robust global role, Minister says.* The New York Times. Web. 6 June 2017.

¹²³ Austen Ian, *Canada will pursue a more robust global role, Minister says.* The New York Times. Web. 6 June 2017.

to defend the country from a Nazi invasion during the Second World War, and the few last details were added after the Second World War, at a time when the threat of a Soviet invasion was high.

The plan consisted in wiring mountains, bridges and roads so that any invading army would have had to waste valuable time and resources when trying to determine how to enter the country.

The parts of the mountains which weren't wired were to be used by the army thanks to the construction of secret bunkers, tunnels and fortresses. This demonstrates that certain countries do manage to successfully exploit their geographical attributes in order to focus becoming a world power.

CHAPTER TWO

INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS: THE ROLE OF PERSONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTES ON THE OPERATIONAL SPHERE

SUMMARY: 1. Putting the Influence of History and Culture into Context – 1.1. The History of States’ Interactions. – 1.2. Not Becoming Entangled in One’s Own Culture – 2. Foreign Policy Decisions and the General Public. – 2.1. The Responsiveness of Decision Makers in Democracies. – 2.2. The Impact of an Authoritarian Regime on Foreign Policy Options. – 2.3. How the National Political System Affects Public Opinion. – 2.4. Can Decision Makers Manipulate the Public? – 2.5. The Consequences of an Uninterested and Misinformed Public Opinion. – 3. The Psychological Sphere. – 3.1. A Lack of Rationality. – 3.2. A Decision Maker’s Personality. – 3.3. The Relationship Between Decision Makers and Their Closest Advisors. – 3.4. The Impact of Changes in the Administration. – 3.5. Groupthinking and Analogies. – 4. A System Based Analysis: The External Environment. – 4.1. The International System and Changes in Its Structure. – 4.2. Multipolarism in the 19th Century. – 4.3. Bipolarism in the Cold War. – 4.4. The Aftermath: Unipolarism. – 4.5 The Relevance of System Attributes. – 4.6. The Role of Intergovernmental Organisations.

1. Putting the Influence of History and Culture into Context

In the previous chapter we discussed the importance of a series of easily observable and numerically quantifiable variables such as a State’s military power and military spending, a State’s availability of natural resources and degree of economic openness and finally a State’s size, population and geography. The challenge now lies in measuring non-quantifiable differences between States such as history and culture and analysing why decision-makers follow certain paths based on these variables. According to Hudson, the beliefs which derive from a mixture of the country’s history and culture “*provide a guiding constraint in foreign policy decision making*¹²⁴.”

Indeed, we should consider that a country’s national history and culture are inextricably linked to each other. Whilst national history conveys historical facts it also conveys common values, customs and traditions related to those facts. On the other hand, a country’s culture conveys the values, customs and traditions which derive from historical facts. Moreover, decision makers both create

¹²⁴ Hudson Valerie M. *Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Perspectives. Web. Volume 16, No.2. 2008.

their own country's history and culture and are influenced by their own country's history and culture, therefore, when they'll have to take a foreign policy decision, they will do so by interpreting their own national history on the basis of their culture.

Still, we should keep in mind that even though when decision makers analyse which foreign policy option would be the most convenient and, in the process, are personally affected by their own country's triumphant or fragile history or illustrious or lacking culture, all foreign policy decisions are taken in a peculiar set of historical and cultural circumstances which rarely repeat themselves throughout history. This is precisely why taking the historical and cultural context into account is absolutely necessary.

For example, one cannot hope to predict the foreign policy decisions of modern decision makers acting on behalf of the People's Republic of China by analysing decision makers' behaviour, rationale and actions during the ancient First Imperial Dynasty. One of the various reasons for which this wouldn't be an efficient approach is that China doesn't possess the same political system, economic interests and defense strategies that it had thousands of year ago-and even back then China's foreign policy constantly changed from dynasty to dynasty, be it strong or weak, reckless or pacific. Analysing China as if it were a sort of monolithic entity with permanently unchanging foreign policy objectives would be like analysing the current foreign policy decision making process in Italy believing that it still has the Roman Empire's ambitions .

Still, we should consider that some characteristics present in Chinese foreign policy decision making are almost permanent and reasons for their continuity may be traced to the country's history and culture. Indeed, it goes without saying that Chinese decision-makers have been deeply affected by their country's experience in the century of humiliation¹²⁵ and, as a consequence, tend to be strongly suspicious of Western actors, sometimes viewing the United States as an arrogant hegemony which wants to do nothing more than become the only hyperpower in the world by exploiting other nations under a false guise of help.

¹²⁵ However, we can trace Western invasions of China back to moments when the country was already at its knees. Because of their history, the Chinese have thus had to gradually learn that national chaos would lead to invasions, as demonstrated by the century of humiliation. Therefore having a strong and stable economic, political and military system-notwithstanding how dictatorial it may be-is essential for Chinese society and Chinese decision makers. This just shows how other country's foreign policy decisions don't merely affect foreign decision maker's foreign policy, but affect internal policies as well.

Quite ironically, China's foreign policy may be guilty of doing the same as we may see through China's relations with its smaller neighbours. On the other hand this may be described as a defence mechanism which Chinese decision-makers employ in order to shield themselves economically from being attacked by other nations, much like all Russian presidents since Stalin attempt gaining de facto control over Eastern European territories in order to shield their country from attacks by other nations. Indeed, Germany's invasion of Russia in the Second World War is a foreign policy trauma which will haunt Russian decision-makers for many years to come.

1.1 The History of States' Interactions

When analysing how a State's history affects the country's decision-makers, we should also take into account the history of the State's interactions with other States. We may thus categorize a State's relations with other States in four different manners. States may be allies, combatants, competitors or simply estranged. Still, we should consider that States never strictly fit into one of these categories for the rest of eternity, rather there is a spectrum on the basis of which States may, through alternating time periods, slide along on one side or the other.

However it is quite rare that States slide on the opposing side of spectrum in a short period of time thus becoming mortal combatants when they only recently were good allies. A slower deterioration or progress in relationships is more frequent than a radical shift in friendships, hostilities, competitiveness or indifference. Indeed, an interesting example which demonstrates the importance of time has to do with the possibility of China become a superpower in the future. The possibility that it may not only rival the United States but overtake the so called hyperpower¹²⁶ may become true. However, a lot of time will pass, especially seeing as the term superpower doesn't merely refer to a country's economic strength, which is all that China has which may be called competition-for now.

How a country perceives another, with regards to these four categories, will shape how the country's decision-makers will interact with foreign decision-makers. Centuries old allies such as the United States and Great Britain will always try to cooperate with one other, regardless of the temporary differences or dilemmas which they may have. In turn, this will strengthen their relationship and may even take the decision-makers down a common path where they share foreign policy objectives. We should note that countries which share similar foreign policy objectives and

¹²⁶ Shambaugh David L. (1995). *Greater China: The Next Superpower?* Oxford University Press.

try to achieve them by working together and supporting their ally usually share a common history which leads to them sharing common values, and those common values will further strengthen the historical bond between the countries.

The United States and Great Britain exemplify this relationship, even though the level of cooperation between the two countries has been described as something much stronger than a mere alliance thus as an unparalleled kind of friendship¹²⁷. On one hand, the two countries are bound by a common history, language and kinship which goes back centuries, and have been close military allies throughout both World Wars, the Cold War and the War on Terror. On the other, their alliance is, in the words of Bill Clinton, a unique partnership, seeing as it is based on shared values and common aspirations. Their closeness is reflected by public opinion, as demonstrated by several polls in which the British agree by a large majority that America is Britain's most important ally¹²⁸ and Americans consider the special relationship with Britain to be the world's most important bilateral partnership¹²⁹.

At the opposing end of the specter are countries which are fairly hostile to each other who will most likely be less than interested in engaging in bilateral discussions thus widening the rift between them. Several interesting theories point towards the fact that certain countries may not have good relationships with others not because their decision makers aren't able to find common ground with their counterparts, but because they have no intention of doing so. Sometimes, having enemies may be strategically useful,¹³⁰ be it in order to create consensus in a group or in order to have a scapegoat or in order to have an excuse to act in a certain manner. Indeed, as stated by Nietzsche, "*if an enemy did not exist it would be necessary to invent one*¹³¹."

¹²⁷ James, Wither. *An Endangered Partnership: The Anglo-American Defense Relationship in the Early Twenty-first Century*. European Security Journal. March 2006.

¹²⁸ In May 2010, a poll conducted in the UK by YouGov revealed that 62% of those assessed agreed with the assertion that America is Britain's most important ally.

¹²⁹ In January 2010 a Leflein poll conducted for Atlantic Bridge found that 57% of Americans considered the special relationship with Britain to be the world's most important bilateral partnership. Only 2% disagreed.

¹³⁰ Fiebig von Hase, R (1997). *Enemy Images in American History*. Berghahn Books.

¹³¹ Moses, Rafael. *The Perception of the Enemy: A Psychological View*. Palestine-Israel Journal of politics Economics and Culture. Web. Vol. 2 no.4. 1995.

1.2. Not Becoming Entangled in One's Own Culture

As for culture, we should consider that decision makers are both products and representatives of their society. As such, they will be influenced by their own culture when taking foreign policy decisions, even if unaware that their culture is affecting them in a decisive manner ¹³². However, extremely capable foreign policy decision makers will most likely try to put themselves in the foreign decision maker's shoes in order to assess how the latter would act in reaction to the decision maker's own policies or how he would act *per se*.

In order to successfully imagine what the foreign decision maker's reactions and actions will be, decision makers will have to take into consideration a series of national, international and intrapersonal attributes along with their counterpart's culture which is made up by certain particular customs, values and traditions. This is precisely why, before taking radical foreign policy decisions, decision makers usually consult ambassadors or diplomats who have lived in the foreign country for long, historians or scholars who are experts in the particular region or high ranking government officials and members of the armed forces who have dealt with the foreign decision makers previously.

It is of the utmost necessity that decision makers realise that their perspective of the world-based on their State's own history, on their own beliefs and judgments, cultural values and education- is not the only perspective. Successful foreign policy decisions never stem from a unilateral interpretation of a certain international crisis. Of course, we should remember that, as Eduardo Braun stated when analysing Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright's decision-making skills, decision-makers are human beings who do try to "*ask themselves hard questions about the accuracy and wisdom of their own beliefs and judgments*"¹³³ but, as human beings, will always be affected by their beliefs, prejudices and values.

However, as exemplified by the Suez Crisis, when leaders do not manage to detach themselves from certain perspectives which were created by their society's own culture and history, the results are quite disastrous. Indeed, in this case, sides were absolutely convinced that their viewpoint was right and neither side wanted to reach a compromise, based on passionate evaluations which

¹³² Indeed, certain scholars believe that "to the degree that foreign policy decision makers remain unaware that their way of understanding the world is not universally shared, they will also remain unaware that they are hemmed in to a certain perspective". Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹³³ Braun Eduardo P. (2016). *People First leadership: How the best Leaders use Culture and Emotion to Drive Unprecedented Results*. McGraw Hill.

derived heavily from their own culture. On one hand, we have Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who failed to understand that the Suez Canal was an anachronic symbol of Western dominance at a time when the remnants of British and French colonialism were becoming increasingly disliked in the Middle East, and was blinded by Great Britain's decrepit power and ancient glory¹³⁴. On the other hand, we have President Nasser, who had despised British colonialism ever since a young age¹³⁵, and ever since the President of Egypt had gained power in 1954 his main foreign policy objective had been to remove the British from Egypt in order to prevent them from trying to keep, once again, his country under their firm heel.

For both actors, only their viewpoint existed. The rest was unimportant, as shown by the fact that President Eisenhower's delicate and then firm attempts to ease the tension fell on deaf ears. Even though one may believe that the President of Egypt's standing on the issue was perfectly comprehensible, given the country's strict colonial past and the active young leader's desire to undertake adventurous actions which would benefit his downtrodden country¹³⁶, Prime Minister Eden's unyielding standpoint in particular, is rather irrational. Justifying Eden's unfounded suspicion that Nasser was a Russian puppet who had to be "*destroyed*"¹³⁷ could be seen to be a rather wild and unfounded accusation. Indeed, Eden's rigid stance was heavily criticized, with many stating that he was so focused on the British point of view of the situation and on his mental demonization of Nasser that "*the British Prime Minister did not understand that the world had changed*"¹³⁸.

Therefore, if foreign policy decision-makers allow their judgments to be clouded by their own country's history and culture, along with their own personal beliefs which are shaped by these two elements, their foreign policy strategy will not be efficient. It is worth noting that Anthony Eden's stance in the Suez Crisis seems to be even more unreasonable seeing as Britain's closest ally with

¹³⁴ Indeed, Prime Minister Anthony Eden was determined to hold on to the few strands of British influence in the Middle East by occupying himself with the deposition of President Nasser. His main foreign policy objective with regards to the Suez Crisis, was to remove a troublesome figure from power, not only because free passage along the Suez Canal was essential to the British thus Nasser was a threat to British interests in the Middle East but also because, from Eden's point of view, the President stirred Pan-Arab sentiments among the Middle East, threatening the region's delicate balance of power.

¹³⁵ Aburish K. Said (2004). *Nasser: The Last Arab*. Thomas Dunne Books.

¹³⁶ Indeed, throughout his youth, Nasser actively participated in protests, wrote essays and gave public speeches criticizing British colonialism, and stated later on that this factor is what primarily caused him to enter into politics.

¹³⁷ As Eden allegedly told Anthony Nutting, a Foreign Office Minister, over the phone in 1938.

¹³⁸ BBC Programme. *Suez: A Very British Crisis*. BBC News Channel. Web. 2006.

whom the country has a *special* relationship, thus the United States, repeatedly warned him not to follow an aggressive foreign policy path. Moreover, we may also attribute Eden's attitude to the fact that decision-makers are human beings who may be stubborn, passionate and irrational, a fact which we will explore later on.

An interesting point which we will analyse further on, is that public opinion played an important role in the Suez crisis, seeing as international opinion wasn't terribly concerned about Egypt's links with the Soviet Union or the threat to British world shipping. Moreover, American decision-makers didn't want to have to deal with a would-be major international crisis, especially right before the elections in Autumn. This demonstrates that the role of public opinion influences leaders' foreign policy decision making options and is thus extremely important in some countries, most notably large powerful democracies whose consensus relies on the population. Indeed, President Eisenhower wrote to Eden on the 3rd of September "*I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the use of force. I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means*¹³⁹."

Indeed, J.P.L. Thomas, the First Sea Lord in the Royal Navy, warned Eden that if force were to be taken it should be taken in July and not in Autumn, and apparently "*thought that Eden, who had never worked in America, did not understand how the American mind worked, particularly approaching a Presidential election*¹⁴⁰." Instead of trying to put himself in his ally's shoes in order to understand how the more powerful Americans would act before deciding which actions he should take in order to be backed by his ally, Eden let his country's old colonialist customs, values and prejudices affect his reasoning so much that he completely disregarded Churchill's age-long advice: "*we must never get out of step with the Americans-never.*¹⁴¹"

President Eisenhower's final act of deterrence-which was related to a hard-line economic diplomacy- demonstrated that the British Prime Minister had indeed catastrophically miscalculated the consequences of invading Egypt. Eden had based himself on antiquated and almost delusional fantasies, assuming that Great Britain still was a world power which had to keep the last remnants of its informal empire together.

¹³⁹ Peevers Charlotte (2013). *The Politics of Justifying Force*. Oxford University Press.

¹⁴⁰ Lord Owen CH. *The effect of Prime Minister Anthony Eden's illness on his decision-making during the Suez crisis*. Oxford Journal of Medicine. Web. 2005.

¹⁴¹ Wawro Geoffrey (2010). *Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East*. The Penguin Press.

As we can see, leaders are greatly affected by rather personal attributes which are usually what make a difference between a foreign policy decision taken in a cool and level-headed fashion as opposed to a foreign policy decision taken heatedly and spontaneously on the basis of a distorted perception of the international stage and of one's own capabilities, one's own allies and one's own enemies.

Of course, this state of mind may derive not only from a State's history or culture, but also from the decision-maker's deepest personal issues. According to Eden's Principal Private Secretary "*I find it difficult to accept the judgment that Anthony's health did not have a decisive influence at least on the conduct of his policy*". However, according to Eden's personal assistant during the 1955 election, the judgment that his illness¹⁴² affected his foreign policy decision making process is too simplistic, which proves once again that several factors must be considered in order to understand how decision-makers take certain foreign policy actions.

2. Foreign Policy Decisions and the General Public

Much like foreign policy decision makers try to influence the population's public opinion, the public may sometimes exert influence on the decision making process. Of course, much depends on domestic political constraints, on the basis of which public opinion may have a greater impact on the decision makers or not. It is rather obvious that the influence which a certain public has on foreign policy decision makers may be extremely high, extremely low or moderate on the basis of a country's structure and the bureaucracy's organisation. The logical assumption would be that in democracies, decision makers are affected by the public and try to shape their policies in a manner that suits all parties involved, whilst in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, decision makers couldn't care less about the public opinion. However, we will demonstrate that as for the latter kind of governments, this statement isn't entirely true.

2.1 The Responsiveness of Decision-Makers in Democracies

First things first, we should recognise that a democracy, true to its definition, means "rule by the people". Seeing as, in democracies, the decision-maker's tenure of an important position in the

¹⁴² An operation on Eden's gall bladder went wrong in 1953 and left him in constant pain in the ensuing years. Therefore, Eden frequently took drugs to reduce the pain, and high doses of amphetamines and barbiturates to counteract the effect of the drugs. Moreover, according to Eden's own diaries, because of frequent abdominal pain, jaundice and the presence of gallstones, he consulted doctors at least 10 times in the short span of time between Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal and the creation of British and French plan for Egypt's invasion.

government lasts as long as the population wants it to last we should assume that a decision-maker responsive to the citizens' wishes will keep his seat whilst decision-makers who ignore citizens' wishes will be removed. Indeed, according to Dahl "*a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens*¹⁴³."

For example, the United States is described as the world's largest democracy and its presidents are heavily influenced by public opinion, even though according to some scholars, traditionally, "*the framers of the US Constitution explicitly positioned the president to be independent of public opinion*¹⁴⁴". However, seeing as presidents hope to be re-elected on the second round¹⁴⁵ and then, throughout their second term, desire going down in history as well-liked and respected politicians, it is convenient for them to be informed about citizens' preferences and complaints and act accordingly.

Now that the sophistication of polling data and research survey has enormously improved, presidents will try to gather as much quality information as possible in order to better understand the public's stance on a certain matter, and from then on determine their foreign policy. This point is summed up perfectly by Howell's following quote "*candidates act responsively for strategic reasons; they try to adopt favourable positions on particular policies. They are political marketers who are highly attuned to consumer demands and intent on pinpointing and then emulating (i.e., moving in a congruent direction) the policy preferences of voters*¹⁴⁶".

Moreover, as Breuning states, "*the domestic audience has a greater impact in political systems where decision makers are accountable to that audience, as is the case in democracies*¹⁴⁷." However she makes an extremely valid point which we will analyse further on when dealing with the Kosovo war thus that "*democracies vary in their institutional arrangements and as a consequence, in the degree to which they are open to domestic influence*¹⁴⁸."

2.2. The Impact of Authoritarian Regimes on Foreign Policy Options

¹⁴³ Przeworski Adam (2003). *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World*. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴⁴ Howell, William G (2011). *The Oxford Handbook of American presidents*. Oxford Handbooks.

¹⁴⁵ Indeed, scholar Canes-Wrone believes that "the policy congruence between a president's positions and public opinion should be more likely the sooner the president faces a context for re-election"

¹⁴⁶ Howell, William G. (2011). *The Oxford Handbook of American presidents*. Oxford Handbooks.

¹⁴⁷ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁴⁸ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

The very definition of the term authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime implies that decision-makers will almost permanently be at the head of the government and will only depart if the population engages in dramatic uses of force such as revolutions or, more frequently, military coups staged by the armed forces. However, these kind of governments strictly monitor the population, prevent the media from being free¹⁴⁹ and dismantle almost all kinds of political interest groups not in line with their policies. Moreover, these governments are very close to the army, often completely controlling it or having extremely close ties to it.

Indeed, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaders will usually dedicate a lot of attention to this segment of society. Having the armed forces back them is extremely beneficial both because this will pose a credible threat to disruptive members of society and also because this will deter military coups¹⁵⁰. Moreover, when the army is supported by certain institutions such as the Judiciary, leaders will have to pay even more attention to the military¹⁵¹. The relationship between the armed forces and the government will of course, in some particular way, be mutually convenient. Of course, we can't exclude military coups which are secretly and completely financed by other countries, such as the CIA's role in deposing the democratically elected Guatemalan President in 1954. However, we will focus-for now-solely on solely national restrictions which leaders may face when taking foreign policy decisions.

Seeing as there are very few possibilities for the public to make their voices heard, there are few political domestic constraints for decision makers living in authoritarian or semi- authoritarian

¹⁴⁹ However, semi authoritarian societies provide the public with more possibilities for protesting thus tolerating more press freedom.

¹⁵⁰ These coups may derive from military officers who aren't satisfied with the status quo, just like what happened in the 1943 Argentine coup d'état which ended the Presidency of a politician who had been fraudulently elected to office. The coups may also be caused by the disgruntled population who united with the military. As we may see in the October Revolution, these cases are quite frequent, probably because the only way for citizens to plan, have the means to and carry out an effective operation to overthrow the powerful government, will be to take up arms or, preferably, ally themselves with an already well-equipped, organised and armed infrastructure thus the military.

¹⁵¹ Indeed, it's quite interesting to note that under Argentina's Supreme Court ruling which backed the *de facto* government doctrine, introduced during a military coup in the 1930s, the rights of the military government after the Revolution of 1943 were expanded thus allowing any government actions taken during a *de facto* government, to stay valid even after the end of the *de facto* government.

societies¹⁵² and the population doesn't have many chances in order to explicitly play a role in influencing a decision maker's foreign policy actions.

However, the fact that leaders will try to pursue foreign policy options which resonate with the population demonstrates that the population may indirectly affect authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaders' decision making process. Therefore, the population does have certain limited possibilities through which it may implicitly shape the foreign policy decision making process in authoritarian and especially semi-authoritarian regimes. This is backed by Lyall's following quote "*leaders are forced to listen to society...these regimes may not be truly accountable to their publics...but they are responsive and perhaps vulnerable to them*"¹⁵³."

Indeed, if there is one thing that authoritarian and semi-authoritarian leaders desire, it is having the population feverishly support them and back their wild foreign policies in order to have effective manpower which will see their fantasies through. Indeed, these kind of States depend heavily on their own population, where the population's women works in the arms industries and the armed forces are traditionally made up by the population's men in order to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.

Moreover, in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian States, a strike or a mutiny, such as the Kiel mutiny against the German Empire, are a catastrophe. The sailors' and workers' slogan *Frieden und Brot* clearly demonstrated that they had had enough and that their desire to defeat their enemies, follow the national interest and respect their foreign policy decision-makers wasn't enough to enact a now controversial foreign policy option. Therefore, it is obvious that before embarking on a foreign policy quest, even authoritarian and semi-authoritarian decision makers will be sure to check whether or not the population is ready to undertake such an endeavor and if not the population will need to be persuaded.

Therefore, we may conclude by stating that as a general rule, the actions of democratic leaders are widely shaped by the public and the actions of authoritarian rulers aren't necessarily shaped by the

¹⁵² These type of leaders usually spend most of their speeches praising their own country, criticizing enemy states or ridiculing states which they'd like to destroy, invade, or exploit, and declaring that a certain foreign policy path was taken on the basis of national interest as defined by the leader himself. This does nothing more than glorify the leader and sway the gullible, weary or oppressed population into backing or passively accepting their leader's foreign policies.

¹⁵³ Lyall, *Pocket Protests*. Cambridge Core. Web. 2011.

public. Leaders may choose to ignore the public, but this could come at a heavy cost¹⁵⁴, as demonstrated by President Anwar Sadat's signature of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty despite his population's discontent. On the domestic level, it led to Egypt's suspension from the Arab League, armed Islamist groups' active attempts to overthrow the President, and finally Sadat's well-planned assassination at an army parade by Lieutenant Islambouli when the President was at the "peak of his unpopularity."¹⁵⁵

Instead, on the international level, the President's negotiations led him to earn the Nobel Peace Prize. This just shows that in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, save certain exceptions where foreign decision makers oust them from power, leaders mustn't necessarily always listen to their country's public opinion but must be at least highly aware of it, especially in certain issues which greatly affect the population.

2.3. How the National Political System Sways Public Opinion

Seeing as national attributes affect the public opinion itself, it shouldn't come as a surprise that people living in a democratic regime act differently than people living in an authoritarian or semi authoritarian regime and that these two different political systems play a huge role in determining how a foreign policy decision maker may or may not act.

We may temporarily assume that people living in democracies will probably be more open towards resolving conflicts by encouraging their governments to ease the tension by consulting international organisations whilst people living in authoritarian or semi authoritarian countries may be influenced by their country's proud culture and belligerent history thus encouraging decision makers to opt for the aggressive foreign policy approach. Thus, we could deduce that whilst decision makers in democratic countries will tend to solve conflicts through diplomacy, decision makers in strong authoritarian regimes will embark on a full scale war at the slightest provocation.

The democratic peace theory seems to confirm this point, stating that, on the basis of a series of empirical studies, democracies rarely go to war with one another even though they do engage in violent conflict with non democracies. Whilst the normative explanation of the democratic peace

¹⁵⁴ As stated by Breuning, "the lack of accountability may make it easier for the leaders of nondemocratic societies to make unpopular decisions, but they cannot do so with impunity." Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁵⁵ Kepel, Gilles (1993). *Le Prophète et Pharaon: Aux Sources des Mouvements Islamistes*. Editions du Seuil.

theory states that societies in democracies all share the same values thus tolerance and compromise thanks to the fact that they have become accustomed to resolving conflict by non violent means, the structural explanation of the democratic peace theory states that decision makers are limited by institutions which keep the governments in check and restrain them from taking aggressive foreign policy decisions.

Indeed, American presidents' foreign policy during both World Wars is living proof of both the normative and institutional explanation of the democratic peace theory. Persuading the American people to go to war in Europe has always been a problem. This demonstrates that when foreign policy decision makers have to take a decision, they have to evaluate not only whether certain options are effective or appropriate, but they must also evaluate how the domestic opinion will assess these options-or at least, this is what happens in democracies. It is worth noting that both the normative and institutional explanations state that *“the more well-established a democracy is, such as the United States, the more deeply ingrained its norms will be and the more powerful will be their influence on the actions of its leaders.”*¹⁵⁶

Indeed, Wilson's presidential campaign during the First World War succeeded mainly thanks to the popular slogan “He kept us out of war” and “America First” which appealed to the majority of the voters, thus proving that promising whether or not to intervene in a war may cost a decision-maker their election. In fact, at the time, several newspapers stated that the primary reason for which Charles E. Hughes lost the 1916 election was that Wilson was a strong anti-war candidate at a time when public opinion did sympathise with the Allied forces but wasn't ready to risk American lives in a war in Europe.

Countless newspapers such as *Sacramento Union*, *The Los Angeles Express*, *Independent* and so on, went so far as to state that Wilson's slogan hadn't just unified Democrat men by appealing to the Midwestern States' notion of pacifism and to the Western States' hatred of war , but had even managed to sway traditionally Republican States like New Hampshire thanks to Wilson's “call of humanity”, and had managed to persuade an extremely high number of American women to vote

¹⁵⁶ Cederman Lars-Erik (2001). *Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macro-historical Learning Process*. University of California.

for him thanks to the fact that, as recognised by John D. Alexander and the *New York Times*¹⁵⁷, they were-apparently- the most “sensitive” voters when it came to risking American lives¹⁵⁸.

However, the fact that Wilson actually intervened one month after his election and was supported by public opinion on the pretense that an intervention was necessary in order to “make the world safe for democracy” and the fact that Congress finally voted to declare war on Germany, proves that public opinion in democracies is pacifist only up to a certain point.

Wilson knew this perfectly which is why, knowing fully well that the situation could escalate, he had spent most of his first tenure expanding the United States Navy, had encouraged American banks to make huge loans to Britain and France who used these funds to buy munitions and raw materials, and had made certain preparations for a land war. This demonstrates that public opinion constraints do narrow a leader’s options, but if the leader is capable enough, creative solutions can be taken which allow him both to pursue a less preferred but still decent foreign policy option and keep the public happy. This is also why Wilson’s slogan was not entirely pacifist and did not explicitly state that the would-be President would always be able to always keep the United States out of World War One. Walter Millis believes that “*he kept us out of war proved to be a safe means of tapping the powerful sentiment for peace without too far alienating the war hawks...had the Democrats attempted to run on a straight pacifist platform they would almost certainly have been defeated*¹⁵⁹.”

If we skip ahead to the Second World War, on the opposite end of the spectrum, we have warmongering, revenge-fuelled imperialistic states such as Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and imperialistic Japan. It is obvious that leaders would never have tried to win over the public’s support by using slogans such as Wilson’s slogan in World War One.

Indeed, “Adolf would have kept us out of World War One. Vote for Hitler! ” is quite comical.

This demonstrates that public opinion does indeed play a role in influencing foreign policy decisions. However we should recognise that decision makers and leaders themselves contribute enormously towards shaping public opinion which is always influenced by a country’s history and culture as well as the country’s political institutions.

¹⁵⁷ *He Kept us Out of the War Won Women*. New York Times. November 12, 1916.

¹⁵⁸ Alexander, John D. *The Issues of the Election of 1916*. Loyola University Chicago. 1949.

¹⁵⁹ Millis Walter (1939). *Road to War*. Houghton Mifflin Company.

It is highly unlikely that the German public would have supported Hitler's aggressive stance had Nazi propaganda not emphasised how quick and effortless victory would be in a Second World War and how unfair it was that they had gotten the short end of the stick in the First World War. Moreover, the fact that Hitler had banned all forms of opposition and completely controlled the government and the military made any kind of criticism impossible.

This demonstrates that in authoritarian governments public opinion does count but only as long as it is in line with the government's policies and if it isn't the troublesome elements will immediately be eliminated. Children spent their schooldays reading state-approved textbooks which described how glorious their nation was, propaganda was spread in order to increase popular resentment against certain countries and the society was organised to conscript men into the armed forces and have women work in factories destined to build up the war effort or encouraged them to have as many children as possible in order to increase the population, which at the times, meant building an efficient army.

Once the indoctrinated men were conscripted in armed forces the game was done seeing as soldiers had to follow their superiors' orders under the risk of being severely punished. Therefore, we may almost state that in authoritarian or semi authoritarian regimes the population serves a primarily decorative purpose¹⁶⁰. Keeping them in line is necessary in order to have an efficient war machine, a good economy and a colorful swarm of enthusiastic youngsters at rallies. Apart from those points, dictators do not listen to their citizens unless they fear being ousted from power. It would be difficult to imagine hardened Japanese decision makers halting the attack against Pearl Harbour seeing as a poll demonstrated that the Japanese population had no quarrel with the Americans.

The rather constructivist approach that societies will act "democratically" under democracies and "aggressively" under dictatorships is demonstrated by the following quote "*Where political leaders are inclined to use violence against each other—violence in the form of political murders, gang attacks, and armed revolts—democracy cannot survive. It will tend to collapse into civil war or a repressive dictatorship...this is what happened in Germany. After the war, the country reverted to its peaceful political tradition. Hitler's ideas were thoroughly discredited, his thugs disappeared, and the nonviolent democratic leaders of the pre-war era came forward. They simply did what came*

¹⁶⁰ For example, the fact that public opinion in Nazi Germany was nothing more than a shadow of the German government is reflected by the fact that the De-Nazification process was quickly abolished seeing as the American government came to understand that, the Nazi party being eliminated, it was ineffective and counterproductive.

*naturally: started political parties, organized campaigns, drew up constitutions, and staffed the government*¹⁶¹.”

Much like “the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree” idiom, we may recognise that seeing as decision makers are both the moulders and the product of their nations’ history and culture, public opinion doesn’t stray far from the decision-maker’s choices in all forms of political institutions. This rule applies both to democracies and dictatorships. It is extremely rare that a leader takes foreign policy decisions which are outrageously contrary to a populations’ values and beliefs.

As described by Entman, the equilibrium between a decision maker trying to influence the public and the public responding in a manner which influences the decision makers is extremely subtle seeing as “*the public’s impact on foreign policy can be more imagined than real because it often arises from a circular process in which government officials respond to polling opinions, anticipated or perceived majorities and priorities that many of them helped create*¹⁶².”

2.4. Can Decision Makers Manipulate the Public?

Of course, extremely confident, more adventurous and highly skilled presidents may try to influence the public opinion themselves thus deciding which foreign policy action and then focusing on creating a favourable public opinion. If we take the United States of America as an example, for arguments’ sake, we will temporarily consider the President to be the most important decision-maker in the country seeing as “*Americans have become accustomed to looking to the president as the principal policy maker and representative of the country*¹⁶³.”

We may use President Clinton as our example and recognise that once NATO warplanes started bombing Serbian targets in order to try and protect the Kosovars during the Kosovo war, only 46 % of the American population was in favour of using military force in order to put an end to Serbians’ violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. American citizens were probably still traumatized by the events of the Vietnam war, believing that the war would be long and bloody. Regardless of the public opinion, and for reasons which we will explain further on, President Clinton still believed that the situation called for a military intervention. The low-risk military strategy which he enacted was rather successful from an American point of view, seeing as no U.S military personnel was

¹⁶¹ Payne James L. *Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?* The Independent. 2014.

¹⁶² Entman (2004). *Projections of Power*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁶³ Howell, William G. (2011). *The Oxford Handbook of American presidents*. Oxford Handbooks.

killed. This would explain why, after the low-risk intervention, the percentage of Americans in favour of the use of military force in Kosovo increased to 68 %. Indeed scholar Thomas Knecht states that “*President Clinton opted for a low-risk military strategy specifically designed to minimize U.S. casualties in hopes of increasing domestic support for intervention*¹⁶⁴.”

It is worth noting that President Clinton’s mind was already made up with regards to an intervention or a non-intervention in Kosovo. Therefore, public opinion definitely didn’t affect his decision making process with regards to the actual timing of the intervention, which happened regardless of the fact less than half of the American population was in favour of doing so. In order to understand why such little consideration was given to the public opinion, we may base our analysis on Canes-Wrone’s research work which focuses on measuring a presidential responsiveness starting with the Nixon presidency and ending with Clinton’s. The scholar believes that a president’s responsiveness in his second term, when re-election is not possible, declines seeing as “*with second term presidents...the fear of being punished by the voters disappears*” and indeed, during the Kosovo war, Clinton was already in his second term.

However, we should still consider that public opinion affected the decision-making process with regards to the type of intervention itself. Indeed, Clinton had to adopt a different, softer strategy than he would have liked in order not to alienate the population. Ignoring the public opinion’s wishes was not an option because of the country’s nature-“*U.S Presidential responsiveness to public preferences is conceptually quite simple. The president represents a national constituency and is expected to follow national preferences*¹⁶⁵.”

The fact that Clinton was indeed responsive to the public opinion with regards to the type of intervention itself during his second term leads us to question Canes-Wrone’s findings according to which Clinton shouldn’t have been responsive to the public opinion during the second term. Indeed, we should also take into account that even presidents serving their second term usually want to leave a solid historical legacy behind, have a good reputation with their party, and possibly lay the groundwork for the party’s favourite next potential president.

Therefore, maybe Presidents serving their second term disregard public opinion a bit more than they would do in the first round, but they simply can’t afford to blatantly fail to consider it. This would

¹⁶⁴ Knecht Thomas (2010). *Paying Attention to Foreign Affairs*. Penn State University Press.

¹⁶⁵ Wlezio Christopher (2009). *Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford University Press.

explain why Rottinghaus, who analyses second-term responsiveness starting with the Eisenhower presidency up to Clinton's own presidency, has completely different findings than those of Canes Wrone, stating that "*second term presidents are as affected by public trends as first term presidents...this presumably stems from concern about their historical legacy and helping to elect their successor.*"¹⁶⁶

Moreover, the Kosovo War is an excellent example of a foreign policy decision maker who knew perfectly well that he had to respect the population's wishes and maneuvered them accordingly in order to render the public opinion compatible with what he thought was the right foreign policy track. This proves that even if in certain States public opinion plays a big role, this doesn't mean that there will be a lifetime restriction on foreign policy actions because of public opinion. There are always ways through which general rules may be expertly bypassed by highly intelligent foreign policy decision makers .

The Kosovo War demonstrates that, with regards to military interventions, decision makers must consider whether or not the anticipated military options will be accepted by the public opinion. If there is widespread consensus then the decision maker will be able to proceed with his military intervention. If however, the majority of the population disagrees, decision makers in democratic States are going to have to evaluate whether to intervene at all and if they do decide to intervene they're going to have to keep a close eye on the length and the timing of the intervention as well as the strategies used. Therefore, public opinion greatly influences foreign policy decision makers and all U.S Presidents know this very well.

This would partly explain President Clinton's obsession with trying to know every aspect of the U.S public opinion: in order to obtain as high a consensus as possible he was ready to -amusingly enough- "*literally poll everything, including the name of his newly acquired pet Labrador*"¹⁶⁷ in order to understand what the public's preferred options were on certain matters, and act accordingly.

A possible explanation for President Clinton's obsession with polls, especially during his second term, may be found in Canes-Wrone's research that "*second term presidents who are facing big*

¹⁶⁶ Edwards III George (2009). *The Oxford Handbook of American Presidency*. Oxford University Press.

¹⁶⁷ Walsh Kenneth T. (2013). *Prisoners of the White House, the Isolation of American's Presidents and the Crisis of Leadership*.

*scandal investigations or impeachment threats such as Nixon, Clinton and Reagan, tend to behave like a president who was running for re-election.*¹⁶⁸” As a result, seeing as these Presidents had both more to prove and more to lose, it is likely that they would have been as attentive as possible to the public opinion and tried to respect their wishes when taking foreign policy actions.

As for the decision makers’ persona, most scholars agree that when it comes to their responsiveness to public opinion, structural conditions play a greater role than individual differences among presidents and that therefore there aren’t any American presidents who are more (or less) prone to have their foreign policy options restricted by the people on the basis of their personalities. As Canes-Wrone states, “*things we tend to think of as very personality-based tend to be diminished significantly by more structural effects, such as the electoral environment*¹⁶⁹.”

Another interesting factor is that, according to her research work, presidents’ level of popularity don’t affect whether or not they’ll try to “pander” to public opinion. This may very well mean that, with the responsiveness to the public opinion variable, structural characteristics have the upper hand. However, other scholars such as Eichenberg have suggested the opposite when analysing Obama’s foreign policy, stating that his particularly likeable persona, tremendous persuasion skills and the unpopularity of the opposition provided him with “*substantial room for maneuver in foreign affairs*¹⁷⁰” even though there was a high degree of polarization that characterized the public opinion thus demonstrating that a president’s popularity plays somewhat of a role when evaluating the degree to which he must be responsive to public opinion.

2.5. The Consequences of an Uninterested and Misinformed Public Opinion

Of course we must consider that the public may be misinformed or uninterested¹⁷¹ when it comes to certain foreign policy matters whilst decision makers usually have a greater access to clear information and are definitely interested in the subject. As a result, when the public isn’t particularly concerned with a certain matter and there aren’t many interest groups which focus on it, decision makers have a greater possibility to sway the public opinion. Thus the public usually decides to rely on decision makers seeing as foreign policy, especially in American politics, is

¹⁶⁸ Canes-Wrone (2005). *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy and the Public*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁶⁹ Canes-Wrone (2005). *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy and the Public*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁷⁰ Eichenberg Richard C. *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Obama Era*. Politique Américaine. Web. 2009.

¹⁷¹ For example, in the year 1998 a pollster called Mark Penn who conducted a countless amount of polls at the request of the President Clinton reported that with regards to the Yugoslav wars “*the number one story is in fact the President’s acquisition of a dog, edging out the Bosnia troop visit by one point.*”

something that is always regarded to be “quite distant”¹⁷² and the public will automatically assume that the decision makers know best, taking into account that the conduct of diplomacy requires secrecy.

Indeed, scholars confirm that “*voters are not that likely to change their opinions on policies simply because the president is promoting them...but there is one big exception and that’s in foreign policy...in foreign policy presidents are often the primary or only information source available to people.*”¹⁷³

According to Canes-Wrone, the Bosnian war provides a perfect example for this seeing as the population, not knowing much about the situation and-in the short term-not having much access to verified information about the conflict, decided to trust the man who they had voted for in taking a foreign policy decision on a war which was totally unknown to voters and which the President presented as potentially having disastrous consequences in Europe¹⁷⁴.

3. The Psychological Sphere

Throughout the course of the essay we have assumed that decisions are taken by a series of decision makers who are organized in a bureaucratic hierarchy. However certain analysts base themselves on the unitary actor assumption according to which foreign policy decisions are usually assessed as if they were made by a single, homogenous entity. The unitary actor assumption is increasingly problematic seeing as by treating the State as if it were a single individual who takes decisions on the basis of its national interest, and who is affected by domestic and international factors, there is a failure to understand what really goes on in the decision making process.

For example, how could we ever explain the reasons for which Italy was dragged into the Second World War without analysing Mussolini’s personality and the fact that he was a recklessly

¹⁷² Holsti (2004). *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. The University of Michigan Press.

¹⁷³ Canes-Wrone (2005). *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy and the Public*. University of Chicago Press.

¹⁷⁴ “In the short term, if the president is telling you that we really need to send troops into Bosnia because it could spill over into Europe, people are unlikely to have hard-and-set views that oppose him. In that sense, it’s not like school prayer or Social Security accounts or health care. Voters are going to say, “I don’t know that much about what’s going on in Bosnia, and this is the president”... So presidents can do more of what they want, in part because they’re going to be able to lead public opinion more in this area.”

Quinones Eric. *Question and Answer: Public Opinion Plays Shifting Role in Presidential Policy Decisions*. Princeton Weekly Bulletin. Web. March 2006.

ambitious authoritarian leader? From the system level of analysis, a relatively weak actor such as Italy declaring war to an economic and military giant such as the United States seems to be pure folly. In order to explain actions which do seem irrational from a system, state and cultural and historical level of analysis, we must recognise that those who make foreign policy decisions are rational or irrational individual decision makers and not the State itself as a collectivity of people. This consideration is essential when analysing the psychological sphere of decision makers which affects his foreign policy decisions.

In order to understand why a foreign policy decision maker acted the way he did we must analyse general internal factors such as human beings' irrationality and the use of analogies, specific internal factors such as his personal characteristics, and finally structural internal factors such as the government bureaucracy. Seeing as there are so many other domestic, international and intrapersonal factors which may influence decision makers, determining what kind of foreign policies decision makers will take on the basis of their psychology is a tricky yet fascinating endeavor.

3.1. A Lack of Rationality

The most basic assumption in International Relations is that the international system is anarchical and the survival of the State is what all foreign policy decisions depend on. Therefore, the unitary actor will act rationally and use all its power in order to achieve this goal. Even though this theory may efficiently explain certain aspects of International Relations, we must note that it cannot do the same when it comes to Foreign Policy Analysis, where we must take into account that individual decision makers and not unitary actors, are the ones who take foreign policy decisions.

Individuals take decisions as human beings who play a huge role in shaping the world and do so by basing themselves on their own personal ambitions which, by the way, may or may not be in line with those of their leader or decision makers; errors which derive from limited information or information interpreted wrongly; and judgments which differ from one decision maker to another on the basis of their experiences and perceptions.

Moreover, we must consider that, as human beings, leaders are always influenced by their emotions, especially when seeking to resolve a foreign policy crisis. Social psychologist Irving Janis proposed a motivational model of Foreign Policy Decision Making and stated that *“the role of emotions is most pronounced in a crisis and at this point stress intervenes, causing a lack of ability to abstract*

and tolerate ambiguity and an increased tendency towards aggressive behaviour. Tunnel vision, fixation on single solutions to the exclusion of all others, may also ensue...as leaders struggle to manage the complexity of decisions¹⁷⁵”.

As we shall analyse further on in a brief case study on the Cuban Missile Crisis, this is precisely why decision makers need to keep a cool head when dealing with perilous foreign policy decisions. This would also explain why sometimes certain foreign policy decisions degenerate into complete chaos, as we shall analyse later on in the Bay of Pigs Fiasco.

Another important point is that, as analysed by Harold and Margaret Sprout who spent years researching human behaviour and cognitive psychology, human beings prefer simplicity to complexity and are thus poor at predicting probabilities. Decision makers do enjoy satisficing, which means taking the first solution that seems reasonable when dealing with a problem, instead of employing an optimal solution which would derive from a detailed decision-making scheme. Even though this heuristic approach allows them to save a great deal of time, as we shall explain later on, it may be extremely dangerous when dealing with foreign policy crises which entail high risks.

Moreover, Professor Rosita Daskal Albert states that, because of cognitive consistency, disruptive effects will be naturally filtered out by human beings or interpreted in such a way that will fit the decision maker's rationale. Therefore, there will always be a personalised interpretation of information, facts and history which interferes with rational decision making. Seeing as decision makers prefer focusing on simple biases, classic stereotypes and superficial generalizations rather than on actual points, they will-inevitably-interpret and devise their decisions accordingly.

Moreover, seeing as both general and specific psychological factors affect decision makers' interpretation of a certain context, we may also state that the very same factors play a role in affecting the decision maker's assessment of the relative risk of a particular choice. Indeed, prospect theory suggests that when foreign policy decision makers operate in a setting of loss, they become risk takers, seeing as in their eyes they have nothing to lose and much to gain. Conversely, when foreign policy decision makers operate in a setting of gain, they become risk makers, seeing as they attentively treasure and cherish what they have which is definitely not worth losing. This is just another example of how individuals may sometimes take decisions which are rational in procedural

¹⁷⁵ Alden, Chris (2011). *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. Routledge.

terms once we analyse the specific situation which the decision maker finds himself in, but which, from the outside, appear to be irrational.

This would be why, according to Chris Alden, human agency is at the core of international politics seeing as “*foreign policy decision making is focused on the centrality of the mind of the decision maker... and the consequent impact on the formulation and selection of policy options*”¹⁷⁶. Therefore, foreign policy analysis has completely different and wider ranging assumptions than international relations when it comes to analysing the reasons behind decision makers’ foreign policy actions.

3.2. A Decision Maker’s Personality

Stereotypically fitting decision makers into certain categories would be rather simple. A precise assessment of decision makers’ personalities may provide us with certain general foreign policy patterns which decision makers follow on the basis of similar or different personalities. It would be worth noting that by personality we do not mean solely to describe decision makers’ attitude and temperament but also their values and profound beliefs. However, as recognised by Schafer¹⁷⁷, we should not merely assume that once we have managed to understand what the individual’s general personality is, we have automatically unveiled the pattern according to which these individuals take foreign policy decisions.

Nonetheless, empirical theories of rationality believe that they may understand and demonstrate how a decision maker’s personality predisposes him or her to understand information in a specific manner and take decisions on that basis. Indeed, some experts, such as Orbovich and Molnar, believe that decision makers’ leadership styles may fall under four broad categories which all differ from one another on the basis of how the decision-maker, according to his personality, processes information. The experts believe that leaders fall under four choice-making styles which are systemic, speculative, judicial and intuitive. The first leadership style will lead to cost-benefit foreign policy decision-making, the second will lead to context-oriented foreign policy decision making, the third will lead to task-oriented foreign policy decision making and the last leadership style relies on a non-rational approach.

¹⁷⁶ Alden, Chris (2011). *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. Routledge.

¹⁷⁷ Schafer, *Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance*. Political Psychology. Web. Vol 31. No 3. 2000.

According to Orbovich and Molnar, the first type of decision makers thus systemic-style decision makers will opt for a certain decision after developing several logical ways to look for patterns when evaluating hard data. They usually prefer being extremely cautious and using mathematical models without however considering context. This is quite a big weakness seeing as a capable decision maker's struggle doesn't lie with the fact that they have to spend years and years working to find the universally excellent solution. The real struggle is that leaders have to take decisions which correspond to the national and international environment at a given moment of time or, if their personality deems it fit, they may even try to manipulate the environment to suit their ambitions.

On the other hand, through the fourth choice-making style, decision-makers decide which option they should pursue on the basis of their experience and intuition. As we may see, this isn't a very efficient leadership styles seeing as in this manner irrational decision-makers who do not always have a good intuition and who have to deal with extremely tense situations which quickly require decisions, are unable to capture the complexity behind a decision making process. The second type of decision makers, those who use a speculative style, have quite a similar approach to the first type of decision makers. They too follow logical steps in the analysis of the options that they should take. However they are more concerned about contextual factors and analyse future possibilities which certain decisions may create. As we may see, this would be the best kind of leadership style seeing as it already has a mixture of a couple of the most important elements in the decision making process thus a quantitative and qualitative analysis of information.

Lastly, we have judicial decision makers who prefer to rely on consensus to select a course of action and seek to understand people's perceptions of the current situation and act accordingly. Much like the intuitive-style of decision, this category isn't exactly ideal as well. As we will analyse later on, taking a decision because all advisors agree that it is the correct decision, without backing it up with mathematical models, an analysis of the context and a bit of the decision makers' experience and intuition, isn't a good idea. The only positive aspect of relying solely on this decision-making choice, is that judicial decision makers consider information from a variety of choices.

Another important point which we will analyse further on seeing as it has to do with the Kosovo war, is that Clinton's leadership style fits into the third category perfectly, as demonstrated by the following quote in which experts claim that what the President yearned for the most was consensus and that all the actions he undertook was in order to, in a way or another, gain the population's trust

and his advisors' approval. "*Charm in buckets, the need for approval, recklessness...here was a leader who, despite the outbursts of temper, craved consensus*¹⁷⁸."

The President's associates confirm this and state that he was so obsessed with pleasing everyone and gaining consensus that he didn't even want to take hard or definite choices, a characteristic which may very well be a weakness in foreign policy decision making. "*As Benjamin Barber recalled, Clinton was a president who didn't like hard choices. When forced to decide between competing views he continued to believe deeply that he could always do some of both....According to Arkansas news reporter Brenda Blagg: he doesn't like to make anybody mad and of course in the process of trying not to make anyone mad, he makes somebody mad all the time*¹⁷⁹."

However, once we'll analyse Clinton's presidency we'll see that he did take hard decisions seeing as, even though he was a judicial decision maker, he was an active and not a passive one who decided to act in order to gain consensus. Indeed, "*James David Barber, doyen of academic analysts of presidential character, regarded Clinton as falling firmly into his category of active positive leaders*¹⁸⁰."

Overall, it is obvious that all these kinds of leadership styles could lead to disastrous consequences, some more than others. The problems arise when one sole decision-making category is rigidly upheld by the leaders who fit into that category. For example, diehard intuitive-style decision makers are too simplistic and radically judicial-style decision makers could lead to group-thinking.

On the other hand rigorous systemic-style decision makers will not pay attention to the historic and cultural context, whilst speculative-style decision makers may get lost in evaluating too many hypothetical possibilities. Decision makers should thus try not to fit into a certain choice-making category but should try to use all the positive aspects of each category in order to take an efficient foreign policy decision. And even then, "*the best and most thorough decision making process does not guarantee a good outcome. It does however make the desired outcome vastly more likely*¹⁸¹."

¹⁷⁸ John Dumbrell (2009). *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000*. Routledge.

¹⁷⁹ John Dumbrell (2009). *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000*. Routledge

¹⁸⁰ John Dumbrell (2009). *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000*. Routledge

¹⁸¹ Breuning M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Moreover, we must consider that individual decision makers are not simply human beings who have decided to sacrifice a great deal of their lives in order to champion their citizens' State on a sort of evangelical crusade. Much like intelligent and ambitious characters in a great Shakespearean play - some to a greater extent than others- they have their own goals which may not always be in line with the goal of increasing their country's world influence.

Most decision-makers do wish to shape the world which they find themselves in but some may decide to do so for personal gain, others for national glory and usually the most successful international players associate national glory with personal gain. As a result, their foreign policies will all be quite different and should be considered to be rational or irrational if they are logical in light of the decision maker's goals.

For example, a quick assessment of Hitler's, Mussolini's and Mao's personalities proves that leaders who enjoy having portraits of themselves propped up in their living rooms, great statues representing a more picturesque version of them installed in main squares, and who have propaganda ministers who laud their talents in popular culture, usually are more prone to have a confrontational foreign policy at the slightest conflict.

However, this doesn't necessarily mean that leaders of great democracies who appear to be humble, pleasant and conciliatory do not have aggressive foreign policies. Considering that military spending is not necessarily an element which evaluates a decision maker's propensity to war, it's rather interesting to note that according to the *U.S Department of Defense's Annual Green Book* , President Obama has been responsible for the largest U.S military budget since the Second World War, easily overriding leaders whose foreign policies are portrayed by the media to be more aggressive, such as President George Bush who came in second, and President Reagan who came in fifth.

Another interesting point is that certain decision makers take foreign policy actions on the basis of their opponent's personality as well. Several historians such as A.J.P Taylor state that Khrushchev took Kennedy's inexperience and youth into account when evaluating whether or not he should deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba. Another example regards General Charles de Gaulle deciding to pull France out of NATO and focus on an independent nuclear weapons programme after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although the aftermath of the Crisis was hailed as an American success, some scholars state that the hardened General believed that if the young President hadn't even used force

against a hostile Castro regime which was within striking distance of the US, Kennedy wouldn't have lifted a finger to protect France in a potential future attack.

3.3. The Relationship Between Decision Makers and their Closest Advisors

A decision makers' characteristics may also play a role in choosing whether or not to heed to the proposals of his advisory group. He may decide to listen carefully to his advisors in order to evaluate the best course of action; or he may decide to take it upon himself to take accomplish high-risk foreign policy deeds in order to show off his country's strength. Whilst the disadvantages which derive from the first strategy may cause the decision-maker to be completely subjugated to the whims of other irrational and imperfect humans, the disadvantages which derive from the second strategy may be linked to the decision-maker overestimating himself thus possibly leading to foreign policy disasters.

Of course, certain advisors may be so influential that they are the primary reason for which a President may take a foreign policy decision, as stated by Redd Steven B, once he analyses the influence of Madeleine Albright's influence on President Clinton's decision to use force against Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo in March 1999¹⁸².

Indeed, as we will explain later on, we should also consider that certain advisors are more powerful than others. For example, in the United States, the Secretaries of Defense and State often take foreign policy decisions quite autonomously seeing as the consent of these powerful players is absolutely necessary in order to implement any kind of decision.

According to Valerie Hudson, this is precisely why "*the US led Bombing of Belgrade in 1998 over the Kosovo crisis was often called Madeleine's War, because of Madeleine Albright's strong, almost single-handed insistence on retaliatory action against the Serbs, even in the face of a more cautionary stance by the Pentagon and even NATO allies.*"¹⁸³

¹⁸² Redd Steven B. *The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton's Decision to Use Force in Kosovo*. International Studies Perspectives. Web. Volume 6, Issue 1. February 2005.

¹⁸³ Hudson Valerie M (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

If we take the leader's personality into consideration, the rather worrying thought emerges that even certain people who are emotionally close to the leader yet not his official advisors¹⁸⁴ may play a role in foreign policy decision making. As the Deputy White House Chief of Staff between 1993 and 1996 stated, "*Hillary Clinton is much harder-edged on issues and Bill Clinton is much more accommodating*¹⁸⁵." Were it not for the following facts, Hillary Clinton's opinions and statements wouldn't be a source of analysis in Bill Clinton's decision making process.

According to some experts, "*it is difficult to believe that Hillary's harder edge did not have some impact on key foreign policy decision during the presidential years, notably in relation to the Balkans*¹⁸⁶." Moreover, in 1993, once the President's Counsellor, David Gergen, asked the Chief of Staff to describe the White House organisational chart, McLarty replied that it was composed by "*three people in the top box: Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton and Vice President Al Gore*¹⁸⁷." The fact that Hillary Clinton told journalist Lucinda Frank, with regards to the Kosovo campaign, "*I urged him to bomb...What do we have NATO for if not to defend our way of life?*¹⁸⁸" and that Bill Clinton did indeed follow her advice is even more curious.

3.4. The Impact of Changes in the Administration

We should consider that leaders and their advisory groups have a unique relationship which can rarely be repeated with other leaders, mainly because all leaders have different personalities which makes them have a reliable and stable relationship with certain decision-makers alone on the field of foreign policy decision making.

For example, it is highly unlikely that Brzezinski-who did not concur with triangular diplomacy but preferred bilateral, direct diplomacy- would have secretly travelled to China to make preparations of a Presidential visit, which is what Kissinger did in June 1971 in order to arrange Nixon's encounter with Mao Zedong¹⁸⁹.

¹⁸⁴ Indeed, during Bill Clinton's presidency, Hillary Clinton's sole role was that of First Lady. Moreover, she never sat in on National Security Council meetings and did not even have Security Clearance.

¹⁸⁵ Bernstein, Carl (2007). *A Woman in Charge: The Life of Hillary Rodham Clinton*. Arrow Books.

¹⁸⁶ John Dumbrell (2009). *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000*. Routledge.

¹⁸⁷ John Dumbrell (2009). *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000*. Routledge.

¹⁸⁸ John Dumbrell (2009). *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000*. Routledge.

¹⁸⁹ The trip led the President to drop his opposition to Chinese entry in the United Nations and lay the groundwork to establish diplomatic relations, exploiting the rivalry between China and the Soviet Union-under his so called triangular diplomacy strategy.

Indeed, apart from the rare cases in which leaders decide to drastically reshuffle the government's bureaucracy which mainly regard authoritarian regimes, we may recognise that in democracies, traditionally, the changes in the newly elected leader's closest circle of advisors are, from a bureaucratic point of view, what affects foreign policy decisions the most.

Even though we should consider that it is the President who selects his advisors in the United States of America, and does so mostly on the basis of his personality which assesses the personality of the advisors themselves, we should recognise that the leader's direct circle of advisors may take certain decisions based on their personality when assessing the personality of the leader himself.

For example, both Kissinger and Brzezinski are considered to be brilliant political scientists and highly able diplomats who served, respectively, as the United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under the presidential administrations of Nixon and Ford; and as Counselor to President Johnson and National Security Advisor to President Carter. Once they were in power, both political scientists played a prominent role¹⁹⁰ in American foreign policy decision making and even after they left office, both figures were frequently sought out by American presidents who sought their foreign policy advice.

However, once Jimmy Carter defeated Ford in 1976, Kissinger decided to leave office, and once Ronald Reagan gained office in 1981, Brezhnev declined the President's offer to stay on as his National Security Adviser. Several scholars attribute Kissinger's decision to leave office to the fact that, according to the political scientist, Carter's persona was too focused on human rights for his liking. Indeed, this is demonstrated by Kissinger's attempts to thwart the Carter Administration's efforts to halt the mass killings by the Argentinian military dictatorship in the years 1976-1983¹⁹¹.

As for Brezhnev's mixed relations with the Reagan Administration, several sources state that the political scientist declined Reagan's offer because *"he felt that the new president needed a fresh perspective on which to build his foreign policy...he supported the Reagan administration as an*

¹⁹⁰ Indeed, Kissinger managed to pioneer the policy of détente whilst opening relations with the People's Republic of China and attempting to end American involvement in Vietnam. As for Brzezinski, he was heavily involved in frequently attempting to undermine the influence of the Soviet Union, normalizing the relations with the People's Republic of China and the brokering of the Camp David Accords.

¹⁹¹ Goni Uki. *Kissinger Hindered US Effort to End Mass Killings in Argentina, According to Files*. The Guardian. Web. 2016.

*alternative to the Democrats' pacifism. On the other hand, he also criticized it as seeing foreign policy in overly black and white terms*¹⁹². ”

On the other hand, Kissinger had a very close relationship with Nixon and less so Ford, much like Brezhnev did with Carter and less so Johnson. Both Nixon and Kissinger were realists, convinced that power was the core dynamic of the international system and thus focused on managing great power relationships whilst, at the same time, recognizing the perils of America's global predominance.

Cynical realism was an important factor in leading the duo to take certain foreign policy decisions such as making relations better with China seeing as, according to Nixon *“the United States no longer is in the position of complete pre-eminence or predominance and that is not a bad thing. As a matter of fact it can be a constructive thing...Now we face a situation where four other potential economic superpowers have the capacity, have the kind of people...who can challenge us on every front*¹⁹³. ”

Therefore, instead of basking on the traditional American exceptionalism¹⁹⁴ to comfort the population in a post-Vietnam world, the duo decided to envisage the system as a multipolar one where America had to learn how to play in the balance of power. On the opposite end of the spectrum, we have Carter, who *“articulated a vision of America rooted in the idea of American exceptionalism...Nixon's realism was not the language of his Cold War predecessors and successors, including Carter.*¹⁹⁵”

Indeed, many scholars state that Carter took certain foreign policy decisions on the basis of idealism. This is demonstrated by most of his foreign policy decisions such as his decision to transfer the Panama Canal Zone back to Panama because *“we Americans want a more humane and stable world... This agreement with Panama is something we want because we know it is right... we*

¹⁹² Hamre J. *Reagan proposal Brzezinskiego, by zostal takze jego doradca*. TVN24. Web. 2017

¹⁹³ *President Nixon's speech in Kansas City on July 6 1971*.

¹⁹⁴ For example Walter Lippmann, a distinguished columnist, wrote in the Washington Post in March 1973 “Nixon's role has been that of a man who had to liquidate, defuse, deflate the exaggerations of the romantic period of American imperialism and American inflation. Inflation of promises, inflation of hopes, the Great Society, American supremacy—all that had to be deflated because it was all beyond our power. Interestingly enough, the President read the article when he was at the White House and scribbled in the margins “wise observation.”

¹⁹⁵ Tom Switzer, *Nixon, The Balance of Power and Realism*. The National Interest. August 11 2014.

*will demonstrate that as a large and powerful country, we are able to deal fairly and honourably with a proud but smaller sovereign nation...In this historic decision he (Roosevelt) would join us in our pride for being a great generous people*¹⁹⁶” even though this move was seen by many politicians as the unnecessary surrender of a strategic asset.

Indeed Senator Strom Thurmond underlined the futility of the foreign policy decision by stating “*we bought the canal and paid for it and we should keep it*”¹⁹⁷.” Another important point which shows how focused on human rights and liberalism Carter was, is the fact that he privately told Omar Torrijos, the de facto dictator of Panama, that the Senate would never have approved the Canal treaties unless he tried to liberalize his rule¹⁹⁸.

This shows how a President’s values, ideals and ambitions influence the foreign policy decision making process, and proves that these leaders tend to select close advisors who share their views and opinions, thus narrowing down foreign policy options which those decision makers may take.

Still, we should consider that, with regards to our description of Carter as idealistic on the basis of his actions with Panama, there was an increasingly violent opposition in Panama to the American presence in the Canal. Therefore, the President had three options. He could have either decided to let the situation deteriorate by not doing anything, face the opposition with armed force and probably lose a great deal of men¹⁹⁹ or finally solve the situation by allowing Panama to gain control of the Panama Canal but still allowing the Americans to intervene to protect the canal or the ships going through it²⁰⁰.

¹⁹⁶ Carter, *Address to the Nation on the Panama Canal Treaties*, February 1 1978.

¹⁹⁷ Milton Watson John (2012). *For the Good of the order: Nick Coleman and the High Tide of Liberal Politics in Minnesota*. Xlibris.

¹⁹⁸ Buckman, Robert T. (2007). *The World Today Series: Latin America 2007*. Harpers Ferry, West Virginia.

¹⁹⁹ Much like Vietnamese jungles and guerrilla fighters, Panama had its own fair set of strategic locations in order to employ the usual guerrilla warfare which had provoked so much chaos and bloodshed in Vietnam. It’s important to note that this point was recognised by Carter himself in his 1978 *Address to the Nation on the Panama Canal Treaties* speech.

²⁰⁰ Indeed, under the Torrijos-Carter treaties, Americans still retained several powers which they had had with the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 such as the right to protect and defend the canal against any armed attack to the security of the canal or of ships going through. It is worth noting that the 1903 Treaty hadn’t granted ownership of the Panama Canal Zone but only the right to use the Canal, much like renting a piece of land- in Carter’s own words in his 1978 *Address to the Nation on the Panama Canal Treaties* speech.

The fact that two thirds of the American Senate agreed with Carter's choice of the third option, including a decent number of Republicans who are usually less idealist than Democrats, demonstrates that the choice was wise²⁰¹ and conveniently allowed the United States to prove the Soviet-aligned charges of imperialism wrong. Of course, a fourth option could have been trying to install an American-backed government in Panama which took focus off the Canal in a style similar to President Nixon in Cambodia in 1970 or President Reagan during the Iran-Contra affair.

As opposed to Carter, Nixon was an experienced practitioner of foreign policy and wanted to control major foreign policy initiatives from the White House, as demonstrated by the changes made to the National Security Council. He managed to mature a close and extremely efficient partnership with Kissinger, where the foreign policy expert dealt with the details of Nixon's general foreign policy plans which focused on acting like the enemy would.

This shows how usually in the White House, it is the advisory group which complements the President and not vice-versa, leaving him ample room for maneuver on the foreign policy field which shall be affected by whether or not he desires to personally and directly be heavily involved in it. Therefore it really isn't surprising that Kissinger was not invited to continue being part of the new President's inner circle and likewise, Brzezinski would have never been part of President Nixon's inner circle.

Their personalities, described by a person's values and profound beliefs, were too different thus their foreign policy objectives were too different. Usually Presidents desire having an immediate advisory group which doesn't exactly tell them what to do but which does share their same ideologies, so that they may all harmoniously work together towards a solution which they deem appropriate. However we must remember that group-thinking thus having advisors who all share similar values and views, is quite a problem.

²⁰¹ Moreover, the Panama negotiations had been going on for decades. The fact that Kissinger himself was quoted as saying to President Ford, back in a meeting with him in 1975 "if these (Canal) negotiations fail we will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America" and that Carter stated in his *Address to the Nation on the Panama Canal Treaties* that Kissinger supported the Torrijos-Carter Treaties demonstrates that even hard-line realists supported Jimmy Carter in certain foreign policy decisions. This is just one example which demonstrates that despite Carter's idealistic focus on democracy, fairness and human rights thus despite his personality, he still managed to be a practical President, demonstrating that there are other factors which must be taken into consideration other than a decision maker's personality.

Indeed, on the other hand Brzezinski mostly had to deal with foreign policy decisions by himself, on the basis of Carter's instructions to evaluate foreign countries' conduct and responses and act accordingly²⁰². This demonstrates that a decision maker's personality does indeed affect foreign policy decisions seeing as, depending on how interested the potentially main foreign policy decision maker may be in a foreign policy matter or in foreign policy itself, other decision makers such as National Security Advisors-or, as we shall see in Clinton's case, Secretary of States-may take it upon themselves to take the reins of actual and accurate foreign policy decisions whilst following the President's general scheme.

Moreover, according to Pfaff William, President Carter and Brzezinski believed that "*American foreign policy should aim to make a better and more moral way of the world by way of economic and political pressures and international institutional reform*²⁰³." An interesting point which we'll analyse later on is that the author believes that Clinton shared this view too and focused greatly on choosing foreign policy interventions based on the consensus of the international community or by delegating or sharing responsibility with international institutions and multinational military instruments.

This is precisely why Pfaff argues that, as opposed to Clinton, had President Nixon been alive would have never intervened in Bosnia seeing as-as stated by Hans Morgenthau-"*policy idealism risks jeopardizing security by pursuing unachievable international goals*²⁰⁴" and the intervention in Bosnia is described by Pfaff as an "*idealistic attempt to solve insoluble problems*²⁰⁵."

Thus, by analogy with regards to President Clinton and Kosovo, his idealism will be another factor which we will analyse when trying to understand why President Clinton took certain particular foreign policy options, considering that there wasn't much to gain economically, strategically or

²⁰² Carter's approach to foreign policy outlines the differences with the Nixon administration perfectly "for too many years we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire never thinking that fire is sometimes best quenched with water." As reported in Haas J. Lawrence (2012). *Sound the Trumpet: The United States and Human Rights Promotion*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

²⁰³ Pfaff William, *The Crucial Debate: Realism or Idealism?* The Chicago Tribune. 1994.

²⁰⁴ Pfaff William, *The Crucial Debate: Realism or Idealism?* The Chicago Tribune. 1994.

²⁰⁵ Pfaff William, *The Crucial Debate: Realism or Idealism?* The Chicago Tribune. 1994.

politically through the NATO bombardment of the country. Moreover, we'll also consider the role of his foreign policy advisors who, much like Carter's relationship with Brzezinski, had a rather wide room for manoeuvre with regards to foreign policy options, an opportunity which Madeleine Albright immediately pounced upon for a series of personal reasons.

3.5. Group-thinking and Analogies

After the Bay of Pigs Disaster, President Kennedy stated *"I want to know how all this could have happened. There were 50 or so of us, presumably the most experienced and smartest people we could get to plan such an operation...but five minutes after it began to fall in we all looked at each other and asked-how could we have been so stupid?"*²⁰⁶

As social psychologist Irving Janis analysed, what led to the failure of the plan was group-thinking. It is defined as a dynamic where members of a team make erroneous decisions because group pressures lead them to take irrational actions and reinforce their previously held beliefs whilst ignoring valid alternatives.

We should note that a group is particularly vulnerable to group-thinking *"when its members are similar in background, when the group is insulated from outside opinions and there are no clear rules for decision making"*²⁰⁷.

We may state that having advisors who all share similar values and views, may be beneficial on one hand, so that decision makers adopt a foreign policy strategy which all agree on and is coherent to their ideologies, but on other hand may be quite a problem seeing as no one will question the strategy itself.

This is precisely what happened in the Bay of Pigs Disaster, after which President Kennedy acknowledged that he hadn't challenged the military leaders around him who were absolutely sure that the mission to overthrow Fidel Castro's Cuban government would work and hadn't considered making any changes to the plan when confronted with potentially useful information.

²⁰⁶ As stated by President Kennedy to reporter Hugh Sidey. The reporter would later write an article on this conversation on April 16 2001.

²⁰⁷ Irving, Janis L. (1972). *Victims of Groupthink*. New York. Houghton Mifflin.

As we may see through Janis' analysis of eight phenomenons which characterize group-thinking, the illusion of unanimity present in the decision making process along with the illusion of invulnerability both contributed to the dynamics of group-thinking in the Bay of Pigs Fiasco.

Self-censorship was another factor present in the advisory sessions. Indeed, Schlesinger, Kennedy's special assistant and a brilliant historian who could have provided the President with valid arguments against the invasion, later stated that "*I bitterly reproached myself for having kept so silent during those crucial discussions in the cabinet room*²⁰⁸" which he probably did for fear of evoking disapproval of his counterparts who all agreed-or seemed to agree-that the plan was efficient and just. And if that weren't enough, "*President Kennedy, Rusk and...Robert Kennedy all acted as mind-guards. Robert Kennedy...withheld memorandums condemning the plan from both Schlesinger and Fulbright*²⁰⁹."

Even though it must be quite pleasant for Presidents to have all their advisors nod in approval at a certain plan and announce how successful it will be, leaders must accumulate as much information as possible and challenge all advice which has been given to them, regardless of the source. Moreover, they must always assume the worse in any kind of case scenario. This will make them, and their advisors be extremely alert when dealing with risky recommendations, creative when considering other options, and patient when evaluating whether or not to dismiss a foreign policy strategy.

Of course, leaders and their advisors must not be so cautious as to restrict all their actions for fear of encountering all the problems which have been listed in the advisory session. Creating an environment where constructive criticism is supported does contribute to foreign policy success. However, this doesn't obviously mean that leaders have to surround themselves with members of

²⁰⁸ Forsyth, Donelson R. (2010). *Group dynamics*. Belmont, Calif.

²⁰⁹ Forsyth, Donelson R. (2010). *Group dynamics*. Belmont, Calif.

the opposing party who always contradict their policies²¹⁰. Firing the administration if timely advice isn't given efficiently thus contributing to cause a foreign policy disaster also isn't an option²¹¹.

Therefore, President Kennedy learnt that it is essential to have multiple options open for debate. Having learnt this the hard way, he made sure not to repeat the mistake one year later during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Several options which could resolve the conflict were put on the table. However, in the Bay of Pigs Disaster there had only been one option thus the invasion of Cuba.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the *Executive Committee of the National Security Council* was given enough time and information to evaluate, explore and present all possible courses of action. Moreover, in order to prevent group-thinking, Janis Irving stated that the leader should avoid stating preferences and expectations in order to counter group-thinking. Indeed, President Kennedy recused himself from the process in order to prevent naturally ambitious advisors from choosing the course of action which they thought would please the President the most.

This is precisely why certain far-sighted leaders have employed devil's advocates in the decision making process, as demonstrated in the Cuban missile crisis, when President Kennedy had two men who were very close to him-Robert Kennedy and Ted Sorensen-serve as "intellectual watchdogs."

Both the President's brother and speechwriter managed to question every single alternative which the other decision-makers presented in order to establish which strategy was the one which had less faults. However we should consider, much like Michael A. Roberto states, that "*if a devil's advocate has some power and status, he or she will not be dismissed or ignored easily. Members of the Kennedy administration knew that these two men had earned the president's trust and respect.*"

²¹⁰ For example, Professor Hart states in his 1997 *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Making* that "vulnerability to groupthink is presumably determined by the amount of political heterogeneity within government. Coalition governments, common in many Western European states will be less likely to suffer from groupthink than the more homogenous American presidency." Even though this is a valid point, we should take care that a coalition government with "too much of a coalition" would provoke negative results seeing as the decision making process will be excessively hindered.

²¹¹ According to Ralph Martin's book *A Hero for Our Time*, Kennedy's response to McNamara's statement is rather quite exemplary with regards to this issue. The Defense Secretary recommended that the responsibility be shared among the administration, stating "we could have recommended against it and we didn't." However Kennedy replied "Absolutely not. I am the president. I could have decided otherwise. It is my responsibility."

As a result, they listened closely to the dissenting views and the probing questions which the individuals put forth²¹².”

The result of this strategy which thus reduced the dangers of group-thinking, were positive. The President managed to influence his Russian counterpart to take a step back and dismantle Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for a public declaration that the United States would avoid invading Cuba again and a secret agreement was made which established that the United States would dismantle all U.S built Jupiter MRBMs which had been deployed in Turkey and in Italy . Not only did President Kennedy emerge as the victor whilst President Khrushchev was highly criticized by the Soviet public and politicians²¹³ but the relationship between the two superpowers greatly improved after this heightened yet brief period of tensions.

As for analogical reasoning, it is obvious that predicting the future and interpreting the present in a reasonable manner may only be possible for decision-makers if they analyse the past. This is also why so many American Presidents have so many historians amongst their advisory groups. The fact that a drastic decision must be made in a short period of time by analysing incomplete information in the midst of secrecy and confusion heightens the importance of decision makers having to analyse similar past situations, compare them to the present situations and take a decision.

Therefore, scrutinizing the past is an excellent way to fill in the present's blanks. This would be useful when dealing with the same adversary over a long period of time. For example, Hitler's failure to efficiently anticipate the Russian scorched earth policy was definitely a factor which contributed to Germany's failed invasion of Russia. The fact that Napoleon's army had had to face the same dilemma over a century ago and that Hitler hadn't prepared his army against the scorched earth policy was a compromising strategic error. Hitler's foreign policy choices should have changed and the outcome of the war could have been different, had he applied analogical thinking to the matter.

²¹² Roberto Michael A. (2013). *How Business Leaders Avoid Conflict*. FT Press.

²¹³ Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, stated that “the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation.” As stated by Taubman William (2003). *Khrushchev: the Man and His Era*. W.W. Norton and Company.

A decision maker who had indeed applied analogical thinking against Napoleon, whose traditional strategy wasn't hard to notice²¹⁴, was Tsar Alexander I. This is why the Tsar, when confronted with the Grande Armée of about 600,000 men, refused to meet French forces head on whilst Russian forces kept retreating every time French forces tried to attack. This caused the campaign to drag on and on, much like Hitler's campaign did because of several other historical factors.

Once the French army had marched deep into the huge Russian territory, they were severely weakened by well-equipped Russian assaults, the cold winter, diseases and the scorched earth policy which left them devoid of supplies. Seeing as Russia has always been prepared to give up space for time and has always afforded to lose a huge number of troops, it is almost absurd that the Wehrmacht found itself in Napoleon's same exact situation more than a century later and that German decision makers-in this case, Hitler himself-hadn't thought about this possibility a bit more.

Therefore, when devising potential solutions, an analysis of similar solutions taken in the past must be done in order to assess whether they solved the foreign policy crisis efficiently. However, understanding how the current problem is different from the past problem is essential so that decision makers may understand why a strategy which didn't work in the past could work in the present and why a certain strategy which worked in one occasion may not have worked in another similar occasion.

For example, the Munich analogy is a classic analogy which demonstrates that *"if you give in even a little to an aggressive leader, that leader will be emboldened and present a bigger foreign policy problem in the future"*²¹⁵ and would explain why several usually peaceful foreign policy decision makers have taken surprising actions on the basis of this analogy. This would explain, according to Breuning, why Margaret Thatcher responded immediately and extremely defensively to the Argentinean incursion into the Falklands.

However, as we shall analyse further on, foreign policy decision makers have to be very careful when applying analogies. Seeing as each historical case is different, the use of analogies risks to deteriorate into a general and superficial application of a historical lesson which has too many details and peculiarities for it to be applied to others.

²¹⁴ It consisted in annihilating the enemy in a major battle strategy and carrying few supplies seeing as the French army usually lived off the supplies which it found in the foreign territory.

²¹⁵ Reiter Dan (1996). *Crucible of Beliefs*. Cornell University Press.

Indeed, expansionist Adolf Hitler justified his annexation of Austria and the strategic Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia on the basis of an irredentist claim which just served as an excuse to increase Nazi Germany's military and economic power. On the other hand, President Leopoldo Galtieri and other Argentine leaders' ambitions didn't extend beyond wishing to distract the population from the disastrous economic situation by obtaining what they perceived to be their territory-which by the way, was of little strategic use.

This would explain why, according to Neustadt and May it is extremely difficult to correctly use analogies seeing as *“decision makers tend to use analogies in a rather superficial manner: they overstate the similarities and downplay important differences between the historical and current case...they fail to carefully compare the current and historical situations²¹⁶.”*

Moreover, seeing as analogies are so easy to apply, considering that decision-makers have incomplete information and limited computational capacities, they are usually applied subconsciously rather than strategically. This is extremely dangerous seeing as whilst an intelligent application of an analogy would be ideal in order to evaluate which foreign policy possibilities are the best, a sloppy application of an analogy would mean using it as a schema.

If analogies are used as if they were schemas, decision-makers won't even bother to carefully analyse the current situation and will randomly replicate decisions taken in what they think are similar situations, to situations which in reality aren't that similar.

The main consequence of using analogies poorly would be taking inappropriate policies, as demonstrated by the Suez Crisis in which Prime Minister Anthony Eden applied the Munich analogy erroneously. Convinced that Nasser was playing in the hands of the Russians just like Mussolini had been Hitler's puppet, he took a drastic foreign policy decision, as we have analysed previously.

4. A System Based Analysis: The External Environment

The system level of analysis is nothing more than an exploration of the structure of the international system which is described as a combination of external realities and pressures which influence a

²¹⁶ Khong Foong Yuen (1992). *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton University Publishers.

decision maker's foreign policy. The most predominant characteristic of the international system's structure is that power and influence are always distributed in a certain manner between States at any given time. However we must also consider that nowadays intergovernmental organisations play an enormous roles in shaping decision makers' foreign policies thus affecting the balance of power.

4.1. The International System and Changes in Its Structure

Kenneth Waltz believed that "*States perform or try to perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them...the functions of States are similar and distinctions among them arise principally from their varied capabilities*²¹⁷." As a consequence, even though all decision-makers employ similar mechanisms in order to reach their goals, certain States will be more powerful than others. We have already discussed what power actually entails and the advantages which it provides foreign policy decision makers with. Therefore, in this section, we're going to assess how the number of great powers in the international system affects the actions which foreign policy decision makers will take, and how changes in the international system complement this relationship.

Usually, one considers there to be three types of international systems namely unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. Conveniently, the world has seen all three of these types of categories, with the world seeing major centers of power in Europe during the multipolar era through World War Two, a bipolar era during the Cold War and a unipolar era with the United States as a world superpower in recent times. As for the future, current debates focus on whether unipolarity will prevail or give way to a new bipolar or multipolar world. According to some scholars such as Robert Kaplan, each system has its own rules on the basis of its structure, therefore different behavioural tendencies emerge with regards to each sort of international system.

Before analysing this point further we must consider that theories differ as to how certain international systems affect foreign policy decisions. Nonetheless, we will recognise that when the world is confronted with a certain structure of an international system, foreign policy orientations may indeed be influenced by the balance of power. Likewise, a shift in the balance of power will cause foreign policy orientations to change. However, in a final analysis, we will consider that, echoing the previously mentioned words of Wendt, system attributes truly are what States make of them.

²¹⁷ Hook Steven (2012). *Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy*. Taylor and Francis.

4.2. Multipolarism in the 19th Century

An example of how foreign policy is affected by the international system regards the United States' behaviour towards the beginning of the nineteenth century. In order to advance the national interests of a relatively insignificant power which had been founded on the enormous empire of one of the greatest European powers, American foreign policy focused on completely ignoring European squabbles and enmities.

The following quote by President George Washington's *Farewell Address*, demonstrates this "*The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is...to have with them as little political connection as possible... Such an attachment of a small or weak towards a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter...*"²¹⁸

This proves that when less powerful States are caught up in a multipolar system their decision makers' foreign policies will try to put as much distance between themselves and the great power conflicts as possible in order to amass power and one day, engage in those issues. On the other hand, great powers in multipolar systems will try to uphold the balance of power in order to prevent a couple of actors or an actor from gaining too much strength thus causing the system to become unipolar or multipolar. This is demonstrated by Copeland's study according to which neo-realists, who assume that States are unitary actors, believe that abrupt shifts in the balance of power may be the cause of drastic foreign policy decisions.

Copeland found that neo-realist expectations explained German leaders' decision to start both World Wars and President Truman's decision to go through with the Cold War. The decision to embark on an ill-fated war or on a cold war derived from the perception that going to war was better than letting the country gain power. Indeed, with regards to the latter case, an expected shift of power towards the Soviet Union caused other States caught up in a precarious balance of power equilibrium, to shift their attitudes towards a State to whom they had previously been indifferent to or who had even an ally of some sorts.

Of course, multipolarism doesn't necessarily entail that, because of the necessity to keep the balance of power in check, great powers will be more prone to act aggressively whilst small powers will simply mind their own business by not enacting active foreign policy decisions.

²¹⁸ Washington George, *Farewell Address*, 1796.

For example, according to Steven Hook, “*Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the provisions he negotiated into the Charter of the League of Nations rested entirely on the repudiation of balance of power politics*²¹⁹.”

Indeed, the President focused on the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities rather than an equilibrium between weak and strong nations in order to create an international system which would be safe and stable for all nations. The fact that the territorial demands which Wilson made were not based on an attempt to reshape the balance of power, much like the 1814 Congress of Vienna had been²²⁰, demonstrates that when the world is multipolar, decision-makers won’t be necessarily caught up in the balance of power in order to maintain peace.

This would also explain why, according to Stephen Hook, “*in this sense, American foreign policy under the multipolar system of the early twentieth century presented a rarity: a great power that, rather than using the balance of power as a justifying ideology wanted to reject it altogether, not only for itself but for the entire system*²²¹.”

As demonstrated by the League of Nations in 1919 and the highly functional United Nations in 1945-which by the way were both based on the moderately efficient Vienna System after the Congress of Vienna-in order to ensure that foreign decision makers’ foreign policies aren’t warmongering, several mechanisms other than the balance of power may be successfully employed.

This would explain why structural realists have argued that multipolarity goes hand in hand with a stable international system. This is because power balances do not matter as much as they do in the bipolar system, thus reducing tensions by creating a situation in which countries don’t have much to gain but have a lot to lose if they attacked foreign countries. Moreover, in multipolar systems it is easier to find allies, thanks to the vast quantity of players and thanks to the fact that countries won’t be forced to choose between two mortal enemies thus earning the unpicked country’s enmity for the remainder of the century.

²¹⁹ Hook Steven (2012). *Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy*. Taylor and Francis.

²²⁰ Indeed the objective of the Congress of Vienna was to provide a long term peace plan for Europe and, according to the ambassadors of the European states, this would be achieved by resizing the main powers so that they could balance each other thus preventing imperialism within Europe.

²²¹ Hook Steven (2012). *Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy*. Taylor and Francis.

Having allies is a convenient manner to uphold the peace, keep the situation as it is and maintain stability. Indeed, the fact that the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century produced over four decades of relative peace amongst the great powers during a multipolar era demonstrates that there may be periods of stability during multipolarism too, which are facilitated-not hindered-by alliances.

4.3. Bipolarism in the Cold War

We may now start our brief analysis of bipolarism by assuming Waltz's standing on the matter. After having evaluated whether or not decision-makers in a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar world order are more prone to pursue aggressive foreign policies, according to Waltz, bipolarity was the most stable international system.

In bipolar systems there are two major powers who'll focus their negative attention exclusively on one another whilst in a multipolar system, multiple poles will create unnecessary and useless hostilities. Moreover, seeing as achieving the major world power status is quite difficult yet means that the two countries are military and economic giants, both countries in the bipolar system won't have to focus on developing external alliances thus eliminating another source of trouble and uncertainty present in a multipolar system²²².

The most obvious example of a bipolar system is the Cold War where bipolarism strikes another point on the lack of aggressiveness foreign policy scale. It is worth noting that after the Second World War, the United States had managed to play a huge role in building the international system's structure and that the Cold War was nothing more than an attempt, by both opposing sides, to maintain the system which they had built.

American and Russian decision makers never engaged in direct combat because of the situation being too dangerous: nuclear weapons could have caused catastrophic consequences. As demonstrated by Kennedy's mental comparison of the dangers of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the outbreak of the First World War²²³ one of the main reasons for which he decided to adopt a well thought out and cautious plan to solve the Crisis was precisely because he knew that, the bipolar

²²² Indeed, Waltz believes that "with more than two states the politics of power turn on the diplomacy by which alliances are made, maintained and disrupted...flexibility of alignment narrows one's choice of policies." As stated in Emerson M. (2006). *The Balance of Power: Stability In International Systems*. Cambridge University Press.

²²³ Clot Melania-Gabriella (2014). *Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

system being as it was with two heavily armed superpowers dictating the rules, the outcome of a rash and aggressive foreign policy decision could be devastating.

It is interesting to note that already during the Second World War, American leaders began to speak in classic balance of power terms. Gone was the time when the United States desired to reject the balance of power as a justifying ideology for their foreign policy in favour of idealist principles such as justice and rights. Of course, maintaining the balance of power may go along with promoting democracy around the world, but in this manner the latter objective merely complements America's hegemony. For example, George Bush's administration called for "*a balance of power that favours human freedom*"²²⁴.

As for Cold War examples, this is demonstrated by General George Marshall's Speech to the Graduating Class of the United States Military Academy "*we are determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle, our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand and of overwhelming force on the other*"²²⁵.

The fact that the General included the term "overwhelming force" demonstrates that the United States does indeed desire to have a role to play in the upcoming struggle for power. The same goes for President Truman who decided to justify the Truman Doctrine by stating that "*the world is not static and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations*"²²⁶.

His decision to employ the term "status quo" in a bipolar era fully demonstrates that decision makers are well aware of the system which they find themselves in and decide to change their foreign policy stances on the basis of it. Even though Woodrow Wilson was described as an idealist, his foreign policy stance after the First World War was very convenient seeing as, after their enemies had been defeated and their allies severely weakened, the United States could afford to focus on principles such as justice to all peoples and nationalities.

However, after the Second World War however, the shadow of the Soviet Union was looming in the dark. It is extremely unlikely that even idealist Woodrow Wilson, had he been President during the

²²⁴ As reported in Kaufman S (2007). *Balance of Power in World History*. Palgrave Macmillan.

²²⁵ General George Marshall's Speech to the Graduating Class of the United States Military Academy on May 29 1942.

²²⁶ *President Harry S. Truman's Address Before A Joint Session of Congress*. March 12, 1947.

Second World War, would have decided to focus his foreign policy on idealistic pursuits, like he had done in the Post-World War One relatively calm multipolar era, instead of toughening up his stance and focusing on the traditional power struggle in the Post-World War Two bipolar era. As recognized, by the *NSC-68* report in 1950, all decision-makers know fully well that new situations require new responses²²⁷.

Indeed we must consider that according to Gilpin, “*an international system is stable...if no State believes it profitable to attempt to change the system*”²²⁸ and profitability is measured by a major power’s satisfaction with the existing territorial, political and economic arrangements, and by the belief that changing the situation would bring upon the nation a higher degree of benefits than the degree of costs which would derive from the nation’s attempts to gain the benefits.

As for the change from multipolarism to bipolarism, in accordance with Waltz’s predictions, most American foreign policy actions changed dramatically. For example, alliances with Europe, once discredited by President George Washington as “*entangling alliances*”²²⁹, became a great source of strength in the bipolar order and a race ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union as to who could transform the most “like minded nations” into loyal and fierce allies.

4.4. The Aftermath: Unipolarism

Once the United States’ main opponent had fallen, the country’s decision makers sought to publicly announce what the country’s foreign policy would be, presidency by presidency. Generally speaking, all post-Cold War American leaders believe Krauthammer’s unipolar conception of the United States as a hegemon to be correct²³⁰ and agree with George Bush’s statement that “*there is no substitute for American leadership*.”²³¹

Some scholars such as Professor Wohlforth believe that unipolarism is the most peaceful system of them all seeing as there won’t be any countries against whom to fight. Quoting Randall Schweller,

²²⁷ The top secret policy paper, described as a blueprint for the Cold War, recognized that “two complex set of factors basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted...in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centres. Second, the Soviet Union...seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.”

²²⁸ Gilpin, Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

²²⁹ *George Washington’s Farewell Address*, 1796.

²³⁰ Krauthammer, *The Unipolar Moment*. Foreign Affairs. Web. 1990.

²³¹ *George Bush’s Address before a Joint Session of Congress*, September 11, 1990.

he states that “*if everyone has high status, no one does*”²³².” Therefore, according to the Professor there will be a zero sum competition for status seeing as all but the hegemon are on the same level, and trying to reach the hegemon’s level would be economically and militarily impossible.

Hegemonies in unipolar systems are also associated with certain peaceful foreign policy behaviours like building coalitions to deal with security issues or economic challenges, actively participating in binding regional institutions or international organisations and respecting the sovereignty of other countries without applying coercion.²³³ Paul Kennedy believed the same, arguing that it was the hegemony of Britain in the nineteenth century that permitted there to be stability and once the hegemon lost power, the system’s stability declined.

However, other scholars such as Monteiro Nuno argued that “*a unipolar system is one that provides incentives for recurrent wars between the sole great power and recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars among major and minor powers*”²³⁴.” Indeed, we should assess that the unipolar era has been made up by more than a few aggressive foreign policy decisions taken by the hegemon²³⁵ and justified on the basis of spreading democracy or keeping the peace in extremely tense regions²³⁶. Could it therefore be that the hegemon, the greatest beneficiary of the unipolar system, knows very well that its power is unparalleled and that it can afford to take whatever foreign policy decisions it pleases?

Nuno Monteiro argues that the lines between anarchy and unipolarism are very thin. Even though other powers benefit from the status quo thanks to the hegemon’s economic transactions and investments, along with its military expertise and technology; the hegemon is the most benefiting actor. And who is to say that a State who is the leading economic power in the world and who has

²³² Wohlforth William W. *Unipolarity, Status Competition and A great Power War*. World Politics. Web. January 2009.

²³³ Schenoni L. *Subsystemic Unipolarities? Power Distribution and State Behaviour in South America and Southern Africa*. Strategic Analysis. Web. 2017 .

²³⁴ Monteiro Nuno P. *Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not peaceful*. Mit Press Journals. Web. 2011.

²³⁵ Moreover, according to Kohout, challengers may jealously initiate wars to expand their capabilities against the hegemon or the hegemon may recognize its declining power and attack possible challengers in order to check their advancements and threat. As stated in Kohout C. *Cyclical, Hegemonic and Pluralistic Theories of International Politics*. International Political Science Review. Web. January 2003.

²³⁶ As a matter of fact, we should recognise that U.S forces have been deployed in at least four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day, Iraq between 2003 and 2011.

both quantitative and qualitative military supremacy won't have intelligent decision makers who'll try maintaining the status quo as it is, whatever the cost?

As a consequence, the unipole's decision makers will be the most interested in maintaining the status quo and will put their maximum effort into both keeping the system's structure together, deterring potential competitors and destroying States which cause instability. As we will analyse later on, it is quite intriguing that certain scholars such as Knelman Fred believe that the Kosovo War is the perfect example of America's desire to maintain the status quo.

Indeed, the researcher states that *"the U.S is dedicated to the consolidation of its position in a unipolar world. To this degree, its military policy is to destroy all rogue regimes which in one way or another are seen to challenge U.S interests while it also seeks to contain Russia and China, the only two countries that might, in the future, threaten the U.S.'s unipolar status"*²³⁷.

Another important difference is that while there was quite a lot at stake with bipolarism, decision makers were constrained and forced to exercise caution in the international arena. Knowing perfectly well that they risked being involved in nuclear annihilation, the public and interest groups generally deferred decision making to the decision makers themselves thus automatically preventing foreign policy decisions from being derailed by militaristic interest groups or mass hysteria.

On the other hand, with unipolarism, even though decision makers will do anything to maintain the status quo, they won't exactly be under that kind of pressure which their predecessors were when taking decisions in the bipolar era. Seeing as there is, relatively speaking, less at stake in foreign policy, leaders may exploit the fact there is a limited lack of constraints in order to manipulate the public to respond to any threat which they desire them to focus on²³⁸.

Indeed, several foreign policy experts ²³⁹ have analysed George Bush's invasion of Iraq by predominantly focusing on the attributes of unipolar systems. They concluded that the Bush administration took advantage of the system attributes offered by unipolarity in order to embark on

²³⁷ Knelman Fred H. *Commentary: Kosovo: A Retrospective*. Peace Research. Volume 32 No 2. Web. May 2000.

²³⁸ Indeed, Professor Robert Jervis stated that for the unipole threats may be nowhere or anywhere . As stated in Jervis Roberts, *The Remaking of a Unipolar World*. Washington Quarterly. Summer 2006.

²³⁹ Snyder Jack; Shapiro Robert Y; Bloch-Elkon Yaeli. *Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home*. World Politics. Web. January 2009.

a much more active and much riskier foreign policy than would be feasible had they been working under the constraints of bipolarity²⁴⁰.

Even though those scholars state that, as a general rule, “*disproportionate power allows greater freedom of action but it is consistent with a broad spectrum of policies, ranging from messianic attempts to impose a new world order to smug attempts to insulate oneself from the world’s quagmires*”²⁴¹ we should recognise that unfortunately for this theory, there aren’t many examples apart from the United States’ current unipolarity which may back up this description of modern unipolarism, as recognized by the researchers themselves²⁴² and by Thomas Mowle and David Sacko who have described the United States’ power as “*something previously unseen*”²⁴³.

Nonetheless, we should recognise that the United States’ foreign policy has changed dramatically after the end of the bipolar era, much like it changed after the end of the multipolar era. Attributing these changes to system attributes isn’t a wholesome explanation but it definitely does play a part in shaping foreign policy decisions.

The fact that Kenneth Waltz himself recognises that “*a wide latitude of policy choices*” allows States to act “*on the basis of internal political pressure and national ambition*” supports the theory that when other countries aren’t willing or powerful enough to keep an ambitious country in check, its foreign policy will be as reckless and as blatant as its decision makers desire it to be.

Lastly, we may recognize that seeing as constraints are seriously reduced in unipolarity thanks to the fact that the unipole won’t have to worry as much about its unparalleled economic strength or military survival as it would have had to do in a bipolar or multipolar system, decision makers may afford to indulge themselves in taking foreign policy decisions based on their values and principles.

²⁴⁰ They have stated that “in the unipolar moment the immediate costs and risks of using military force against Saddam Hussein’s hollow, troublesome regime seemed low to U.S. leaders.” Snyder Jack; Shapiro Robert Y; Bloch-Elkon Yaeli. *Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home*. World Politics. Web. January 2009.

²⁴¹ Snyder Jack; Shapiro Robert Y; Bloch-Elkon Yaeli. *Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home*. World Politics. Web. January 2009.

²⁴² Indeed, they recognise that “The U.S since 1991 is the only case of a modern unipolar power.” Snyder Jack; Shapiro Robert Y; Bloch-Elkon Yaeli. *Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home*. World Politics. Web. January 2009.

²⁴³ Mowled Thomas, Sacko David (2007). *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Whilst a military intervention in a remote country on the basis of ideological purposes was deemed to be unthinkable by a new, timid country which had just gotten out of the American Revolution against its former, redoubtable coloniser, American foreign policy decision makers nowadays welcome the thought of getting involved in faraway places waving the flag of liberty, democracy and human rights.

The same goes for alliances, with Stephen Walt arguing that the choice of allies based on ideological affinity depends on whether or not the dangers which States face are weak. This is the case in unipolarism seeing as unipoles only have to deal with a highly limited number of threats to their sovereignty²⁴⁴. On the other hand, States living in a multipolar or bipolar era will be more set towards formulating strategic alliances which are necessary for their survival-even though those “allies” may have nothing in common or may very well secretly or openly despise each other, as demonstrated by the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact²⁴⁵.

4.5. The Relevance of System Attributes

Finally, in order to answer the question as to whether or not foreign policy, most notably American foreign policy, is influenced by system attributed, we may finally take a look at Steven Hook’s analysis of the matter. He states that *“looking broadly over time, however, the outlines of American foreign policy have largely coincided with the demands and expectations of balance of power theories²⁴⁶.”*

However, we should consider that according to Geller and Singer *“the results of data based studies on polarity and warfare are mixed with no definitive linear patterned evident regarding unipolar, bipolar and multipolar configurations and the occurrence of war.”*

This proves that a multilevel analysis, which takes into account this level of analysis as well as three others, is thus the best approach to an analysis of foreign policy decision making. Indeed,

²⁴⁴ Walt Stephen M (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell University Press.

²⁴⁵ For example, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact provided a guarantee of non-belligerence between Germany and the Soviet Union during a multipolar era. Moreover, a secret protocol outlined the spheres of influence between the two powers. However, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact only remained in force for two years after which, during Operation Barbarossa, Hitler decided to attack Soviet positions in Eastern Poland. Several high ranking foreign policy decision makers such as President Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov subsequently justified the Pact by describing it as necessary because of France’s and Britain’s lack of effective actions against the rise of Fascism.

²⁴⁶ Hook Steven (2012). *Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy*. Taylor and Francis.

Morgenthau had argued that predicting foreign policy decision making is so complicated that it is impossible that a broad systemic-level theory could be applied to the foreign policy process.

We must therefore recognise, true to Wendt's statement that system attributes are what States make of them, that the structure of the international system does affect the actions of foreign policy decision makers but definitely do not dictate them. A wider consideration of the variables which affect foreign policy must be taken into account thus including the previously analysed state attributes, psychological attributes and cultural and historical attributes.

4.6. The Role of Intergovernmental Organisations

As opposed to the realist conception that there is no central power and each country is left to its own plots and schemes in order to ensure their own survival, we believe that intergovernmental organisations impose limits on the sovereignty of member states thus constricting the range of actions which foreign policy decision makers may take. Indeed, academics such as Robert Keohane believe that the advent of international institutions has completely substituted the traditional importance of the international system's structure. As a consequence, the international environment would appear to be characterized by voluntary cooperation.

Nowadays, decision makers will interpret the international environment in a different way than they may have done centuries ago. They'll have to take foreign policy decisions by respecting certain international rules and regulations, on the basis of the obligations which foreign policy decision makers' countries must uphold.²⁴⁷

The classic example regards the United Nations, the largest and most powerful intergovernmental organisation in the world which is made up by 193 sovereign States. The fact that its Charter has been written primarily to prevent aggression by one nation against another obviously shapes decision makers' foreign policies thus severely limiting the possibility of jubilantly declaring war against another nation for aggressive purposes.

We must however consider that, as argued by John Ikenberry, these kind of institutions have emerged in the post-war order along with the rise of American hegemony. The scholar believes that institutions were set up by the United States or with their close support in order to demonstrate to

²⁴⁷ Almost all leaders of States have, at some point in time, demonstrated their willingness to abide by common rules by signing and ratifying treaties, conventions and declarations.

other countries that the unipole wasn't a threat. For example, according to Kenneth Waltz, NATO's continued existence after the fall of the Soviet threat²⁴⁸ "*illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived and misperceived interests*²⁴⁹."

Therefore, according to this view, the United States desire to present themselves as a friendly unipole, allowing weaker States to have a voice, helping strong States economically and finding a *raison d'être* for these institutions to continue working after the end of the Cold War. Ikenberry argues that other great powers decided not to engage in a balance of power struggle against the United States seeing as the country's decision makers managed to convince their relatively weak or moderately strong counterparts that they were interested in cooperation rather than domination.

Indeed, we should recognise that creating an enduring institutional order which played into the very hands of the liberal basis of U.S hegemony was a genius move. It allowed Western countries to calmly accept their inferiority and support the benevolent unipole's exploits on the basis of the new post-world order²⁵⁰. Therefore, we may state that system attributes such as the structure of the international system do play a role in shaping the functions of international institutions which on the other hand, play a role in shaping decision makers' foreign policies.

²⁴⁸ It is worth noting that, as stated by NATO's First Secretary General, the organization's goal was to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."

²⁴⁹ Waltz Kenneth. *Structural Realism after the Cold War*. International Security. 13 December 2012.

²⁵⁰ Ikenberry G. John. *Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Post-war Order*. International Security. Web. Winter 1998-1999.

CHAPTER THREE

A CASE STUDY: THE KOSOVO WAR

SUMMARY: 1. A Step by Step Analysis. –1.1 Option One: A Diplomatic Solution Based on Analogies. – 1.2. A Fatal Misunderstanding of the Counterpart’s Persona. – 1.3. Why War is Better than a Bad Compromise. – 1.4. A Lack of Viable Alternatives. – 2. Option Two: Calling in NATO. – 2.1. Power, Allies and Influence: Hyperpowers Will Because They Can . – 2.2. How to Maintain American Hegemony: The President’s Grand Strategy. – 2.3. Cherry-Picking: An Analysis of America’s Reaction to the Rwandan Genocide. – 2.4. Who Needs Domestic Constraints? Ignoring Congress. – 2.5. The Joys of An Uninterested Public. – 2.6. An Economically Motivated War? – 2.7. Not Knowing One’s Enemy: Blatantly Disregarding Yugoslavia’s Culture and History – 3. Option Three: Unilaterally Using U.S Force. – 3.1. Past Experiences and the Fear of Failure. – 3.2. The Attitude Towards Risk Taking – 4. Option Four: Doing Nothing. – 4.1. The Role and Motivations of Advisors: Madeleine’s War. – 4.2. Manipulating Public Opinion Through Analogies.

1. A Step by Step Analysis

As devastating as President Clinton knew the Kosovo war could turn out to be, two things were crystal clear. One, the United States of America would never risk sending their ground troops in a faraway and hostile country. Two, sitting back and doing nothing whilst ethnic and religious strife was taking over the Balkans and negotiations had failed was not an option. The foreign policy decision making process which ensued, ultimately terminating in the adoption of a conveniently middle-ground response, will be the object of our multi-level analysis.

Before evaluating the extent to which system, state, psychological, and cultural and historical attributes affected the Clinton administration’s decision makers, we should briefly present who the decision makers involved in the foreign policymaking process were, and we should depict from a historical point of view how the decision making process took shape.

We will observe that even though at the first stages of the crisis a rather vague set of policies had been formulated as a response to the dilemma, inaction had always been deemed inadmissible whilst unilateral military action had occasionally been considered by the previous presidency. However, the final plan according to which the Kosovo Liberation Army would have been

supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's aerial bombing campaign of Yugoslavia, emerged only towards the middle stages of the decision making process yet proved to be, in the eyes of the Clinton Administration, the most efficient solution.

However, notwithstanding the doubts, the vacillations and the delays, even though the Clinton Administration had probably already decided which course of action the United States of America should take towards the summer of 1998, the President of the United States never once publicly and explicitly excluded one option in favour of the other right until the 24th of March 1999, the very same day when NATO dropped its first bomb on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

As for the first point thus who these foreign policy decision makers involved in the decision making process in the Kosovo war were, we should take into account Roger Hilsman's political process model, which eschews the conceptualization of a nation as a unitary rational actor thus allowing for a very comprehensive evaluation of who the individuals calling the shots in foreign policy decision making truly are and what types of domestic and international pressures each and every one of them was sensitive to.

Based on Hilsman's approach, which allows a range of actors to be considered, there are nine power centres and three concentric rings of power in the American foreign policymaking process. The inner ring, which is the most influential one and which we shall, throughout the course of this analysis, call "The Clinton Administration", is made up by the President, the President's staff and advisors, Congress, political appointees and bureaucrats. The second ring is composed by interest groups and the media. Finally the outer ring comprises public opinion and the electorate. Of course, we will also explore the actions of the Clinton Administration's counterpart and the latter's own decision making process. The President of Serbia may indeed, based on the nature of his regime, be seen to be the main decision maker on the opposing side.

Starting with our step by step analysis, an important point to remember is that it was the Bush administration which first came up with the idea of a unilateral American military intervention. Indeed, towards the end of George Bush's Presidency, he informed President Milosevic that Serbian aggression in Kosovo would have provoked the use of "*U.S military force*²⁵¹" as we may see in the President's secret Christmas Warning in December 1992. However, George Bush's dramatic threat

²⁵¹ President George Bush, *Letter to Slobodan Milosevic*, December 25 1992.

of force fell flat seeing as the administration, with the President's mandate coming to an end, hadn't obviously had enough time to act on the issue.

The hot potato was passed on to newly elected Bill Clinton who had initially been quite laid-back when trying to find solutions to the Kosovo problem, as several scholars have evaluated.²⁵² Indeed, at the start of his presidency, his close circle of politicians, diplomats and advisors hadn't exactly given their undivided attention to the issue, with Secretary of State Warren Christopher vaguely alluding to the fact that the United States should be "*prepared to respond*"²⁵³-in some manner-against the Serbians in the event of a conflict in Kosovo.

The fact that Clinton's first Secretary of State didn't precisely state the nature of the so-called response at the beginning of the President's first term but was rather cautious about talking about a potential intervention in Kosovo proves that the newly nominated Clinton administration-which saw several important changes during the President's second term-initially took its time in assessing the situation or was simply temporarily uninterested in it, for reasons which we will explain further on.

As a matter of fact, it was during the early-middle years of his second term, at the beginning of March 1998 and with the worsening of the killings by the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that President Clinton's administration confirmed, in response to whether or not Bush's Christmas Warning which entailed military intervention was still in effect, that "*U.S policy has not changed*"²⁵⁴.

It is interesting to note that even though the Clinton administration was utterly convinced that some sort of immediate action should have been taken in Kosovo ever since the start of March 1998, as we may see through Madeleine Albright's quotes²⁵⁵, the unilateral military intervention option

²⁵² For example, Brinkley described that at the start of Clinton's presidency, his foreign policy consisted in "improvising policy at each flashpoint...using in action as action." D. Brinkley, *Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine*, Foreign Policy 106. Web. 1997. p. 113.

²⁵³ Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "We remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action." Washington News conference, Opening Statement on February 13, 1993.

²⁵⁴ Robert Gelbard, U.S special representative for the Balkans, March 4 1998, when asked if Bush's Christmas Warning was still in effect. Taken from *Crisis in the Balkans; Statements of United States' policy on Kosovo*. The New York Times. Web. April 18 1999.

²⁵⁵ For example Madeleine Albright stated on March 8 1998, in Bonn "the time to stop the killing is now, before it spreads. The way to do that is to take immediate action against the regime in Belgrade"

started losing its grip whilst the NATO option started popping up in most domestic and international talks and conferences.

For example, on July 23 1998, the U.S special representative for the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, told the House International Relations Committee that no decision still had been made regarding the use of force but that “*all options including robust military intervention in Kosovo remain on the table...NATO planning is on track*”²⁵⁶. Therefore, the Clinton administration had made sure to keep the NATO’s participation into account ever since the early-middle stages of the decision process, whilst it figured out what steps to take thus the Clinton administration had smartly decided to keep all his options open.

However, the confirmation that the NATO option was the main plan which the Clinton administration was pursuing came on June 9 1998, when President Bill Clinton stated that “*NATO is prepared to act if President Milosevic fails to honour the United Nations resolutions*”²⁵⁷ but took great care not to underline that this was the sole option which his foreign policy decision makers could or would take-even though the work had already been done behind the scenes and decisions, policies and strategies had already been established.

It is not surprising that American decision makers were both eager to pursue this pathway and fearful that the plan would not have worked out, which proves that President Clinton’s decision not to exclusively commit themselves in public to their most preferred plan was very wise. An example of a high ranking official getting rather edgy is the American Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, who tersely stated at a NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting on September 29 1998 “*I believe that the credibility of NATO really is on the line, that one can not continue to prepare for possible military action or indeed threaten military action unless one is prepared to carry it out.*”²⁵⁸

Through time, President Clinton started viewing this desirable option as a reality and decided to shift the burden of action on multinational military instruments, as we may see by the following

²⁵⁶ As stated by Robert Gelbard to the House International Relations Committee July 23 1998. As we shall explain later, the fact that the Clinton administration thought that Milosevic perceived their warnings to be no idle threat shows an obvious lack of understanding of the President’s ways, as demonstrated by Robert Gerald’s full quote: “Milosevic understands that this is no idle threat.”

²⁵⁷ President Clinton, Oct. 6, 1998, opening the International Monetary Fund/World Bank annual meeting.

²⁵⁸ Secretary of Defence William Cohen, Sept. 29, 1998, News conference at NATO Defence Ministers' meeting, Vilamoura, Portugal.

quote on October 6 1998, in which he states that he had been authorizing and supporting “*an accelerated planning process for NATO.*”²⁵⁹ This is obviously very different from George Bush’s inconvenient threat of a unilateral military intervention in Kosovo.

Still, right up to the failure of the Rambouillet accords, the Clinton Administration was still pursuing the “diplomacy backed by a credible use of force” approach, promoted both by Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright, who we shall analyse further on. Indeed, General Clark himself described the intense military planning sessions as serving nothing more than “*a diplomatic purpose*”²⁶⁰.

This proves that the first option which foreign policy decision makers would have preferred to adopt was indeed diplomacy. However, when the situation worsened because of the 18th of March 1999 peace talks ending with only the British, American and Albanians signing the Rambouillet accords²⁶¹, President Clinton became much more dependent on his master plan and started to directly associate the need for an immediate humanitarian intervention with a well-thought out NATO intervention only one day after the failure of the proffered agreement on Kosovo²⁶². Finally, on the very same day that NATO started bombing Yugoslavia, President Clinton announced “*I don’t intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war*”²⁶³ thus eliminating the controversial plan which he had always classified as the least preferred alternative.

1.2 Option One: A Diplomatic Solution Based on Analogies.

When American foreign policy decision makers decided to rely on NATO in order to solve the conflict going on in Kosovo, we’re pretty sure that, despite their determination to stop the chaos, the first thing which they had in mind wasn’t supporting a full scale bombing campaign on a whole

²⁵⁹ President Bill Clinton, June 9, 1998, in Washington.

²⁶⁰ Johnson Kenton Nicholas (2011). *Justifying America’s Wars: The Conduct and Practice of US Military Intervention*. Routledge.

²⁶¹ The Rambouillet talks were supposed to facilitate negotiations between the Albanian majority population of Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The proposed peace agreement was deemed inadmissible by Belgrade seeing as it called for NATO administration of Kosovo thus requiring a force of 30,000 NATO troops immune to Yugoslav law to pass through the territory. Moreover, the solution presented by Kosovo which would have seen the pre 1990 status quo restored was unacceptable for President Milosevic..

²⁶² As we can see in President Clinton’s speech on March 19, 1999, in Washington which is briefly analysed by the article present on CNN on the very same day, entitled *Clinton makes his case for Kosovo strikes to senators*.

²⁶³ President Clinton, *Statement on Kosovo* speech on March 24, 1999

country. This is shown by President Clinton's following quote in his inaugural address "*we will act with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary*"²⁶⁴.

Indeed, unless foreign policy decision makers are some sort of gleefully warmongering villains diplomacy is always an option and usually ranks as the preferred option. However, the grave errors which the Clinton Administration made during the negotiations with the Yugoslav government, combined with the fact that the decision making process had been increasingly focusing on a potential NATO intervention, automatically decreased the relevance of any viable alternatives.

The first fundamental mistake which foreign policy decision makers made was treating Kosovo as if it were Bosnia. Their reasoning was that if a certain solution had worked in the Balkans for one conflict, the same solution could be employed for another conflict in the region. Therefore, they expected President Milosevic's reaction to foreign countries trying to diplomatically solve the conflict in Kosovo to be the same reaction which he had when foreign countries tried to diplomatically solve the Bosnian War.

The foreign policy decision makers probably thought, in good faith, that if President Milosevic had signed the 1995 Dayton Agreements with regards to the peace agreement which put the Bosnian War to an end, he would also sign the Rambouillet Accords which contained similar military provisions with regards to Kosovo. Further proof of the matter is that in order to find common ground between the two warring parties in the Kosovo conflict, the Clinton administration decided to call back to duty-or at least consult-all American negotiators who had played an important role in convincing the government of Yugoslavia and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to sign the 1995 peace agreement.

As for NATO's role in the negotiations, the Contact Group that demanded that Yugoslavia solve the problem in Kosovo was made up by the very same countries which oversaw the last phases of the Bosnian conflict. It is therefore logical that if at least three quarters of an administration's information and suggestions comes from a group of individuals who have already dealt successfully with what they perceived to be a similar conflict, the solutions to solve the current conflict will be alarmingly similar.

²⁶⁴ Clinton, *First Inaugural Speech Transcript*, Washington D.C. 20 January 1993.

This strategy proved to be disastrous when it came to finding common ground, negotiating and signing the 1999 Rambouillet Accords which had been thought up on the basis of the 1995 Dayton Agreements. The Dayton Agreements, signed by the President, allowed NATO to be at the lead of a multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, whilst the Rambouillet Accords would have allowed NATO or even the UN, to be at the lead of a multinational peacekeeping force deployed to Kosovo.

Even though the military provisions present in Appendix B of the Rambouillet provisions seemed to be-in the Western decision makers' eyes-quite similar to the military provisions present in the Dayton Agreements, President Milosevic refused to sign the proposed peace treaty. Indeed, the government of Yugoslavia stated that the military provisions present in Appendix B of the Rambouillet provisions constituted an inadmissible violation of the country's sovereignty and could not be accepted. President Milosevic would always cite this issue, and not Kosovo's autonomy, as the main reason for which he could never sign the Rambouillet provisions.

The West's mistake was that Kosovo was entirely different from Bosnia and the timing of the decision making process was wrong. As recognized by expert diplomat Richard Holbrooke, whilst Bosnia was viewed by the international community as an independent State which was being tormented by its neighbours, Kosovo was officially viewed both by Yugoslavia and by the West as a part of Yugoslavia seeing as *"the international community did not accept Kosovo's claim to independence. The late Bush administration started...telling Milosevic that he should not abuse the human rights of the Albanians of Kosovo but that Kosovo was part of Serbia. This was a very complicated equation. But it was the position of the Clinton administration and the Europeans inherited and held to it²⁶⁵."*

This makes it even harder to explain why President Clinton could have even thought that President Milosevic could have accepted, in the Rambouillet Accords, military provisions which allowed NATO soldiers to be stationed in what was interpreted to be, both by the international community and by President Milosevic, as Yugoslavia itself. This vision was maintained throughout the course

²⁶⁵ As we may see in the Public Broadcasting Service's Frontline Interviews Section: *Interview with Richard Holbrooke*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web. 1995-2014.

of the conflict, during the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia²⁶⁶ and right up to the very end of the negotiations on Kosovo.

Moreover, in Bosnia, the Clinton administration had threatened airstrikes to prevent an ethnic cleaning of Bosnian Muslims towards 1993, urged NATO to drop bombs for peace in April 1994 and had then persuaded Milosevic to sit at the bargaining table with the Dayton process in November 1995. As for the Kosovo Crisis, in February 1999, the Clinton administration tried to convince the Yugoslav government to accept more drastic²⁶⁷ terms than the Dayton Accord, before urging NATO to drop bombs for humanitarian reasons on the 24th of March 1999. As we can see, the decision making process was not only unsuitably applied but even incorrectly applied. The success in Bosnia had probably encouraged decision makers that using more or less the same solution for yet another crisis in the Balkans would have been a wonderful idea.

1.3 A Fatal Misunderstanding of the Counterpart's Persona.

It is very interesting to note that even though outstanding diplomats, seasoned generals and expert negotiators had a tremendous role in determining which policy choice the Clinton administration should take in the Kosovo war, none truly understood the domestic constraints which Slobodan Milosevic faced, along with his peculiar and strong-willed personality.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, almost all American foreign policy decision makers have always believed that those whom they perceive to be evil dictators are to be heavily criticized²⁶⁸ and ostracized by the international community; have to be severely weakened²⁶⁹ and

²⁶⁶ For example, diplomat Richard Holbrooke stated “at Dayton... I repeatedly reaffirmed the Christmas warning of the Bush administration on instructions...His reaction was that Kosovo is an internal matter. We said we accept the fact that Kosovo is inside the Yugoslav national boundary but that does not give you the right to squash people.”

²⁶⁷ A fact which the Clinton Administration should have known, had a suitable decision making process been accurately applied.

²⁶⁸ Recent examples regard Western politicians' constant criticisms of Vladimir Putin's policies in Ukraine in early 2014, as demonstrated by Obama's quote after his Administration pushed towards imposing grave economic sanctions on Russia “it is not our preference to see Russia isolated the way it is. We would prefer a Russia that is fully integrated in the world economy...” Indeed, this quote, present in the *Vladimir Putin leaves G20 after leaders line up to browbeat him over Ukraine* article, published on the Guardian by Wintour Patrick, demonstrates that the United States of America's behaviour towards leaders whom they perceive to be authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, is quite clear. Until they learn how to behave and interact civilly in the international community, they will not be able to sit down at the negotiating table with the world's most powerful unipole. Unless-that is-the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian country

left at the mercy of their political opponents or the wrath of their people; and must be dealt with swiftly and with force²⁷⁰- unless, of course, they change their ways and conform to a Western kind of political bureaucracy, along with its obligations and values. Moreover, the United States' endless history of public or secret military interventions in authoritarian or semi- authoritarian countries is blatant proof of this constant.

Indeed, President Milosevic, yet another despicable despot in the decision makers' eyes was, according to them, nothing more than a hardened politician who only responded to force or the absolute incredible threat of the use of force²⁷¹ as stated by Richard Holbrooke; or a jumped up tyrant who had been unjustly terrorizing the Kosovars for decades, as recognized by President Clinton's previously mentioned public speeches; or-in the more colourful words of the Secretary of State herself- a school ground bully who had to be put in his place²⁷² in order to maintain stability in Europe and the Balkans, and would back down crying after getting a good punch in the nose²⁷³.

Indeed, the EU emerged as America's most important trade and investment partner which could secure America's economic well being²⁷⁴. Seeing as maintaining the region stable and keeping close ties was fundamental, the economic relationship became highly politicized , with American decision makers wanting to take actions that reaffirmed that their country was a trustworthy and powerful partner for EU security and business.

is extremely influential from an economic, political and military point of view -but that is another matter which we have previously discussed.

²⁶⁹ The American policy towards Colonel Gaddafi, who was eventually murdered by rebel fighters, is another current example which reflects America's constant attitude, be it Democrats or Republicans who are in power. If world leaders cannot behave themselves and act in a manner which doesn't affect American interests-which are usually linked to factors such as world stability, seeing as keeping the international system as it is would be optimal for their unipolarity and a series of other cultural values-they will be steered towards doing so, be it the easy way or the hard way.

²⁷⁰ As we will analyse in our own case on the Kosovo War.

²⁷¹ Indeed, Richard Holbrooke stated "I regret to say, but it is obvious that Milosevic only responds to force or the absolute incredible threat of the use of force. This was clear in Bosnia, and it was clear in Kosovo." As we may see in the Public Broadcasting Service's Frontline Interviews Section: *Interview with Richard Holbrooke*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web. 1995-2014.

²⁷² Johnson Kenton Nicholas (2011). *Justifying America's Wars: The Conduct and Practice of US Military Intervention*. Routledge.

²⁷³ Carver Tom, *Madeleine Albright: Haunted by History*. BBC. Web. April 9 1999.

²⁷⁴ Indeed the US and the EU are the biggest players in the global economic system therefore when they act in partnership they control globalization

Seeing as the Balkans were surrounded by member states of NATO and the EU such as Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary; the fact that the conflict in Kosovo could spill over in Albania and Macedonia which could affect NATO countries such as Turkey and Greece was well supported. The Balkans could not be left as they were. If the region remained isolated it would have always produced violence and strife, an excessive outflow of refugees and countless victims. This would also explain the reasons for which American decision makers believed that they could not stand idle and watch the Balkans fall into a heap of chaos.

The fact that President Milosevic was holding on to his power by a thread and considered his political position to be more important than his nation's well being was not considered²⁷⁵. Indeed, the President's political behaviour had always been analysed as opportunistic in nature²⁷⁶, with many individuals who had worked for him stating that he was principally motivated by a desire for power²⁷⁷.

Indeed, one would think that a President would finally give in once he saw his country being physically destroyed day after day by the intensity of an air bombing which his country's army couldn't really do much to counter. However, Professor Gray, a strategic thinker, confirms our theory and states that in President Milosevic's case, this was not so. He believes that President Milosevic finally succumbed to the air bombardments not because he was concerned for the well being of his citizens but because "*the bombing of economic and national communications infrastructure targets in Serbia triggered a distress and then a political dissatisfaction that caused Milosevic to fear for his political future and personal safety*²⁷⁸."

Moreover, the fact that the losses of Yugoslavia's financial elite played a significant role in the decision making process which President Milosevic took in order to determine whether or not to back down from Kosovo, demonstrates that interest groups do play a role in foreign policy decision making, especially in authoritarian and semi authoritarian regimes.

²⁷⁵ For example, a senior military officer said of President Milosevic during the NATO bombing campaign, "He doesn't care if his soldiers die in Kosovo, as long as he stays in power." Schmitt Eric and Myers Steven L. *Crisis in the Balkans: The Bombing; NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite's Property*. Web. New York Times. April 19 1999.

²⁷⁶ Henriksen, Dag (2007). *NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998–1999*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

²⁷⁷ Sell, Louis (2002). *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

²⁷⁸ Colin S. Gray (2015). *Air Power Theory in Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

The West's paradoxical error was to consider President Milosevic, a man who they themselves described as a dictator, to act as if he were running a democracy which depends heavily on public support. Indeed, as we have demonstrated previously, leaders of democratic nations do enjoy staying in power as well, but are more prone to renounce their position if the stakes become too high, for fear of being isolated and treated as outcasts in a democratic society.

Indeed, no reasonable President of a democratic State has ever allowed his country to be bombed by the world's most powerful intergovernmental organisation. In accordance with the previously analysed democratic peace theory, the leaders of democracies, who share many common values and ideologies with other leaders of democracies, would not be so masochist and reckless as to be bombed by a coalition of their counterparts.

However, Western foreign policy decision makers didn't consider this point when analysing the so called dictator's response to the Rambouillet Accords, even though the shadow of a severe and sustained bombing was looming in the dark.

Moreover, we should also consider a fundamental aspect of this whole dilemma, which is President Milosevic underestimating the United States of America which may have led him to take more blatantly reckless foreign policy decisions. Just like the Clinton administration got the wrong idea of which actions Milosevic would take, thinking that he was a school ground bully who would immediately back down, Milosevic thought that the United States would never be "*crazy enough to bomb us over these issues we're talking about in that lousy little Kosovo*"²⁷⁹.

What lay at heart of the initial and middle stages of the negotiation process was, therefore, a fatal misunderstanding between both parts- an unfortunate psychological variable which frequently spreads its wings in a high number of decision making processes. The United States thought that they were dealing with an insignificant little thug who could be easily intimidated into backing down and giving the Clinton administration what they wanted. On the other hand, President Milosevic, a well-established and excessively self-confident politician, simply could not understand why such an important and powerful nation would stick its nose in his country's internal problems.

²⁷⁹ Indeed, during negotiations, Milosevic formulated this incredulous statement as a question to his American counterparts. As we may see in the Public Broadcasting Service's Frontline Interviews Section: *Interview with Richard Holbrooke*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web. 1995-2014.

As the saying goes, it takes two to tango. The blame which derives from the failure of a diplomatic solution to the crisis is to be attributed both to the Clinton Administration's and Milosevic's miscomprehension of their adversaries, for reasons which have to do primarily with psychological and cultural variables such as analogical thinking and shallowness, a self-proclaimed pride bordering onto excessive over-confidence, and the inability or unwillingness to actively engage in finding a solution with one's own respective counterpart.

1.4 Why War is Better Than a Bad Compromise

A logical assumption would be that wars, whenever possible, must be avoided in favour of finding a compromise with the opposing party. Still, this doesn't necessarily mean that it would be convenient for a State's decision makers to accept a compromise which would entail more negative consequences than the consequences which would derive from fighting an actual war-or at least, the consequences which the decision maker believes there will be. Of course, miscalculations are frequent. It is obvious that Adolf Hitler would have never embarked on a full scale quest to subordinate Europe under his country's hegemony had he known, in advance, what the outcome of the war would be.

Still, we believe that it is the counterpart's duty-or rather, the State who has the upper hand- which must try and act sensibly when negotiating diplomatic solutions to solve impending or future conflicts. Seeing as more powerful countries usually have more negotiating power they must thus take greater care into motivating their counterpart to engage in one action rather than the other. Indeed, a decision maker at the head of a country with little to lose will carefully engage in a cost-benefit analysis when evaluating whether to sit at the negotiating table or not. If the costs of adopting a diplomatic solution are higher than the possible benefits of a war, it is obvious that the decision maker will opt for the latter.

Therefore, even though we have previously argued that decision makers do try to solve matters peacefully, which is why diplomacy is always the best option to solve a crisis, we should consider that in some cases, when diplomacy gives way to unacceptable demands, aggressive actions may be beneficial both to democracies and authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes.

Indeed, we should consider that the diplomatic solution presented by the Clinton administration was so absurd that President Milosevic might have very well hoped for a war instead of complying with

the requests. Many state that President Milosevic believed that if indeed the Clinton administration was crazy enough to opt for a NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, there was not much he could do except stoically hold on to his power and try not to give in to absurd Western requirements.

Thus, a point which the Clinton administration did not consider was that the potentially devastating and rather unprovoked bombing of Yugoslavia by foreign forces was the best option which President Milosevic could have ever hoped for, when presented with an unreasonable peaceful solution. Indeed, providing a foreign force of 30,000 potentially hostile soldiers with the unhindered right to pass through one's territory is a request which no self-respecting leader would ever allow, as we may see in several historical cases such as the German invasion of Belgium in the First World War, when the country's decision makers preferred going to war rather than guaranteeing passage to an unpleasant country's military forces .

Moreover, allowing a highly equipped foreign force to stay and watch over a country's autonomous province whilst respecting the soldiers' complete and utter immunity to the country's own law, is a feat which no reasonable government has ever accepted, and even less so in a proud and "authoritarian²⁸⁰" State.

From President Milosevic's perspective, there was not much which he could do seeing as all his foreign policy options would have never worked. The West wouldn't leave him alone seeing as a compromise which suited their side could not be found and the compromise which had been proposed by the West would have meant political suicide. Quite obviously, declaring war on the United States was obviously not an option.

Still, it is quite likely that President Milosevic thought that he could pull himself out of this dilemma. President Clinton's initial insistence that ground forces were not an option made the Yugoslav Government quite optimistic both during and after the negotiation process. Having his population tolerate the airstrikes, for what he thought would be a short period of time, and waiting for Russian pressure to weaken the alliance, which could also be weakened by internal disagreements on the crisis, is probably what President Milosevic hoped would happen.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ Indeed, Western media always portrayed President Milosevic as a dictator running an authoritarian government at home. The true extent to which the country was run by an actual dictator in an authoritarian manner is however debated.

²⁸¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon (2001). *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Brookings Institution Press.

Therefore, not signing the Rambouillet Accords wouldn't have, in his eyes, unleashed such devastating consequences on his country. Of course, certain personality traits which remind us that decision makers are individuals who must be analysed up to their most personal level demonstrate that Milosevic was quite stubborn and superficial, disregarding information and advice given by his advisors and lacking foreign policy experience²⁸².

This would explain why, on one of his final meetings with high ranking Clinton advisors before the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, President Milosevic appeared to be passively fatalistic when asked if he understood what would happen to his country if he didn't sign an agreement. The following conversation between the President and Richard Holbrooke demonstrates this point:

“I said to him “You understand if I leave here without an agreement today, bombing will start almost immediately?” And he said “Yes, I understand that” ... I said “Yes, you understand. You're absolutely clear what will happen when we leave?” And he said, very quietly, “Yes. You'll bomb us” ... I asked “Is that it? And one more time you understand what happens?” He said “Yes.” So we left and that was it. I want to stress that there was no misunderstanding in his mind. He knew the bombing would start immediately after our departure.”

Therefore at this stage, enduring the bombing of Yugoslavia was the best option which Milosevic had, with various sources stating that NATO's campaign had solidified popular support²⁸³ for a President who, in the eyes of Serbian nationalists, was nothing less than a martyr who was trying to defend his country against an unjustified attack by the West²⁸⁴.

Seeing as foreign policy decision makers decide which foreign policy options to take on the basis of their adversary's expected reactions, we may state that in the Kosovo crisis, towards the initial and middle stages of the negotiations, all failed to understand how the enemy truly would have responded on the basis of misunderstandings, false perceptions and misrepresentations. If Milosevic's decision calculus had been taken into consideration at the beginning of the hostilities, maybe the foreign policy outcome of the decision making process would have changed.

²⁸² Doder and Branson (1999). *Milosevic: Portrait of A Tyrant*. Free Press.

²⁸³ For example, this is recognised by the New York Times article *Crisis in the Balkans: The Bombing; NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite's Property*, April 19 1999, Schmitt Eric and Myers Steven L.

²⁸⁴ Milosevic took great care in emphasising this point, stating that “the only correct decision that could have been made was the one to reject foreign troops on our territory”.

Monitoring Milosevic's Statement: Defend the Country. BBC News. Web. 24 March 1999.

1.5. The Lack of Viable Options

Once the negotiations had failed and the threat of a NATO bombing became more and more pronounced, President Milosevic found himself backed in a corner. The Americans had gambled that the situation would never have deteriorated to this point, relying on his acceptance of the Rambouillet accords. However, once the Yugoslav government failed to sign the accords, the Clinton administration's strategy, which it had been working on for months, came into effect and all other policy options were conveniently discarded. As recounted by Richard Holbrooke, the failure of the agreements "*was the moment at which diplomacy was going to have to yield to the use of force. There was no longer any other option*²⁸⁵."

President Milosevic's mistake depended on the fact that whilst his already economically and militarily devastated country could not afford holding its head up high when refusing an offer made by American foreign policy decision makers, nor could it go against sacred democratic values, the United States of America was an economic and military giant who could very well afford to make mistakes in the decision making process against a country which was tiny and weak.

Of course, President Milosevic wasn't blessed with many foreign policy options through which he could save face, because of the domestic constraints which he himself had contributed to create. Regardless of the errors which an American administration makes which thus lead to some sort of military interventions, the United States of America usually comes out on top in every world conflict. That is the beauty of being blessed with formidable and commanding system-level and state-level assets.

Of course, the United States of America had been backed in a corner too. After having repeatedly declared that it would have used military force against Yugoslavia had they not signed the Rambouillet Accords, they had no other option but to eliminate the passive option of doing nothing and waiting for sanctions to act. The President was left with deciding the level of force which he could employ: sending in ground troops or opting for an easier and less risky option which could have however not been sufficient to attain the President's goals-thus performing air strikes.

²⁸⁵ As we may see in the Public Broadcasting Service's Frontline Interviews Section: *Interview with Richard Holbrooke*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web. 1995-2014

Thus, towards the end of the failed negotiations, when veiled threats started to become realities, a checkmate had been performed on President Milosevic's side of the chessboard. Pleading for a rematch was out of a question, surrendering would mean losing and attacking would simply be insane. The only alternative which the President of Yugoslavia had was to stubbornly wait for the West to perform its last action, in the hope that he would at least gain domestic support or international sympathy for what was to come.

2. Option Two: Calling in NATO

Once no other alternative but to use force remains, the next step regards deciding how much military force the country should use. Usually, the decision making process has three branches. One, the decision makers may back down again and decide not to employ force thus the status quo will prevail. Two, the decision makers may decide to opt for a limited use of force and accompany it with other measures. Three, the decision makers may decide to go full on and use a large scale of force²⁸⁶. Therefore, in this section, we will analyse why and how President Clinton decided to opt for the second option by analysing system attributes, state attributes and the decision makers themselves.

2.1 Power, Allies and Influence: Unipoles Will Because They Can

After the end of the Cold War every single American administration's foreign policy decisions have been shaped by the desire to preserve international stability and promote the creation of democracies, for one reason or another. These objectives have inevitably led the country to be dragged into one local and regional conflict after the other, even though from an outsider's point of view, these conflicts would seem to hold no interest for the United States of America seeing as they'd pose no immediate threat to such an impressively powerful country.

Indeed, the Clinton administration chose to intervene in a faraway conflict which was of no direct concern to him under the pretense of a humanitarian intervention which may have been very well applied to other, more devastating conflicts. Whilst President Kennedy had no other choice but to stand up to President Khrushchev in the bipolar era, or risk having Soviet ballistic missiles which were located 90 miles from Florida being deployed against the United States, President Clinton did not have to take a stand in the Kosovo War.

²⁸⁶ Mc.Cormick James and Joseph S. Nye (2012). *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

This would explain why Mandelbaum heavily criticized President Clinton, stating that most of his foreign policy interventions such as those in Bosnia, Haiti or Somalia did nothing to further American interest and that these countries were not a threat to the United States. Comparing the President's foreign policy interventions for humanitarian reasons to social work, much like Mandelbaum does²⁸⁷ is however a bit too extreme for our taste.

However, a hyperpower in a unipolar system has much less constraints than a superpower in a bipolar system or a powerful country in a multipolar system. Decision makers who have the benefit of handling a unipole's foreign policy may very well afford to take certain foreign policy actions which other decision makers in other systems cannot afford to take. If the Clinton administration desired to undertake so called social work, in Mendelbaum's words, then-on the international level-it could very well do so.

As for constraints which international institutions may set on unipoles, we should consider that the unipoles reap certain benefits thanks to them as well. Moreover, in the early stages of the post Cold War era, most international institutions were relatively lost when trying to assess what their new global functions would be now that the Soviet Union had collapsed. This would explain why subsequent American administrations such as the Clinton administration, were more than happy to take the lead on the matter and decided to focus on expanding the functions of intergovernmental and international organisations, as well as enlarging their membership.

It is worth noting that even though, as we have previously argued, many scholars believe that those type of institutions provide the international arena with a peaceful environment in which to negotiate in, many other scholars argue state that they are nothing more than puppets of powerful countries²⁸⁸, or are at least heavily influenced by them.

²⁸⁷ M. Madelbaum, *Foreign Policy as Social Work*. *Foreign Affairs* 75. Web. 1996.

²⁸⁸ For example, Samir Amin stated with regards to the Kosovo War, that "Washington sought through these bombings to terrorize he whole world and let every country know that the U.S can always use such means...European countries are at the centre of verbal attacks regarding President Clinton's decision to attack in Kosovo. Amin even writes that European countries participated in this criminal choice while it has been proved that NATO is a political instrument in the ands of the United States."

Amin Samir (2015). *Coercive Diplomacy of NATO in Kosovo*. Cambridge Scholars Publisher.

Rather than opt for either one of these radical theories, we may recognise, through an analysis of the actions taken by President Clinton during the decision making process, that international institutions, multinational military instruments and other countries are indeed influenced to a certain extent by powerful countries. Seeing as those powerful countries know this very well, their own decision making processes will be shaped by this advantage.

However, powerful countries do not always get their way²⁸⁹. For example, President Clinton knew very well that he would have never had the support of the U.N Security Council in a military intervention in Kosovo seeing as Russia would have used its veto against the matter²⁹⁰.

Still, it is highly unlikely that President Clinton would have started threatening President Milosevic unless he already knew that he would be supported, in some way, by other important actors in the international arena or by international institutions or multinational military instruments. Of course, this could have also been because the cause which he was fighting for was one which interested most democratic countries, international institutions and multinational military instruments alike.

Even the Russians would have unwittingly or subtly and implicitly allowed, to a certain extent, the Clinton Administration to proceed with the use of force, demonstrating that the Clinton Administration could truly take whichever foreign policy it deemed fit without having to limit its actions because of constraints placed by other relevant foreign decision makers.

Indeed, the fact that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov allegedly told Richard Holbrooke, “*If you take it to the UN we’ll veto it. If you don’t we’ll just denounce you*”²⁹¹ proves that American decision makers knew that the possible risk of the Russian military intervention which President Milosevic had been hoping for, had the Western World used force, was close to zero. Another interesting point is that the fact that President Milosevic expected the support of the USSR and acted accordingly, confidently ignoring American demands, was a grave foreign policy error. Had the President known that the only support which the USSR would give him were words of comfort, maybe Milosevic wouldn’t have acted as recklessly arrogant as he did.

²⁸⁹ By the way, this would explain why unipoles have little interest in agreements that might complicate or limit its freedom of action.

²⁹⁰ Indeed, after the bombing campaign had started, Boris Yeltsin stated that “Russia is deeply upset by NATO’s military action against sovereign Yugoslavia which is nothing more than open aggression.” Moreover, they condemned NATO at the UN, describing the strikes as illegal actions. *“Russia condemns Nato at UN”*. BBC News. 1999-03-25.

²⁹¹ Judah Tim (2000). *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. Yale University Press.

Thus, during the Kosovo conflict, both sides knew very well that the United States of America was calling the shots. For example, a rather shocking finding is that despite during the Rambouillet Agreements, much effort was made in order to present the negotiations as a European show, “*the draft agreement was written by the same group of U.S. State Department personnel who had crafted the Dayton Accords*²⁹²”.

Going back to Richard Holbrooke’s equally interesting private meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade, right before the NATO bombing began, he asked Milosevic whether or not he fully understood what was going to happen to his country if he didn’t sign the Rambouillet agreement.

After a short pause, President Milosevic sat back, looking resigned and said “*You’re a great country, a powerful country. You can do anything you want. We can’t stop you.*”²⁹³ Indeed, the previous day, on the instructions of Secretary Albright, Richard Holbrooke and a team of American diplomats and high ranking army officials²⁹⁴ had publicly presented Milosevic with an ultimatum which stated that if he didn’t sign the agreement, the NATO bombing would start.

However, we should consider that even though the United States of America is the world’s hyperpower, as we have previously defined hyperpowers to be, its Presidents must be sure to retain that global status. This would explain why taking the isolationist approach is a policy which has been unheard of ever since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, President Clinton’s foreign policy decision making process and multilateralism is also shaped by this point.

Indeed, multilateralism did get an enormous boost during the intervention in Kosovo which was the first war fought by a formal alliance of democracies since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, it gave a true sense of purpose to a slightly decrepit and depressingly aimless NATO, seeing as it was the first major military humanitarian intervention which NATO had been involved in throughout its fifty year history. It was also the ultimate demonstration that the United States of America was not alone when it decided to randomly embark on military missions.

²⁹² Maseidvag Helge I. *Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations’ Foreign Policy: An Ad Hoc or Coherent Approach?* Web. September 2009.

²⁹³ Public Broadcasting Service’s Frontline Interviews Section: *Interview with Richard Holbrooke*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web. 1995-2014.

²⁹⁴ For example, both General Mike Short and highly skilled diplomat Chris Hill were present on the negotiating team.

This would also explain why the President stated that “*America must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non state actors, to provide global leadership and to remain a reliable security partner for the community of nations that share our interests*”²⁹⁵.

Now that the United States was indeed the world’s global power, taking as many like-minded countries under its wing and leading them into foreign policy battles was what it had to do in order to remain relevant on the international arena. In line with his National Security Strategy, President Clinton explained why an intervention in Kosovo was necessary by stating that the United States had to act immediately in order to prevent a wider war, thus providing global leadership for the Kosovo intervention. Another point which he emphasised was standing united with his allies in order to promote peace, thus demonstrating that the United States was a reliable security partner for nations which shared their interests.

Finally, we should recognise that scholars such as Knelman agree that one of the reasons for which the Post Cold War Clinton Administration decided to intervene in Kosovo was that “*the U.S is dedicated to the consolidation of its position in a unipolar world. To this degree its military policy is to destroy all rogue regimes...*”²⁹⁶

This proves that even though certain system attributes allow countries a wider range of liberty in their foreign policy actions than others, escaping the influence of system attributes altogether is almost impossible. Of course, when considering why the Clinton administration acted in a certain manner in a grave humanitarian crisis and failed to act in an even worse humanitarian crisis²⁹⁷ is a point which may be explained only with regards to other state-related, psychological and cultural and historical attributes. Indeed, throughout both terms of the Clinton presidency, what changed wasn’t the global standing of the United States.

²⁹⁵ National Security Council, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington D.C. Web. December 1999

²⁹⁶ Knelman Fred H. *Commentary: Kosovo: A Retrospective*. Peace Research. Web. Volume 32, No 2. May 2000.

²⁹⁷ Of course, Third World leaders have repeatedly criticized the fact that Clinton had been reluctant to engage his troops in Bosnia and in Rwanda, where ethnic extremism was dire.

W. C McWilliams and H. Piotrowski (2014). *The World since 1945: A History of International Relations*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

2.2. How To Maintain America's Hegemony: The President's Grand Strategy

As Roger Hislman recognizes, it is widely accepted that the President of the United States is the single most influential actor in determining America's foreign policy. Indeed, a series of scholars consider that President Clinton's tactics and ideas were the driving force behind all foreign policy decisions during his Presidency, including the Kosovo War. As recognised by Wittkopf "*Whatever Clinton decided would be America's policy*"²⁹⁸. As such, we should now focus on a more detailed analysis of President Clinton's objectives, values and preferences.

Indeed, the decision making process wasn't shaped just by the fact that the United States of America could do whatever it wanted on the international arena, as long as it had a publicly valid explanation to justify its actions. It was also affected by the Clinton Administration's Grand Strategy which was an interesting combination of selective engagement and multilateralism on the secret backdrop of American primacy²⁹⁹. However, President Clinton's foreign policy approach was publicly presented as benevolent Wilsonian liberalism which aimed to preserve international stability by promoting democracy through America's actions as a global policeman.

This apparently paradoxical combination may be explained by Secretary Albright's following statement, written in her memoirs "*I hope never again to hear foreign policy described as a debate between Wilsonian idealists and geopolitical realists. In the last part of the last millennium no President or Secretary of State could manage events without combining the two*"³⁰⁰.

According to Walt's expert report ³⁰¹ several goals had indeed dominated the Clinton administration's foreign policy, with the main goal being trying to build a world order which was compatible with American values in order to maintain America's hegemony. In order to do this, President Clinton encouraged democratic enlargement and used force against major human rights

²⁹⁸ Mc.Cormick James and Joseph S. Nye (2012). *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

²⁹⁹ Indeed, justifying the use of military force on the grounds of "if we have to use force it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future" as Madeleine Albright herself stated, is extremely common, both amongst Democrats and Republicans who, quite reasonably, believe the unipole to be the most powerful country in the world. The Secretary of State justified the 1998 Iraq campaign by uttering these words. *Interview on NBC-TV with Madeleine Albright, Transcript*. February 19, 1998, USIS Washington File.

³⁰⁰ Albright Madeleine (2003), *Madam Secretary: A memoir*. New York: Pan Books.

³⁰¹ Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

abuses, which may also be characterized as a form of promoting democratic values throughout the world.

As we may see in the Kosovo War, it is obvious that this characteristic influenced the decision making process. Indeed, as we have stated previously, American political administrations usually function by-at the very least-taking into account what the President's Grand Strategy is and trying to coordinate it with foreign policy decisions. This is what we believed happened throughout the Clinton administration, with the President outlining what the main aims and objectives should be and his circle of advisors and high ranking decision makers searching for a solution which fit the President's values.

Moreover, the previously mentioned *Foreign Affairs* study reported that another of Clinton's goals was to reduce the risk of a major war in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East by remaining, in some way, militarily engaged in these regions. This would be because the country "*has an enduring interest in peace because a major global conflict would threaten its pre-eminence*³⁰²."

Therefore, according to President Clinton, the best way to preserve stability³⁰³ was to keep American forces in Europe and Asia. Indeed, this would also explain why the Clinton Administration eliminated almost immediately the foreign policy option of arming the Kosovar Albanians. As stated by Lockhart, the President did not want the conflict to spread. Of course, believing that American military presence is the best way to keep an eye on unstable areas and prevent further conflict is also a form of American primacy.

However, unilateral interventions are usually undertaken when both governmental institutions and the public are in complete support of the matter. When support is lacking, decision makers prefer to carefully share the burden of responsibility by involving other countries in their decision making process.

This would explain why during the decision making process for the Kosovo War, President Clinton didn't just decide not to intervene unilaterally, he also decided only desired to rely on airpower in a multilateral intervention, despite British and French enthusiasm to act more aggressively. Moreover,

³⁰² Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

³⁰³ The threat to the peace and security in the region was further emphasised by the UNSC Resolution 1199.

even though the United States did lead the air campaign, it allowed the Europeans to handle most of the subsequent process of reconstruction and peacekeeping.

Multilateral intervention would be even more advantageous seeing as the administration was trying to revive multinational military instruments and maintain old partnerships. Indeed, Professor Walt states that, with regards to NATO's role in the Kosovo war, "*compelling NATO to act in such circumstances, however, forces the alliance to develop a common approach to problems for which there is rarely an obvious solution. Thus, not only is NATO busier now than in the past, it is acting in situations where consensus will be very difficult to achieve*³⁰⁴".

Just like the Clinton administration managed to intervene in the sovereign territory of another State without the Security Council's resolution and didn't encounter solid opposition from other States and the United Nations itself, the Clinton administration's ability to persuade one's allies to bear a great share of the burden in a conflict, while insisting on leading the alliance is Realpolitik at its finest.

This would indeed explain why the Clinton administration decided to lead a multilateral force in Kosovo on the grounds of acting as a global policeman who defended liberty and democracy, thus promoting global stability. It's interesting to note that the classic American belief that democracy and liberty go hand in hand was rooted in President Clinton's rhetoric as well: "*Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause*³⁰⁵."

2.3 Cherry-Picking: An Analysis of America's Reaction to the Rwandan Genocide.

The Clinton Administration's decision not to organise some kind of a military intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes but to press for a NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is rather curious, especially seeing as the number of killings in Kosovo pales in comparison to what happened in Rwanda, which may be described as a region which is so insignificantly far away and unrelated to the West that internal turmoils won't usually pose a threat to global stability.

³⁰⁴ Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

³⁰⁵ W. J. Clinton, *First Inaugural Speech Transcript*, Washington D.C. 20 January 1993

Of course, logically speaking, there is no obligation on the basis of which the United States of America are forced to intervene in every single conflict going on in the world. However, it is interesting to note that when American foreign policy decision makers do decide to intervene in certain conflicts under the pretense of humanitarian reasons, a certain degree of cherry picking is quite common.

For example, considering that the explanation which the Clinton administration gave to the public was that taking military action in Kosovo was vital for humanitarian reasons, we may briefly evaluate how foreign policy decision makers perceived the conflict in Rwanda to be, and assess why they didn't deem it to be worthy of an humanitarian intervention.

Before exploring this matter we should however determine whether or not President Clinton and his advisors had the same degree of information on the atrocities being committed in Rwanda as they did with regards to the atrocities being committed in Kosovo. We should consider that countless foreign policy decision makers in Clinton's administration, including the President himself, have in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide publicly apologized or justified their lack of intervention under the pretense of not having enough information to truly understand what was going on in the country.

Indeed, Madeleine Albright has stated *"it was a very, very difficult time and the situation was unclear. You know in retrospect it all looks very clear. But when you were there at the time it was unclear about what was happening in Rwanda"*³⁰⁶. This could lead us to believe that the American response to one genocide wasn't the same as the response to another similar genocide because of the lack of clear information which they had on the genocide for which they did not react militarily³⁰⁷.

However, we should recognise that expert journalist Rory Carroll reported that *"intelligence reports obtained using the US Freedom of Information Act show the cabinet and almost certainly the President had been told of a planned final solution to eliminate all Tutsis before the slaughter"*

³⁰⁶ Interview with Madeleine Albright. *Ghosts of Rwanda*. PBS Frontline. April 1, 2004

³⁰⁷ Moreover, President Clinton himself had, when visiting the Rwandan capital in 1998, stated that "it may seem strange to you...but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."

*reached its peak*³⁰⁸”. Indeed the CIA’s intelligence briefings, which circulated around the White House, recognized on the 6th of April 1994 that what was going on in Rwanda was a “*genocide...a final solution to eliminate all Tutsis*³⁰⁹.”

It is thus interesting to note that the Clinton administration did not intervene militarily or propose to do so, and its decision makers didn’t even state the word “genocide” in public until the end of May. Moreover, Alison des Forges, an American expert on the Rwandan genocide, stated that “*they (the Clinton administration) feared this word (genocide) would generate public opinion which would demand some sort of action and they didn’t want to act. It was a very pragmatic determination*³¹⁰.”

On a separate occasion, the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda criticized Madeleine Albright, at the time the U.S Permanent Representative to the U.N, by saying that she had avoided describing the Rwandan genocide in 1994 as an actual “genocide” until she had been presented with overwhelming evidence to do so³¹¹.

This demonstrates that President Clinton was not an unequivocal believer of Wilsonian liberalism, but that his foreign policy decisions were shaped by selective engagement, through which the Clinton Administration tried to preserve peace in regions or continents which mattered for international stability. Indeed, Third World leaders have repeatedly criticized the fact that Clinton had been reluctant to engage his troops in Bosnia and in Rwanda, where ethnic extremism was dire³¹².

Moreover, some analysts have focused on psychological variables, stating that the use of analogical thinking may have affected the President’s administration itself when determining whether or not to intervene militarily in order to try to end the violence in the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, a shocking incident which had taken place in Somalia in 1993, shortly before the Rwandan genocide in 1994,

³⁰⁸ Carrol Rory, *US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide*. The Guardian. Web. March 2004.

³⁰⁹ Carrol Rory, *US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide*. The Guardian. Web. March 2004.

³¹⁰ Carrol Rory, *US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide*. The Guardian. Web. March 2004.

³¹¹ Dallaire, Roméo (2004). *Shake Hands with the Devil*. Arrow. p. 374.

³¹² W. C McWilliams and H. Piotrowski (2014). *The World since 1945: A History of International Relations*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

“deflated Clinton and paralyzed the administration’s efforts to restore the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti and stop the genocide in Rwanda³¹³.”

Moreover, according to the *Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History*, the humiliation which the Clinton Administration went through after the events in the streets Mogadishu surfaced online, *“challenged the post-Munich assumption that anything short of a rapid, unflinching response to hostility was appeasement of the aggressors³¹⁴.”* The theory according to which President Clinton didn’t intervene in Rwanda seeing as the Somalia analogy was fresh in his mind whilst he did intervene in Kosovo many years later because the administration had regained its strength and determination, could be quite convincing³¹⁵.

Thus, the cultural belief that the world is made up by an ideological confrontation between dictatorships and democracies and the United States of America’s necessity of continuously reaffirming its world leadership, coupled with the anxiety of alliance commitments, were all constants throughout President Clinton’s foreign policy objectives. Indeed, they are perfectly reflected throughout every single one of his foreign policy decisions, especially the Kosovo War which was indeed deserving of a so called humanitarian intervention seeing as it happened at the right time and in the right place.

2.3. Who Needs Domestic Constraints? Ignoring Congress

One would believe that leaders who aren’t authoritarian or semi-authoritarian fully respect their country’s laws, which shape the foreign policy decision making process with regards to a series of foreign policy options-such as declarations of war, for example. Indeed, the Constitution of the United States has divided the federal government into three branches in order to ensure that a certain individual or a certain group doesn’t gain too much decision making power. Whilst the Courts should evaluate laws, the Executive branch should carry out laws and Congress should make laws.

³¹³ Lynch Timothy (2013). *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History*. Oxford University Press.

³¹⁴ Lynch Timothy (2013). *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History*. Oxford University Press.

³¹⁵ Of course, other experts have focused exclusively on state level explanations, arguing that the United States had no interest whatsoever in Rwanda which was perceived to be a small central African country of no particular strategic or economic value.

Amongst the laws which Congress has made lies the War Power Resolution, a federal law which was designed for the specific purpose to limit the President's power to commit the country to war. Indeed, the President may only send the armed forces into action in three cases: if Congress declares war; by statutory authorization; or in the case of a national emergency which is created by an attack upon the country, its territories or possessions or its armed forces³¹⁶.

Therefore, we should assume that when the Clinton administration was evaluating which pathway to take during the Kosovo crisis, it would have taken these legal constraints into account. However, this was not so. President Clinton was heavily committed to the bombing campaign of Yugoslavia even though Congress hadn't declared war, there had been no attack on the United States, there hadn't been any requests of help by an ally under attack and there hadn't been any other type of emergency that would have justified the President's deliberate sidestepping of congressional deliberation³¹⁷.

The fact that Congress should have had a role in deciding whether or not to use force against the Serbs but was nonchalantly brushed off by President Clinton, demonstrates that the President faced very few domestic constraints and would suggest that foreign policy decisions were mostly based on his own ideology and preferences. This point is supported by the fact that, regardless of the other international leaders' personal views and strategies, legislatures in all other NATO countries had to take votes in order to authorize military action in Yugoslavia.

An interesting point is that we should note that in almost all of his speeches, the President used the first person singular when talking about who had decided to take a foreign policy decision, a habit which is quite rare amongst American Presidents. For example, at a news conference a couple of months before the bombings, President Clinton told the press "*yesterday I decided that the United States would vote to give NATO the authority to carry to military strikes against Serbia if President Milosevic continues to defy the international community*"³¹⁸.

³¹⁶ *Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President*. Enacted by the 92nd United States Congress. Effective on the 7th of November 1973. Subsequently codified in the United States Code. Title 50, Chapter 33, Sections 1541-48.

³¹⁷ T. Campbell, *Kosovo: An Unconstitutional War*, Mediterranean Quarterly. 2000.

³¹⁸ President Clinton. *Remarks on the Decision of Certain Health Maintenance Organizations to Opt Out of Some Medicare Markets*. October 8 1998.

Of course, the President did try to justify himself by stating that Congress' approval of a bill funding the operation implicitly constituted congressional authorization of the bombing campaign of Yugoslavia. In reality, this was not even a valid excuse seeing as the War Powers Resolution explicitly stated that funding didn't mean authorization³¹⁹. It is therefore very important to note that sometimes, and even in democracies, certain domestic legislative constraints are, very surprisingly, ignored in favour of actions which certain actors in Hilsman's inner circle decide to take unilaterally and on the basis of their own objectives and constraints.

2.4. The Joys of An Uninterested Public

Professor Walt once stated that "*Americans do not like to think of themselves as practicing realpolitik but they do like being number one*"³²⁰. Still, as Secretary Albright recognized, it's quite difficult to become number one without practicing realpolitik, maintaining the system attributes which one's country has and having the country gain a series of state-related attributes. This would explain why, according to Professor Walt, several polls demonstrate that the public judges Clinton's stewardship of foreign policy to be outstanding³²¹. Indeed, the man was one of the few Presidents of the United States who managed to give the American people the kind of foreign policy interventions which they wanted which excluded boring and useless isolationism and worked in favour of adventurous foreign policies which were neither costly nor international crusades.

Indeed, the American public wasn't as uninterested in foreign policy as to approve of an administration which would wallow in domestic concerns, and wasn't as passionate about foreign policy as to vote politicians who would spend their time solving the whole world's problems. Engaging in too many humanitarian interventions was seen to be completely unnecessary and harmful; engaging in no humanitarian interventions whatsoever was downright dull and Un-American; whilst engaging in a couple of humanitarian interventions provided for an ideal equilibrium seeing as it struck into the American people's classic sense of pride and patriotism.

President Clinton was the President who gave the American public that perfect balance. A new form of cheap hegemony was thus establishing its reign over the country and dictated that foreign policy

³¹⁹ Indeed, the President was challenged on this point by a member of Congress in the Circuit case *Campbell v Clinton*. However the Court found that the question was a non-justiciable political question. Even though the Congress disapproved of the President's behavior, no other successful legal action was taken against Clinton.

³²⁰ Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

³²¹ As we may see in polls conducted by the *Chicago Council on Foreign Relations* according to Schier E. Steven (2000). *The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S Politics*. University of Pittsburgh Press.

interventions were acceptable only if they weren't too costly. This is backed up by Professor Walt's statement that "*Clinton's strategy is hegemony on the cheap because that is the only strategy that the American people are likely to support*³²²." The strategy is of course, typical of an order in which the country is a hyperpower, demonstrating that system and state attributes once again, are relevant.

Indeed, the first thing which we should note is that America's global preponderance and tremendous freedom of action caused most of its citizens to lose interest in foreign policy decision making, right after the Cold War, as demonstrated by a series of surveys³²³. However, a relatively uninterested public opinion makes it easier for foreign policy decision makers to pursue actions freely, without having to respect a series of constraints. Moreover, it increases the possibility to manipulate the public into supporting the foreign policy decision.

Instead of having to practice emergency drills against a potential nuclear strike, duck and cover techniques at work and school and stay up to date with the news in order to act quickly once danger arose—all because of the widespread suspicion that evil communist sleeper agents were roaming the country, citizens could relax in the Post-Cold War atmosphere, and elect a President and a Congress which focused on more pressing domestic issues such as the economy. Still, the ideal candidates couldn't be reluctant to embark on foreign policy adventures which would accomplish feats such as demonstrating that their country was a hyperpower, all while allowing them to reaffirm old alliances and promote the development of multinational military instruments.

Of course, President Clinton knew that public opinion was relatively uninterested in foreign policy issues, which is why he initially decided to focus on domestic issues such as the economy during his first election campaign, as demonstrated by his popular one liner "*it's the economy stupid*³²⁴." The same went for Congress, which was made up by both Democrats and Republicans and had seriously cut the budget allocation for international affairs, demonstrating a preference to focus on domestic policy issues³²⁵.

³²² Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

³²³ For example, a 1998 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations asked Americans which were the main problems which the country was facing. Issues related to foreign policy did not even make the list and once the citizens were asked to name a couple of foreign policy issues the majority's response was "I don't know."

³²⁴ As reported by Michael Kelly, *The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats-Clinton and Bush Compete to Be Champion of Change; Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gain*. The New York Times. Web. 1992.

³²⁵ Of course, Congress members' travel records are not a clear reflection of whether or not they were interested in foreign policy. Still, the following figures indicate that public opinion was completely uninterested that those in power

2.5. An Economically Motivated Intervention?

When the British intervention in the Kosovo War was described as nothing more than economic imperialism, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Robin Cook, smartly quipped “*there is no oil in Kosovo...there is only some dirty lignite*³²⁶.” This statement was rather different than the one pronounced by Clinton’s Secretary of Energy in November 1998. Bill Richardson spelt out his policy on the transport of Caspian oil, suggesting a possible motive for intervening in Kosovo: “*This is about America’s energy security. It’s about preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values. We’re trying to move these newly independent countries towards the West...We’ve made a substantial political investment in the Caspian and it’s very important to us that both the pipeline map (the AMBO pipeline) and the politics come out right*³²⁷.”

Indeed, certain experts have argued that the United States of America’s longstanding obsession with oil and routes through which oil may be transported, along its overzealous attitude towards a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo should not be undermined. Even though the oil reserves present in the Caspian Sea are quite a long way from the Balkans, the routes through which they may pass and arrive to the West are not. Moreover, according to Gokay “*geography makes the Balkans region a key stepping stone to oil interests in Eurasia.*³²⁸”

Moreover, an expansion towards the Balkans could have opened up the potential for the exploration of the large oil reserves of the Caspian Sea. As a bonus, the process of democratisation, which could have only been possible with the removal of Milosevic, would have guaranteed the West with a relatively stable economic partner whom they understood and knew how to deal with better, seeing as more similar values would be shared.

Indeed, as stated by Dr. Knelman, “*a deeper understanding of the Kosovo war lies in the geopolitical policy of the U.S. At the centre of this policy is the U.S need to secure the flow of*

deal with foreign policy issues. Two thirds of the Republicans in Congress did not possess passports and the Republicans ‘majority leader, Richard Armey, had smugly stated that he had no need to visit Europe seeing as he had already been there once. Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

³²⁶ Gokay B (2002). *11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgment*. Routledge.

³²⁷ Stokes Doug (2010). *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*. The John Hopkins University Press.

³²⁸ Gokay B (2002). *11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgment*. Routledge.

*oil*³²⁹.” If these points did motivate American foreign policy decision makers to bomb Yugoslavia, this would prove that national attributes or rather the lack of national attributes, do affect foreign policy decision makers when deciding whether or not to engage in aggressive actions against States. This would also explain why President Clinton closed his eyes with the Rwandan Genocide, with the country being small and practically economically useless and resource-less.

This statement is further supported by a Senior Clinton Official, John Norris, who decided to write a novel which outlined the reasons for which Clinton had decided to intervene in Kosovo, which were more related to economics and politics rather than to humanitarian intervention.

Indeed, the normal yet politically correct American public would have been much less prone to nod vigorously in approval when informed that a military intervention was necessary in Kosovo if they heard the word “oil” than if they heard the words “humanitarian intervention”³³⁰. Interest groups were of course, a whole different matter. As for the Senior Clinton Official’s quote, John Norris wrote in 2005 that “*it was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform, not the plight of the Kosovar Albanians, that best explains NATO’s war*³³¹.”

Moreover, the fact that the United States of America, the self-proclaimed champions of democracy and respect for international institutions, bombed a sovereign country in what many experts³³² describe to be a violation of the United Nations Charter, humanitarian law and the various protocols which govern the conduct of war appears to be excessive. It is highly suspicious that the Clinton administration would have gone to such lengths had there not been higher ranking interests than a benevolent humanitarian intervention.

³²⁹ Knelman Fred H. *Commentary: Kosovo: A Retrospective*. Peace Research. Volume 32, No. 2. May 2000.

³³⁰ Indeed, as stated by the twentieth United States Permanent Representative to NATO, Ivo Daalder, “negotiations led many Kosovo Albanians to believe that violence begets international attention...as time goes by more and more people realize or conclude that the way you get the West involved is to start killing people.” Daalder and O’Hanlon (2001). *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*. Brookings Institution Press.

³³¹ Norris John (2005). *Collision Course*. Praeger.

³³² As recognised by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms’ Judgment. Indeed, its President stated in 1999, with regards to the international response to the Kosovo War, “the norms which should govern a just and peaceful world have been put in place, vide the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Hague and Geneva Conventions and dozens of other human rights and humanitarian law instruments produced by one set of diplomats so another set can violate them. All you have to do is pay attention to your own words.” The quote is available at the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy website, under the heading *Kosovo and the Abolition of War*.

Indeed, the Chinese President, Jiang Xemin, described the bombing campaign as a new form of colonialism through which America was using its economic and military superiority to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in order to expand its influence by, in Yugoslavia's case, expanding eastward and managing to control all of Europe³³³. Indeed, this quote would complement our previous description of an ambitious and unstoppable hyperpower and sits in quite well with the United States of America, a country in which its foreign policy decision makers literally know of no constraints at a system level. Taking advantage of this situation, decision makers' foreign policy is focused on trying to reduce the few domestic constraints which they have by increasing their economic power and political influence.

Of course, the West contested these accusations, repeatedly stating that the war had been the first war for values with Tony Blair describing it as necessary in order *"to avert what would otherwise be a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo"*³³⁴ and a war which consisted in, according to Clinton *"upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace."*³³⁵

However the Trans-Balkan oil pipeline would have passed through Bulgaria Macedonia and Albania, transporting Caspian Sea oil from the Black Sea port of Burgas to the Adriatic at U.S friendly Vlore, ultimately taking the oil refineries to Western powers for a much lower cost than the one present nowadays. It would have thus provided the United States with a secure passage for the oil and gas being extracted in Central Asia.

The US Trade and Development Agency had calculated that, thanks to the route, at least 750,000 barrels a day could be transported which meant roughly, at those past oil prices, about 600 million dollars a month. As the Agency stated one year after the bombing, the scheme would not only *"provide a consistent source of crude oil to American refineries"*³³⁶...but also *"advance the*

³³³ Fredeking Brian (2007). *The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold War*. Routledge. p. 148.

³³⁴ Blair, Tony. *We must act-to save thousands of innocent women and children*. The Guardian, London. Web. 23rd of March 1999.

³³⁵ Clinton, Bill. *Statement on Kosovo*. March 24, 1999.

³³⁶ *US Trade and Development Agency's* paper, May 2000. As reported in Philips John (2004). *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*. IB. Tauris.

*privatization aspirations of the US government in the region*³³⁷” and facilitate “*rapid integration of the Balkans with Western Europe*³³⁸.”

Even though the pipeline wouldn't have directly passed through Yugoslavia, the project would have been impossible to finance if political turmoil was present in the Balkans. This would also explain Russia's opposition to the Kosovo War, with their Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, accusing Washington of economic and political imperialism in a war which tried to usurp Moscow's traditional influence in the region in order to deprive it of the control of the Caspian basin³³⁹.

It is thus self-explanatory why Professor Walt describes Clinton as a master strategist who managed to “*cloak U.S policy in the rhetoric of world order and general global interests, but its defining essence remains the unilateral exercise of power*³⁴⁰.” He states that foreign policy interventions such as the Kosovo War were his greatest achievement seeing as the President managed to perform actions which he presented as necessary for the greater good, but in reality were nothing but imperialistic power calculations.

The same goes for another theory which states that the main reason for American intervention was in order to obtain other kind of natural resources which the country lacked such as lead, zinc, cadmium, silver and gold. Along with 17 billion tons of coal reserves present in Kosovo, all these resources were present in enormous quantities in the country's state owned Stari Trg mining complex which was described as the most valuable piece of real estate in the Balkans. Indeed, it was worth at least five billion dollars and the capacity of the lead and zinc refineries ranked third in the world whilst lignite deposits were sufficient for the next thirteen centuries³⁴¹. According to the

³³⁷ *US Trade and Development Agency's paper, May 2000. As reported in Philips John (2004). Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans. IB. Tauris.*

³³⁸ *US Trade and Development Agency's paper, May 2000. As reported in Philips John (2004). Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans. IB. Tauris.*

³³⁹ Gokay Bulent (2001). *Kosovo: the Politics of Delusion*. Frank Cass publishers.

³⁴⁰ Walt Stephen M. *Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs. Web. March-April 2000.

³⁴¹ As stated by Chris Hedges, the Balkans bureau chief of New York Times in a report written on the 11th of July 1998. Hedges Chris, *Stari Trg journal; Below it All in Kosovo, A War's Glittering Prize*. The New York Times. Web. July 8 1998.

mine's director, Novak Bjelic, "*the war in Kosovo is about the mines, nothing else. This is Serbia's Kuwait-the heart of Kosovo*³⁴²."

Even though we should recognise that a purely economic reasoning when analysing the causes of the Kosovo war-or of any war-would be terribly incomplete, we should consider, based on the previous quotes, statistics and well-supported theories, that economic causes may have indeed played a small role in foreign policy decision making in the Kosovo war. Therefore, this would prove that geographical and economic factors do influence foreign policy decision making when taking a foreign policy decision. Of course, the extent to which they shape the decision may be quite limited in certain cases and more pronounced in others and as for the Kosovo war, the arguments which support the theories of economic imperialism played quite a limited role in deciding whether or not the Clinton administration should intervene in the crisis.

2.6. Not Knowing One's Enemy: Blatantly Disregarding Yugoslavia's Culture And History

Seeing as the use of military force always suggests that diplomacy has gone wrong somewhere, we should try and understand why the negotiations between Western decision-makers and President Milosevic, in their initial phases, went wrong, by taking cultural and historical variables into account and not just decision maker's personalities.

Ever since the Serb defeat at Kosovo Polje in 1389, when Ottoman troops defeated Serb forces thus occupying Kosovo for about four hundred years, retaining Kosovo became central to the entire Serb population in order to define their own national identity. The fact that the Clinton Administration and other Western decision-making administrations failed to understand that when evaluating what level of force should be employed in order to compel President Milosevic to stop the atrocities was an extremely grave error made by decision makers who had not had enough information or capabilities to truly comprehend that Serbian national identity was inextricably linked to Kosovo and that the President would not give it up that easily.

Indeed, the very fact that the West thought that the Serbs would halt their campaign of ethnic cleansing and withdraw from Kosovo after just a couple of days³⁴³ of airstrikes, was what played a fundamental role in deciding that a brief display of airpower was more than enough to win the war.

³⁴² Hedges Chris, *Stari Tng journal; Below it All in Kosovo, A War's Glittering Prize*. The New York Times. Web. July 8 1998.

³⁴³ Charles W. Kegley Jr. (2002). *From War to Peace*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

It is indeed highly unlikely that decision makers would have opted for this relatively soft decision had they known that Milosevic would have intensified his purge of Kosovo during the bombing campaign thus removing 800,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, and that NATO would have had to expend 28,000 munitions on over 37,000 sorties³⁴⁴ before finally accepting the President conceding defeat, seventy-eight days after the air war.

Had Western decision makers known that Operation Allied Force would be not only long-lasting and costly but would also cause hundreds of civilian casualties³⁴⁵ because of the mistaken bombings of refugee camps, hospitals and prisons along with the controversial bombing of the Chinese Embassy and the Radio Television Serbia headquarters bombing, they would have probably thought twice before going ahead with the airstrikes³⁴⁶. Had the decision makers taken into account Yugoslavia's complicated history and culture, they could have come closer to deducing the potential consequences of an air bombing and they would have, most likely, reviewed their decision making process in order to modify their decision.

Indeed, experts Gregory Raymond and Charles Kegely both believe that “*At the heart of the Serbian foundational myth is a sense of continuity between ancient traumas and current events*³⁴⁷.” An interesting point in history regards the Serbian defeat in Kosovo in 1389, which was seen by the Serbian people as a national humiliation which saw the destruction of the bulk of the Serbian army, the death of their beloved Prince³⁴⁸ and the transformation of Serbian municipalities into Ottoman vassals. This is obviously the sort of historical event which has an enormous impact on a population's culture and history thus shaping the future foreign policy decision making process.

³⁴⁴ Josh Wiitala. *Culture and Coercion: Revisiting the Kosovo War*. Small Wars Journal. Web. January 3 2016.

³⁴⁵ A minimum of 489 and a maximum 528 Yugoslav civilians were killed in the NATO airstrikes, according to Krieger, Helke (2001). *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law*. Cambridge University Press. P. 323.

³⁴⁶ This is also why, even though we agree that, as NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said when trying to justify the incidents and casualties caused by NATO forces in the Kosovo War, “there is always a cost to defeat evil” we believe that foreign policy decision makers should ideally opt for the best option possible which would have been, in our opinion, solving the Kosovo Crisis through diplomatic means by softening the negotiation terms. Jamie Shea stated the previous quote in the following article: *Civilian deaths necessary price*. BBC News. Web. May 31 1999.

³⁴⁷ Charles W. Kegley Jr. (2002). *From War to Peace*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

³⁴⁸ Moreover, Prince Lazar of Serbia, who sought to resurrect the Serbian Empire was regarded as a hero, a martyr and a saint throughout Serbian history.

As we have previously explained, we must consider that a nation's culture and history goes both ways: it may affect decision makers themselves, seeing as they are nothing more than a product of their nations' own values and past, and decision makers may decide to contribute to the creation of the nation's history and culture through their foreign policy decisions.

This is exactly what happened in the case of Serbian President Milosevic who, back in 1987, when he was only a communist leader, had passionately told Serbs who lived in the province of Kosovo and complained that they were being hunted away from the place by Kosovar Albanians, to hold on tight and stay in Kosovo in order not to “*shame your ancestors and disappoint your descendants*³⁴⁹.”

Finally, Slobodan Milosevic concluded his encouraging speech by feverishly announcing that “*Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo.*³⁵⁰” Of course, those remarks were met with ardent support by Serbian nationals.

Along with the previously acquired knowledge that Milosevic was a stubborn and ambitious man whose primary concern was power, it is quite likely that a more refined cultural understanding of the situation could have helped decision makers to understand that neither the President nor the Serbs were accommodating weaklings, especially on this matter.

As we may see, Western foreign policy decision makers did not heed Sun Tzu's advice of knowing one's enemy³⁵¹ even though common sense would have required them to try to understand how their adversaries perceived their own interests to be. Understanding their adversaries' culture could have provided Western foreign policy decision makers with a stepping stone thanks to which they could have tried to understand what their enemy's decision calculus could be.

After having analysed which foreign policy responses the adversary could adopt, Western foreign policy decision makers should have decided which pathway to take accordingly. Given the enormous cultural significance of the matter to the Serbs, as we may see through their President's rhetoric, and given the fact that the Rambouillet accords insulted and violated this sacred cultural

³⁴⁹ Charles W. Kegley Jr. (2002). *From War to Peace*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

³⁵⁰ Charles W. Kegley Jr. (2002). *From War to Peace*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

³⁵¹ Sun Tzu (2010). *The Art of War*. Lightning Source Inc.

significance so badly, it doesn't seem that unreasonable that the Yugoslav Government would take the risk of being bombed in order to defend their homeland.

It is worth noting that paradoxically, many scholars believe that the Kumanovo Agreement, which concluded the Kosovo War on the 9th of June 1999, along with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, actually contained softer provisions than the Rambouillet Accords. Indeed, both the Agreement and the UN Resolution recognised the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and refrained from recognising Kosovo as an independent State.

This rather vague formula could have signified that Kosovo could therefore remain part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia³⁵². Therefore, from our perspective, the bombing of Yugoslavia did not make a great deal of sense. If the Clinton Administration had simply proposed a softer treaty but applied more diplomatic pressure during the negotiations phase, a war could have potentially been avoided.

3. Option Three: Unilaterally Using US Force

In early October 1998, President Clinton quietly sent a letter to the Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott regarding the issue of sending military ground forces to Kosovo, promising *"I can assure you that the United States would not support these options"*³⁵³.

Regardless of suggestions of a harsher form of intervention which mostly derived from Secretary Albright, President Clinton always instructed his Administration to merely threaten President Milosevic with the use of force, without however stepping into the Kosovo area unilaterally and militarily. Indeed, the political costs of using ground troops were too high. In order to invade Yugoslavia, at least 200,000 soldiers would be needed for a ground war which would have taken place before a midterm election and in the midst of an impeachment fight, as reported by Clinton's National Security aide in a plan which he presented to the Clinton administration³⁵⁴.

Another reason which would explain the President's cautiousness has to do with domestic and psychological pressures and constrictions. Indeed, starting with domestic pressures, we should

³⁵² Vukovic Sinisa (2015). *International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management*. Routledge Studies in Security and Conflict Management.

³⁵³ As reported in *Peace in Kosovo Depends on Ground Troops*, The Tennessean. Web. Saturday, October 17, 1998.

³⁵⁴ The plan was entitled *Kosovo: Time for Another Endgame Strategy*. Rothkoph David (2006). *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*. Public Affairs.

recognise that an effective and unilateral military intervention requires that the leader of the country leads it with a clear head, confidence and the utmost availability. However, during this period of time, the President was otherwise occupied with the Lewinsky scandal, which made it rather challenging for President Clinton to be that kind of leader.

For example, Clinton spent the first six weeks of 1999 frantically consulting with lawyers and experts seeing as he was on trial in the Senate, following the impeachment by the House on December 19 1998. Seeing as the Senate concluded its twenty one day trial on February 12 1999, it was highly unlikely that the President would have had time and the support by Congress and the Pentagon, to engage the country in an actual war.

Indeed, as for domestic constrictions, not only did President Clinton know without a doubt that Congress would have never allowed American troops to be unilaterally deployed in the conflict in Kosovo, he also suspected that Congress would have never backed the option of deploying NATO ground forces in Kosovo, similar to those deployed, in Bosnia.

As stated by Richard Holbrooke “*given the mood of Congress and the situation in Washington, it was clear that Congress would not support a deployment of NATO ground forces in Kosovo*³⁵⁵.” Moreover, the Pentagon had been resisting military interventions for years as long as the criteria in the Powell Doctrine, which denotes the exhausting of all political, economic, and diplomatic means, before the possibility of the nation resorting to military force, were not met.

The fact that these criteria were, most likely, not respected before the Clinton Administration decided to embark on a NATO led bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, could demonstrate that even after the failure of the Rambouillet Accords there still could have been a possibility to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means. Of course, this theory is purely hypothetical, yet the fact that the subsequent Kumanovo Treaty imposed lighter terms than the ones present in the Rambouillet Agreement shows that the Clinton Administration could have sweetened its tone and suggested stipulating this sort of agreement before the actual bombing of Yugoslavia, thus complying with a hypothetical application of the Powell Doctrine.

³⁵⁵ Public Broadcasting Service’s Frontline Interviews Section: *Interview with Richard Holbrooke*. Public Broadcasting Service. Web. 1995-2014.

Of course, as we have stated previously, President Clinton wasn't terribly interested in respecting the divisions of power with regards to the President and Congress. Still, deciding to actually send American soldiers on the ground in a foreign land would have been criticized much more heavily and severely challenged legally. Intervening through the use of air strikes along with a multilateral force was different and Congress didn't particularly complain when they hadn't been involved in the decision making procedure, even though they definitely weren't happy about it.

However, it is likely that even if those domestic constraints hadn't been in place, the Clinton administration would still never have intervened unilaterally and on the ground. Indeed, Wittkopf classifies American Presidents who do not completely opt for the American primacy strategy, as civilian nonveterans who prefer a limited kind of intervention instead of escalating the conflict to a full scale intervention, which is exactly the sort of person President Clinton was³⁵⁶.

This strategy sits well with Selective engagement which was, as we have suggested previously, Clinton's kind of Grand Strategy. Indeed, in the light of his Grand Strategy, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia did seem to be the most convenient option which the Clinton Administration had: the reasons behind the intervention weren't too benevolent to be associated to Wilsonian liberalism and weren't too radical to be associated to the idea of American primacy.

Moreover, according to Wittkopf, the preference of limited intervention will prevail regardless of the goals of the military operation, which may very well be realpolitik issues, interventionist issues or humanitarian issues³⁵⁷.

3.1. Past Experiences And The Fear of Failure

An important point regards that American foreign policy decision makers' experience with other conflicts and psychological variable were too strong for there to be a true, unanimous possibility of an actual unilateral military intervention. Indeed the so called Vietnam syndrome highly discouraged presidents from using military force abroad , for fear of being involved in another long, costly and disastrous conflict similar to that in Vietnam which derived from the boots on the ground approach.

³⁵⁶ Wittkopf Eugene R (2003). *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

³⁵⁷ Wittkopf Eugene R (2003). *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

It had left traumatising impressions on the minds of the originally unsuspecting public opinion, on the humiliated military personnel, on a furious Congress and of course on the minds of new coming political leaders. Indeed, according to Dumbrell, Clinton had been so exposed to the Vietnam War in his early years and on a personal level, that once he became President his foreign policy outlook was formed mainly by the failures in Vietnam, which demonstrated that America should never intervene in areas far removed from its core interests. This demonstrates that, as individuals, foreign policy decision makers' psychological attributes which play a role in shaping their decisions derive from personal experience as well.

This would explain why the Clinton Administration decided not to opt for this option, with historian Niall Ferguson supporting this claim by stating "*it is well known that the Clinton Administration's attitude was determined, as usual, by the fear of American casualties*³⁵⁸."

The fact that President Clinton was supported by his Defense Secretary, William Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus the highest ranking military officer in the country, Hugh Shelton, demonstrates that not even military men, who are usually way more prone towards a military intervention as recognized by Wittkopf, did not support a unilateral military intervention.

More recently, a shocking incident had taken place in Somalia in 1993 and according to Halbestram³⁵⁹ this was the main reason for which Clinton decided not to launch unilateral military actions right before the national midterm elections in November 1998. The shooting down of the Blackhawk helicopter by Somali rebels and the international humiliation which the newly elected President went through when a video of a U.S crew member's body being gleefully and disrespectfully dragged by the rebels and the locals through the streets of Mogadishu surfaced online. The unfortunate event was a horrible experience which the Clinton Administration never wanted to risk repeating again.

The failures in Somalia were also the main reason for which, according to certain scholars, Clinton decided not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide which followed the Somalian incident. Indeed, according to the US' former deputy special envoy to Somalia, "*the ghosts of Somalia continue to*

³⁵⁸ Niall Ferguson, (2005). *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*. Penguin Books.

³⁵⁹ Halbestram David (2001). *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and The Generals*. Scribner.

*haunt US policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again.*³⁶⁰”

This demonstrates that analogical thinking was indeed a constant for President Clinton and particularly shaped his foreign policy decisions, as was his obsession with public opinion which definitely was opposed to sending ground troops.³⁶¹ The high degree of influence which psychological variables had on the leader may of course be attributed to his lack of expertise in the foreign policy field, which rendered him more dependent on his ideologies and public opinion, advisors and domestic variables, and own psychological attributes-all under the shadow of the necessity to maintain American hegemony.

3.2. The Attitude Towards Risk-Taking

Diplomat Richard Haass once stated that President Clinton was only willing to intervene in a foreign crisis “*when the domestic political cost of standing aloof exceeds the cost of a carefully staged and limited operation*”³⁶².

As stated by McDermott and Kugler³⁶³, the attitude towards risk-taking varies depending on the situation which the decision maker finds himself in. Even though President Clinton may be described as a risk taker with regards to the military actions which he took in Bosnia, he most definitely decided to play on the safer side with regards to the military actions which he took in Kosovo after a couple of years.

Indeed, during the Kosovo war, President Clinton’s approach was quite cautious and he was reluctant to make foreign policy decisions which were too ambitious. As we have stated previously, this is recognized by the fact that despite numerous inter-alliance disagreements and influential

³⁶⁰ As stated by Walter Clarke in *Ambush in Mogadishu: Transcript*. PBS. Retrieved October 27, 2009.

³⁶¹ For example, a Gallup poll conducted on March 25 1999 asked the question “If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective in achieving the United States’ objectives in Kosovo, would you favor or oppose President Clinton sending U.S. ground troops into the region to stop the Serbian attacks on Kosovo?” and 65% were opposed to the matter.

³⁶² R. N. Haass, *The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More from the Commander-in-Chief*. Foreign Affairs. Web. 2000. p.139.

³⁶³ McDermott and Kugler. *Comparing Rational Choice and prospect Theory Analyses: The US Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm*. Available at Professor’s Jonathan Renshon’s own personal website. Web. 2004.

advisors' advice, Clinton decided to only opt for an air campaign in Kosovo, even though he could have and was seriously encouraged by both allies and advisors to take far more radical options.

According to this prospective theory of risk taking, much depends on the political context which the decision maker is in, rather than the assumption that individuals have individual characteristics or a certain personality which predispose them to take or avoid risks. The latter theory would fall under the standard conception of the risk orientation theory but we will analyse McDermott and Kugler's theory for the time being, especially because the political risks between militarily intervening in the war in Bosnia and in the one in Kosovo were very different.

If we start with Bosnia, we'll observe that President Clinton's behaviour was quite self-confident and occasionally brazen. For example, regardless of the fact that Republicans, who held the majority in Congress, were against the decision, the Clinton administration agreed to assign 20,000 US troops to act as peacekeepers in Bosnia once the Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed. According to Halbestram, the reasons for President Clinton's rather audacious approach towards Bosnia have to do with the fact that the decision to intervene in Bosnia was taken during the re-election campaign which is when a President has a lot to gain and not much to lose and indeed President Clinton had a lot to gain if the campaign in Bosnia was a success but wouldn't have had much to lose.

On the contrary, with regards to Kosovo, seeing as the President had already been re-elected, a success wouldn't have been that beneficial in political terms but would have been disastrous if the situation had deteriorated. Therefore, even though the public opinion was much more favourable with regards to the presence of American troops in Kosovo than they had been with regards to the presence of American troops in Bosnia³⁶⁴ the President was much more cautious, opting for the NATO intervention strategy and even then, taking a series of strategies in order to avoid casualties. It is interesting to note that many analysts state that the so called CNN effect does not apply in the Kosovo case with regards to an accompanying use of ground forces once the bombing campaign had already started. As for the definition of the theory, it recognises that foreign policy decision making is heavily influenced by the role of the media thus according to Professor Livingston, the media acts as a policy agenda-setting agent or as an impediment towards reaching the foreign policy decision makers' original objectives or as a factor which speeds up a certain foreign policy

³⁶⁴ Ciot Melania-Gabriela. *Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Web. 2014.

decision³⁶⁵. Thus we may assume that, on the basis of this theory, after the horrifying images of Albanian Kosovars being subjected to ferocious retaliations in response to NATO's air campaign were published, Washington would have stepped up its intervention and sent in ground troops to prevent or at least diminish the attacks on an innocent population.

Yet, as analysed by a series of foreign policy researchers, this was not the case. Indeed, Professor Robinson recognises that *"the case represents one instance in which it appears that extensive news media coverage of a humanitarian crisis ran alongside policy-makers failing to respond to critical coverage."*³⁶⁶ This proves that the previously analysed factors which persuaded President Clinton's administration not to opt for the ground force option, were so strong that they induced President Clinton not to unilaterally intervene militarily even when the genocide was at its peak. Indeed, Professor Robinson backs up our points by stating that *"in the context of politically risky and high level decisions regarding the use of force policy makers are likely to be driven by concerns other than media pressure"*³⁶⁷.

4. Option Four: Doing Nothing

On the 24th of March 1999, President Clinton walked towards the White House podium to announce that US-led airstrikes against Yugoslavia had begun and stated *"I am convinced that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not acting"*³⁶⁸. The Clinton strategy was rather simple. It consisted in employing hard diplomacy and substituting it with a multilateral force when it failed. It would prove to be effective, yet certain doubts emerge on whether the foreign policy decision making process during the diplomatic negotiations genuinely failed due to human error, or intentionally failed, due to secret ambitions.

It is curious to note that during President Clinton's second mandate, American decision makers were irrationally keen to get involved in the Kosovo crisis. Considering that the NATO bombing commenced on the basis of the lack of an agreement during the Rambouillet Accords, we should analyse very carefully what a former hand on the State Department's Yugoslavia desk, George Kenney, reported in May 1999. He stated that, with regards to the Rambouillet Accords, a Senior

³⁶⁵ Livingston, Steven. *Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of military Intervention*. Joan Shorenstein Center. Web. Research Paper R-18, June 1997.

³⁶⁶ Robinson Piers (2002). *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*. Routledge.

³⁶⁷ Robinson Piers, Media as a Driving Force in International Politics: The CNN Effect and Related Debates, E-International Relations. Web. 2013.

³⁶⁸ President Clinton, *Statement on Kosovo* speech on March 24, 1999.

State Department Official had told journalists, off the record, that “*we deliberately set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept. They need some bombing and that’s what they’re going to get*³⁶⁹”

It is also worth noting that Henry Kissinger himself had described the Rambouillet text as “*a provocation, an excuse to start bombing...a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.*³⁷⁰” Historian Christopher Clark has even stated that the terms of the 1914 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia appeared more lenient compared to what NATO demanded President Milosevic to accept in the Rambouillet Accords³⁷¹.

The fact that NATO started bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis that negotiations had failed even though the previous day the Serbian assembly had hurried to accept the principle of autonomy for Kosovo while rejecting a NATO troop presence³⁷² seems to prove that these criticisms are correct.

During the negotiations phase, the conflict was thus avoidable but Clinton’s unintentional or even deliberate mishandling of the situation was what provoked the decision making process to steer in the pathway towards warfare.

Another interesting point which regards international military alliances and organisations is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation bombed a sovereign nation without the approval of the United Nations for the first time in history. Seeing as NATO itself is an intergovernmental organisation, we must try and understand who the colossal driving force behind this unparalleled and controversial NATO intervention was.

Considering that almost all European, African and Asian countries had mixed or negative reactions towards the bombing campaign and that the United States of America was the sole unipole powerful and influential enough to be the driving force behind the campaign, we do not deem it necessary to find further proof that doing nothing was not on the list for the Clinton administration.

³⁶⁹ Kenney, George *Rolling Thunder: The Rerun*. The Nation. Web. 27 May 1999.

³⁷⁰ Henry Kissinger as reported in the following book: Whetham Bradley (2015). *Responsibilities to Protect: Perspectives in Theory and Practice*. Brill Nijhoff.

³⁷¹ Clark, Christopher (2012). *The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went To War In 1914*. London: Allen Lane. p. 456-457

³⁷² As recognized in Ken Booth (2001). *The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions*. Frank Cass.

The question which we should ask ourselves however, is why President Clinton's administration focused so much on a crisis which seemed to be so faraway and relatively unimportant for the country, an issue which for most of the American public was unheard of.

Discovering the true reasons through which decision makers in the decision making process concluded that a military intervention in Kosovo was the best and only foreign policy option which they could take will be the object of our analysis. Heroically announcing that a just and powerful democracy would sacrifice part of its economic and military power in order to overthrow an evil dictator is a scenario too picturesque for our liking.

4.1. The Role and Motivations of Advisors: Madeleine's War

Professor Mintz recognises that "*war and peace decisions are rooted not only in international politics but also in considerations of domestic politics*³⁷³." Indeed, as recognized by Bueno de Mosquita³⁷⁴, decisions to use force depend on a combination of domestic and international factors:

(1) before using force abroad, decision makers must evaluate the domestic consequences of the matter, (2) leaders must take into account military strategic considerations such as projected casualties, geography and military capabilities.

Advisors are those who are going to have to present the President with information regarding those issues thus becoming a crucial factor in the Administration's decision making process. Even though all advisors rank in what Roger Hilsman described to be as the inner circle in the decision making process, as we previously described, we should consider that some advisors may be more influential than others.

It is obvious that Secretary Albright was a very influential figure in the decision making process which led to the Kosovo War seeing as she was the President's chief foreign policy advisor. Whilst in the first stage of President Clinton's decision making process she convinced him that he could not ignore the crisis and helped him narrow down the options, in the second stage, once the negotiations had failed, she was the primary architect behind the use of airstrikes. Without her presence, it is highly likely that the President, otherwise occupied with internal issues, would have

³⁷³ R.A.W.Rhodes (2014). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*. Oxford University Press.

³⁷⁴ Quackenbusch Stephen. *Use of Force in Foreign Policy*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia. Web. 2017

simply followed Sandy Berger's³⁷⁵ more cautious approach and not opted for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia option.

A rather amusing example of high ranking military men trying to avoid Madeleine Albright's hawkishness was when General Clark presented to the "dovish"³⁷⁶ Secretary of the Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff a document on the challenges in Kosovo and the possibilities for the future use of ground forces. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Joe Ratson, told General Clark "*we can't deal with any more problems and the Secretary (Cohen) is concerned that Madeleine Albright might get a copy of this*"³⁷⁷.

Trying to avoid that the Secretary of State herself obtains valuable documents may indicate that something wasn't quite right in the Clinton Administration's decision making process and that many feared the degree of power and influence which the Secretary had. However, grumpily hiding information from a trigger-happy colleague is not the same as stating that the Kosovo war was nothing more than Madeleine's war, single-handedly promoted and handled by the Secretary of State herself.

Of course, Secretary Albright's role in the decision making process was unmistakably significant. Indeed, she was the foreign policy advisor who proposed the coercive diplomacy strategy backed by air support, after having proposed countless other strategies which were deemed to be too aggressive. Indeed, the Secretary believed that the only language Milosevic would respond to was firm action³⁷⁸ and thus desired to opt for tough options when trying to counter Milosevic.

Whilst President Clinton was meeting with his lawyers, on the 19th of January 1999 thus three days after the highly publicized Racak massacre, Secretary Albright presented the final version of the plan which would be enacted. Even though Sandy Berger, Secretary Cohen and General Hugh Shelton were all initially opposed to the plan, they finally agreed to send it to the President, who accepted it seeing as no other viable alternatives had been proposed. This moment is described as

³⁷⁵ Sandy Berger was the National Security Advisor under the Clinton Presidency from 1997 until 2001 and before that he was president Clinton's Deputy National Security Advisor.

³⁷⁶ Halbestram David (2001). *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and The Generals*. Scribner.p. 377.

³⁷⁷ Quoted in Clark (2002), *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*. Public Affairs.

³⁷⁸ Albright (2013), *Madam Secretary*, Harper Perennial. p. 381

the point “*at which Secretary Albright began to assert her greatest influence over the foreign policy making process*³⁷⁹.”

It was thus obvious that President Clinton valued her hawkish advice³⁸⁰ enormously, and her arguments in favour of a more interventionist policy motivated by a humanitarian justification definitely took their toll on the decision making process, at least on the outside, when President Clinton presented the justifications for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

Along with General Clark, she was the only true supporter of a ground troop intervention even though all the rest of the Clinton Administration blatantly and fearfully opposed the suggestion. Moreover, given her personal past and the determination with which she sought to remove Milosevic from power, we should note that the Secretary was probably the only figure who truly and genuinely desired to use military force in Kosovo for the sole aim of humanitarian intervention.

Moreover it is hardly surprising that with the President occupied in the Lewinsky scandal which had turned into a media circus since February 1998, and with the upcoming U.S national elections in November 1998, President Clinton must have delegated tasks which the public was least interested in thus foreign policy decisions, to his most trusted advisors. One of the President’s political advisors remarked “*I hardly remember Kosovo in political discussions. It was all impeachment, impeachment, impeachment. There was nothing else*³⁸¹.”

Secretary Albright was the only advisor who took it upon herself to take control of the steering wheel and drive through the decision making process which led the Clinton Administration to embark on the Kosovo War. Indeed, no other advisor was so passionate and determined to find a solution to the Kosovo Conflict. Moreover, Hollis and Smith’ study finds that advisers tend to have greater influence over foreign policy decision making when their leaders are distracted by other pressing domestic scandals, which proves that with President Clinton being otherwise occupied, Secretary Albright had been provided with a convenient opportunity for establishing her dominion in a foreign policy action which only she kept alive.

³⁷⁹ Redd Steven B. *The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo*. International Studies Perspectives. Web. 2005.

³⁸⁰ However, President Clinton had a series of other advisors as well, and only the Secretary of State, General Clark and to a certain extent Vice President Al Gore, had been, at a certain point in time, in favour of employing a more drastic type of military force than airstrikes along with a multilateral coalition.

³⁸¹ Art Robert J. (2003) *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Therefore, it was the Secretary who managed the Kosovo crisis during this period of time, ensuring that the NATO members who intervened in Kosovo remained unified and trying to keep the Russians on board. Mistakes were made of course, with Secretary Albright opting for the airstrike option because she was convinced that after a few nights of air strikes Milosevic would capitulate. Indeed, when the bombing began, Albright stated *“I think this (success) is achievable within a relatively short period of time³⁸².”*

Her determination to employ aggressive tactics may be explained, according to The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History, by analysing her own personal history. Indeed, *“the influences on Albright’s life...the lessons of her mentors...her family’s experience...her family’s defecting to the United States...resulted in a pragmatic, decisive and tough approach to diplomacy and the same influences fostered a formidable critique of appeasement, inaction and human rights violations³⁸³.”*

Further proof that this decision maker’s personal experience definitely shaped her foreign policy, is the fact that the Czech-born Secretary of State excessively used the Munich analogy, desiring to deal with Milosevic immediately and severely³⁸⁴ in order to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

Indeed, Secretary Albright was probably heavily influenced by the fact that she had been forced to live in exile, along with her family, following the 1938 Munich Agreement and subsequent Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. Thus, Madeleine Albright was, in her own words, a doer who arduously opposed appeasement. This would explain her following quote *“at some stage negotiations become appeasement³⁸⁵”* and her disdain for pursuing further negotiations *“while Milosevic was torching a village a day³⁸⁶.”*

As we may deduce, we did well to analyse foreign policy decision making by taking singular decision makers into consideration instead of considering the State to be a unitary actor. All foreign

³⁸² Daalder and O’Hanlon (2001). *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*. Brookings Institution Press.

³⁸³ Lynch Timothy (2013). *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of American Military and Diplomatic History*. Oxford University Press.

³⁸⁴ Albright (2013), *Madam Secretary*, Harper Perennial p. 389.

³⁸⁵ Albright (2013), *Madam Secretary*, Harper Perennial

³⁸⁶ Albright (2013), *Madam Secretary*, Harper Perennial

policy decision makers are indeed human beings whose views, preferences and outlooks have all been shaped by their personal experience and history.

However, we should consider that President Clinton did not let Secretary Albright completely have her way or the United States of America would have sent ground troops in Kosovo. Indeed, several scholars and journalists have described her as *“a cold warrior lost in the wrong decade, habitually casting foreign policy flare up as challenges to U.S. might”*³⁸⁷. As for her influence on President Clinton Hirsh described their relationship as *“again and again, she has tried to pull her boss Bill Clinton-who is nothing if not equivocating- in a more aggressive direction only to look over her shoulder and find he’s not there”*³⁸⁸.

Of course, the fact that Secretary Albright had tried to promote, since the start, a hard-hitting strategy forced the softer Clinton administration to set the bar up higher in order to find some sort of middle ground strategy which suited all. Indeed, other high ranking advisors such as Sandy Berger tried to convince the President not to opt for the airstrikes option, and were opposed to even threatening Milosevic with the use of force.

4.2. Manipulating the Public Opinion Through Analogical Thinking

We have already analysed why, at least on a public level, foreign policy decision makers decided to persuade and promote the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo War. The official justification was humanitarian reasons, as stated by President Clinton when he addressed the nation on the Yugoslavia strike in 1999 *“My fellow Americans, today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces...we have acted with resolve for several reasons. We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo...We are upholding our values...Advancing the cause of peace...Right now firmness is the only hope of the people of Kosovo”*³⁸⁹.

Therefore, it would be interesting to discover how President Clinton managed to convince the American public opinion that a military intervention was in everyone’s best interests. Of course, analogies were used in order to convince the uninterested American public of the rampant cruelty of the acts performed by Serbian forces against the Kosovars and of the absolute necessity to

³⁸⁷ Hirsh Michael. *Albright’s Old World Ways*. Newsweek. Web. 1999.

³⁸⁸ Hirsh Michael. *Albright’s Old World Ways*. Newsweek. Web. 1999.

³⁸⁹ *Transcript: Clinton addresses nation on Yugoslavia strike*. March 24, 1999.

intervene militarily to stop these acts of savagery. It looks like President Clinton almost enjoyed wildly yet craftily backing the military intervention up by using the previously mentioned Munich analogy at every important public speech which had to do with the Kosovo war ³⁹⁰.

It is also worth noting that it was the Secretary of State who had first employed the analogy in order to convince the President that stopping President Milosevic immediately was necessary or the situation would have even deteriorated further, possibly provoking widespread disorder across Europe. It is therefore not surprising that, through the constant repetition of these claims, President Clinton may have very well come to believe the analogy to be true himself, or would have at least used it to influence the public.

Going back to President Clinton, his comparison of the killings of the Kosovars to the Holocaust was a very practical move, as demonstrated by the speech which he gave on May 13 1999, shortly after that American armed forces had joined their NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces: *“Today, he (President Milosevic) uses repression and censorship at home to stifle dissent and to conceal what he is doing in Kosovo. Though his ethnic cleansing is not the same as the ethnic extermination of the Holocaust, the two are related; both vicious, premeditated, systematic oppression fuelled by religious and ethnic hatred³⁹¹.”*

Simplifying the ethnic and religious strife which had long been present in the Balkans by putting the blame on a single leader was also an intelligent move. Going through the Balkans’ history and analysing the social, economic and political causes for which the region was in such disarray was obviously not an attractive alternative. Allowing the American public to immediately understand who the enemy was along with the reasons for which he must be defeated was, on the contrary, a sharp and effective strategy.

Finger pointing is indeed one of the favourite tactics which most foreign policy decision makers employ in order to allow an uninformed and potentially hostile public to vent their anger and outrage on one single individual. Rhetorically asking, *“Think the Germans would have perpetrated*

³⁹⁰ *Transcript: Clinton addresses nation on Yugoslavia strike.* March 24, 1999: “All the ingredients for a major war are there. Ancient grievances, struggling democracies and in the centre of it all, a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing...but start new wars...Sarajevo, the capital of neighbouring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region... Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved? How many Americans would not have had to die?”

³⁹¹ *Transcript: Clinton justifies US involvement in Kosovo.* May 13 1999

the Holocaust on their own without Hitler? Was there something in the history of the German race that made them do this? No” is a terribly simple and straightforward way of facing an extremely complicated and controversial question³⁹².

Benevolently announcing that barbaric foreign policy decision makers may actively promote heinous acts such as genocide is an effortless oversimplification as well: *“political leaders do this kind of thing (promote genocide)...We got to-we got to get straight about this. This is something political leaders do. And if people make decisions to do these kind of things other people can make decisions to stop them*³⁹³.”

³⁹² This is a question which we ourselves have tried to answer in previous chapters. We feel it is necessary to state, once more, that along with several other characteristics, history and culture play an extremely important role in taking a foreign policy decision which-in democracies, authoritarian and semi authoritarian regimes alike-must always be supported, to a certain degree, by the population.

³⁹³ *Transcript: Clinton justifies US involvement in Kosovo*. May 13 1999

CONCLUSION

Throughout the course of this essay we have managed to evaluate, from the viewpoint of a multi-level analysis, the main factors which affect foreign policy decision making in order to understand and predict which actions foreign policy decision makers may take. We have also analysed a remarkably curious case study which provided the perfect excuse for exploring the role which certain variables play in the decision making process.

With regards to the Kosovo War, after having successfully proven and established that a principled concern was not the sole driving force behind the decision making process which led President Clinton and his Administration to opt for the “NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia Option”, we have come to conclusion that even though international, domestic and individual aspects of everyday politics shape foreign policy decision making, all variables play an equally important role.

We have thus proved that a multi-level analysis is the best type of theoretical work which one should employ when analysing foreign policy decisions seeing as, even though in certain contexts some factors may sometimes affect the decision making process more than others, taking all of them into account is absolutely necessary and facilitates the comprehension of the matter enormously.

Once we applied this concept to several brief case studies and in particular to the Kosovo War, we found that the theory does indeed concur with the case. As a matter of fact, we have found that the primary factors which shaped American foreign policy decision making in the crisis are to be linked both to a series of strategic considerations and to a series of unintentional influences on the decision making process. Indeed, with regards to the strategic considerations, we have evaluated the need to preserve System and State Attributes by making the most of them through a quite rapid, generally popular, conveniently distracting and relatively cheap foreign policy intervention. As for unintentional influences, we have assessed variables such as Psychological and Cultural and Historical Attributes, which eliminated the “Diplomacy Option”, blindfolded the Administration’s eyes and led them towards the path to war thus proving that an excessive dependence on certain factors may lead to disaster.

Of course, the “Unilaterally Using U.S Force” and “Doing Nothing” Options were not feasible for reasons related to bureaucratic domestic constraints present in democracies and a heavy use of

analogical thinking with regards to the former option and with regards to the latter option, for reasons related to the maintenance of American hegemony and the fortification of alliances.

Moreover we have found out that, quite surprisingly, a foreign decision maker's response, no matter how small or insignificant his country may be, could have a tremendous impact on an economic, political and military superpower and might even force the superpower's decision makers to change paths. Indeed, we have clearly demonstrated how Milosevic's unwillingness to realise the tricky situation which he was in and the influence of hawkish advisors in the decision making process forced the Clinton Administration into eliminating the first, more natural and peaceful alternative, with the words "*at some stage negotiations become appeasement*"³⁹⁴ echoing into the Administration's minds, proving once again that analogical thinking is extremely dangerous and uncalled for.

We have also discussed the difference between a foreign policy which aims to maintain the status quo and one which wishes to change it. After finding out that only satisfied States try their very best to keep the situation as it is whilst ambitious, expansionist or vindictive States are those who try to change it, it should come as no surprise that another likely motivation of American interventionism during the Kosovo war had to do with the fact that in order to promote its global leadership role after the end of the Cold War, America had to preserve and boost its credibility. Indeed, this is demonstrated by President Clinton's constant belief that "*foreign policy is domestic policy*"³⁹⁵.

Moreover, the idea that preserving European stability was necessary contributed towards eliminating the "Diplomacy option" and proved to Europe that the United States of America was the only country which could keep it safe, thus making it yearn for the well-established and persuasive American hegemony, as we may see in Clinton's statement "*we act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results.*"³⁹⁶

On the other hand, trying to anticipate the response of one's enemies by stepping in their shoes, taking in consideration the foreign decision makers' personalities, culture and history, is an intelligent foreign policy strategy which American decision makers so often ignore. Had they made

³⁹⁴ Albright Madeleine (2003). *Madam Secretary: A memoir*. New York: Pan Books.

³⁹⁵ Klein (2003). *The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton*. Broadway Books.

³⁹⁶ President Clinton. *Statement on Kosovo*. March 24, 1999.

an effort to truly comprehend the motives behind the vast scale of atrocities being committed in Kosovo and President Milosevic's own foreign policy options, it is highly likely that diplomacy and negotiations could have worked.

Yet, as we have previously analysed, the Clinton Administration decided to fall back on well-known terrain, oversimplifying the crisis and viewing it as similar ones before it, believing that nothing had changed and that their approach to the matter should be the same. Seeing as bad diplomacy often leads to war, it is not surprising that President Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet Agreements- even though this was a fatal error on his part due to the lack of his country's ability to afford such a bold action. This also outlines just how much a decision maker's personality, be it narcissistic or delusional, cowardly or excessively over confident, may have dreadful consequences on his own country and the rest of the world.

Still, we have found out that the line between what we may consider to be foreign policy mistakes and foreign policy failures is particularly thick when it comes to world superpowers who may thus very well afford to make a couple of faux pas. Their errors usually derive from over-confidence in solving crises, miscalculations caused by a lack of information, irrationality and pure inertia or overestimates and underestimates which are usually based on the decision maker's personal attitude towards the matter, thus demonstrating the necessity of a multi-level analysis.

Indeed, even though we believe that all conflicts should best be solved through diplomacy, Robert Pape describes the case that best supports the arguments of airpower proponents as the NATO Campaign in Yugoslavia³⁹⁷, thus demonstrating that the pathway which the Clinton Administration followed after the failure of negotiations did have its rewards and was an efficient foreign policy option, even though President Milosevic's capitulation was not imminent and the prolonged campaign increased the violence and chaos in Kosovo.

Moreover, the Clinton Administration was particularly insightful when deciding not to embark on a full scale war which could indeed risk being a repetition of the Vietnam War due to Kosovo's

³⁹⁷ Moreover, the political scientist recognizes that the bombing campaign option was the most convenient alternative which the Clinton Administration could have taken, stating that "Regardless of whether airpower is an effective independent instrument of coercion, it is much less costly for the unipole in both human and political terms to employ airpower and similar operations than to employ ground troops." Pape Robert (1996). *Bombing to Win*. Cornell University Press.

location and geography, the lack of support which Americans would have had in the region, and an extremely negative public opinion. Indeed whilst domestic constraints relative to the option which the Administration followed were quite scarce, due to the limited nature of the intervention, a more aggressive stance would have attracted both Congress' and the public's hostility thus proving that analysing the general public's stance when determining the reasons behind a foreign policy action is terribly useful in democracies.

As for the "Doing Nothing" option, we have evaluated how American hegemony and interventionism is indeed subjected to cherry-picking the conflicts which they'll play a part in based on political, domestic and personal variables related to the Administration in charge. Regardless of the shady reasons or wrong methods which the Clinton Administration employed when coming to the conclusion that these last two options were not to be employed, we should consider that the fact that they were deemed to be unwanted was a wise foreign policy decision indeed which kept American decision makers from straying on an even more tragic path.

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